The private market and the process of lower income urbanization in Colombia : the pirate housing submarket of Medellín (with related analysis of the pirate submarket of Bogotá. by Blaesser, Brian William
THE PRIVATE MARKET AND THE PROCESS OF LOWER INCOME URBANIZATION
IN COLOMBIA: THE PIRATE HOUSING SUBMARKET OF MEDELLIN
(With Related Analysis of the Pirate Submarket of Bogota)
by
BRIAN WILLIAM BLAESSER
A.B., Brown University
(1969)
J.D., Boston College Law School
(1979)
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June, 1979
O Brian William Blaesser 1979
Signature of the Author . . .
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
May 17, 1979
Certified by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Profe or Lisa Redfield Peattie
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by .- Professor Ralch Gakenheimer
M HUSTS INSTITUTE Chairman, Departmental Commi ttee
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT ro 1979
LIBRARIES
Z.*'2) / ') i)
The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income Urbanization
in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin
(With Related Analysis of the Pirate Submarket of Bogota)
by
Brian William Blaesser
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 17, 1979 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Master of City Planning
ABSTRACT
The demand for housing in developing countries of South America has been
met primarily by the private sector through various "submarkets" of
which the squatter or land invasion settlement is the most well-documented
example. Another "submarket" which has received less study is the market
for the purchase of plots of land on the urban periphery of many South
American cities by lower income families. This submarket, unlike
"squatting" involves an actual purchase and sale transaction between
lower income purchasers and subdividers. As a result, the individual
purchasers usually obtain apparent (though often defective) proof of
title to their plots of land; however, the subdivisions or settlements
which result nevertheless are illegal because they occur "clandestinely"
in violation of municipal regulations for subdivision approval and also
violate zoning laws and service provision requirements. Such subdivisions
typically enable the pirate subdivider to realize a very high profit
while externalizing the costs of providing the necessary service
infrastructure upon municipal governments.
In Colombia, this submarket is known as the "pirate" submarket and
accounts for a significant portion of the lower income settlements in
such cities as Bogota and Medellin. This thesis analyzes the pirate
submarket and its settlements in Medellin from an economic, legal and
institutional perspective through the use of two case studies as well
as reports and other documents available in municipal offices. Where
appropriate, comparisons to the pirate submarket of Bogota, as described
in existing research, are made. The analysis traces the growth and
persistence of the phenomenon of pirate settlements in Medellin in terms
of various structural factors and compares the housing solution offered
by the pirate submarket with those offered by alternative "legal" submarkets,
particularly the government sponsored housing submarket.
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It is suggested that under conditions of rapid urbanization, MedellIn's
rigid urban perimeter policy and high technical standards for land
classification, subdivision and the provision of services, increased
the cost of land dramatically within the urban perimeter, and helped
foster the market behavior of pirate subdividers; the latter responded
to the demand by lower income families for cheaper land on the urban
periphery by clandestinely creating subdivisions and selling unserviced
lots. Although the limited land supply within Medellin and the effective-
ness of criminal sanctions against pirate subdivisions have greatly reduced
the rate of pirate subdividing in Medellin, it is concluded that smaller
pirate settlements continue to occur in the semi-rural areas surrounding
Medellin. The persistence of the pirate submarket is explained by the
inability of alternative housing submarkets to effectively compete with
the pirate housing solution. The latter provides access to a plot of land
which appreciates over time as well as the attributes of spatial
flexibility and economic feasibility, that is, the opportunity to build
or expand the housing structure incrementally, and an installment purchase
and sale arrangement suited in amount and number of payments to the lower
income family's economic needs. The solutions offered by alternative
housing submarkets in Medellin have usually lacked one or both of these
attributes.
The thesis concludes that the "market" solution offered lower income
families through pirate subdividing could potentially satisfy public
policy concerns, particularly with respect to infrastructure costs, provided
adjustments are made in the legal-institutional framework which controls the
land subdivision process as well as lower income families' access to land
and housing. Evaluation is made of existing and proposed modifications in
that framework, particularly with respect to the subdivision approval
process and related standards, regulations governing the subdivision
business, and the credit requirements of conventional financing institutions.
Thesis Advisor: Lisa Redfield Peattie, Ph.D.
Professor
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rapid urbanization which has characterized the development of most
countries in South America since World War II has resulted in severe
housing shortages in almost every city, in particular for lower income
families. Despite the establishment of various government housing pro-
grams in response to the demand for housing, the largest supply of housing
has come from the private sector through various "submarkets." These sub-
markets supply housing solutions that provide various levels of physical
quality and legal tenure to lower income families. Perhaps the best docu-
mented "submarket" of this type is that of squatter settlements which are
the result of the illegal occupation or "invasion" by lower income families-
of urban land belonging to others. The housing settlements which result
usually lack the physical infrastructure of roads; water, sewers and
electricity as well as legal tenure.
Another submarket which has received less study, however, is the market
for the purchase and sale of residential lots by lower income families.
As the description suggests, this submarket, unlike "squatting," does not
involve the act of land invasion, but rather the act of purchase, by which
families enter into a purchase and sale transaction with a subdivider en-
gaged in the business of selling lots usually on less expensive land
located on the urban periphery. The subdivisions which are created are
known in various South American countries as colonias ilegales (illegal
subdivisions), loteos brujos (magic lots), barrios clandestinos (clandes-
tine neighborhoods) and urbanizaciones piratas (pirate subdivisions). The
reason for such labels implying illegal activity is that although indivi-
dual purchasers may have apparent (but often defective) proof of title to
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their lots, the subdivisions themselves are illegal. The reason for their
illegal status is that such subdivisions occur "clandestinely" in violation
of municipal regulations for the approval and development of subdivisions
and usually in violation of municipal zoning laws and municipal standards
for the provision of basic urban services as well.
In the typical transaction the subdivider (or his agent), without in-
forming municipal planning authorities, simply draws up a simple plot
layout or rough subdivision plan and sells lots to families by means of an
installment contract with the promise of transfer of legal title at the end
of the payment period. Often, however, the transaction is based only on
the subdivider's oral promise of legal title and written receipts to ack-
nowledge the downpayment and installments. The family's initial downpaymernt
enables it to occupy their lot immediately and to begin to build their house
incrementally as their income permits, along with monthly payments to the
subdivider. The latter usually provides only a few bulldozed streets or
access roads, and promises, but rarely provides, necessary infrastructure
for urban services. Families, therefore, satisfy their service needs for
water, for example, from nearby streams, or, if necessary, by means of
illegal connections to municipal service trunk lines for water and elec-
tricity.
In Colombia, these illegal subdivisions are known as barrios piratas or
urbanizaciones piratas, that is, "pirate" neighborhoods or subdivisions.
The Colombian governmental response both nationally and locally to such
developments has been to treat them as an illegal and undesirable market
phenomenon which enables the pirate subdivider to realize an exorbitant
profit and to externalize the costs of providing the necessary service in-
frastructure upon the municipal governments. Accordingly, Colombian hous-
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ing policy has been directed at policing this form of housing submarket
while at the same time providing subsidized low income housing "units"
and experimenting with various forms of "sites and services" programs for
the urban poor. The sites and services programs are similar to pirate
land developments in that the government, acting as the landowner and sub-
divider, sponsors subdivisions with a minimal level of services for in-
cremental development by low income owner-builders. Such programs while
more economical of Colombia's limited financial and administrative re-
sources as a developing country than programs of "complete" housing units,
nevertheless require a significant public investment. In addition, it is
questionable whether government sponsored housing programs can provide a
competitive alternative to the housing solution purchased by lower income
families in the pirate submarket, particularly under conditions of rapid
urbanization.
In light of the considerations noted above, it is important to obtain
a better understanding of the nature of pirate subdivisions as a source
of housing for lower income families within Colombia's private market eco-
nomy. The underlying issue is whether the legal, financial and adminis-
trative institutions which govern or influence the conventional land sub-
division process in Colombia can be modified so as to internalize the
pirate submarket's perceived costs and to maximize its potential to pro-
vide a source of land and an opportunity for housing to lower income fam-
ilies.
Within the last 6 years, a number of scholars have addressed this is-
sue in Colombia from somewhat different perspectives in studies of pirate
subdivisions in the capital city of Bogota. George Vernez's 1973
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study provided the first detailed economic analysis of the interrela-
tionships between the pirate submarket of Bogota and the socio-economic
structure and development of its metropolitan area. Vernez estimated that
nearly half of Bogota's families resided in pirate subdivisions; he found
that housing investments by lower income families in pirate subdivisions
contributed significantly to capital formation and to employment, and
that the pirate market was an efficient allocator of land resources. His
study concluded that the incremental housing construction observed in the
pirate submarket should be legalized and rationalized as a means of stimu-
lating housing and other investments by the lower income portion of the
population. William A. Doebele's study in 1975- examined the legal and
institutional context in which the process of pirate subdividing occurs
and the attitudes of pirate barrio residents toward the formal legal sys-
tem. His purpose was to assess the possibilities for legal-institutional
reform that might eliminate acknowledged defects in the pirate subdivision
process and maximize its benefits as identified by Vernez and confirmed by
- 3/his own research. The 1976 study of Losada and Gomez- similarly examined
the legal-institutional context of the pirate submarket. In addition, they
presented an analysis of the various factors which seem to explain the
1/ George Vernez, "Bogota's Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity for
Metropolitan Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1973).
2-/ William A. Doebele, "The Private Market and Low Income Urbanization
in Developing Countries: The 'Pirate' Subdivisions of Bogota" (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Department of City and Regional Plan-
ning, Discussion Paper No. D75-ll, October, 1975).
3/
- Rodrigo Losada Lora and Hernando Gomez Buendia, La Tierra en el
Mercado Pirata de Bogota (Bogota: Fundacion Para la Educacion Superior
y el Desarrollo -- FEDESARROLLO, 1976).
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growth of the pirate submarket in Bogota, as well as a detailed soci-
economic analysis of five pirate barrios surveyed. The latter analysis
provided a good up-date for comparison with Vernez's findings. Finally,
Alan Carroll's preliminary analysis in 1978± of data obtained from a city-
wide survey of pirate subdividers by Colombia's National Superintendency
of Banks provided the first glimpse of the characteristics of the pirate
submarket as a land development business. Carroll's preliminary analysis
also suggested that policy interventions should be devised that would en-
hance the existing positive aspects of the pirate subdivision business
and that would direct it toward such desired social goals such as the pro-
vision of necessary infrastructure.
All of the studies mentioned focused upon the pirate submarket of
Bogota. No study has yet been done of the pirate submarket in another one
of Colombia's principal cities, Medellin, the capital of the Department of
Antioquia, and one of the most important economic centers of the country.
The broad purpose of this thesis is to provide a basis for comparative
analysis with the Bogota studies through the presentation of case data
and other research on pirate subdivisions in Medellin obtained by this
author during the period 1974-1975. The more specific purposes of the
thesis are two. The first is to determine whether the data on the pirate
submarket of Medellin supports the general conclusion of the Bogota' studies
that, from the economic viewpoint of lower income families, the pirate
submarket, despite its defects, provides those families with a housing
solution that alternative legal housing submarkets cannot equal. The
- Alan Carroll, "The Supply of Residential Land by Pirate Subdivi-
ders in Bogota'," (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Preliminary Dis-
cussion Paper, December, 1978).
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second purpose is to assess existing and proposed modifications in the legal,
financial and administrative institutions which govern the land subdivi-
sion process in Medellin and in Colombia in general, and which are intended
to respond more realistically to the economic constraints of lower income
families.
The crucial assumption underlying the specific purposes of this thesis
is that absent radical change in Colombia, the country's political and
institutional framework will continue to support a private market economy.
On the basis of this assumption it is considered reasonable to assess the
pirate housing submarket as a potentially viable "market solution" for
lower income families provided certain modificationsare made in the legal-
institutional framework which governs the operation of that submarket.
Chapter II introduces the reader to the essential background character-
istics of Medellin and presents the best available estimation of the scope
of the city's pirate submarket. It is hypothesized that although the rate
of pirate urbanizing has decreased significantly since 1968 because of
legal constraints and the scarcity of available land within the metropol-
itan area, pirate subdivisions nevertheless continue to occur at a yet-
to-be-calculated rate in the increasingly extended peripheral areas of
the city. The remainder of the chapter suggests the factors which seem
to explain the growth and persistence of pirate subdivisions in Medellfn.
The first two parts of Chapter III set forth two case studies of pirate sub-
divisions in order to illustrate important characteristics of the pirate
submarket in Medellin. The second of the two case studies is derived from
the author's own written survey in 1975 of families in the pirate subdivi-
sion known as La Cascada. The last part of Chapter III compares the
characteristics identified in the pirate subdivisions of Medellin with
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those of other housing submarkets in Medellin, particularly the government-
sponsored housing submarket. It is concluded in this chapter that from the
perspective of lower income families, the government housing submarket in
Medellin does not provide a competitive alternative to the offerings avail-
able in the pirate submarket. Chapters IV and V present the comparative
analysis of the pirate submarkets of Medellin and of Bogota' using the
data presented by this author for Medellin and the data-presented by the
authors of the Bogota studies mentioned above. Chapter IV compares the
pirate submarkets of the two cities with respect to the characteristics of
lot purchasers, the physical characteristics of subdivisions and the
economic characteristics of the transactions. The first part of Chapter
V sets forth the Colombian legal instruments and procedures which govern
the transfer of land and compares them to the instruments and procedures
used in the pirate submarket. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to
a comparison of this author's survey results with those of Losada and
Gomez, and of Doebele in particular, concerning pirate barrio residents'
attitudes toward the formal legal system. Such attitudinal data is rele-
vant to any future policy decisions which may be made to reform certain
legal institutions in order to facilitate low income purchasers in the
market.
Chapter VI assesses a recently instituted modification in one part of
the regulatory framework which governs the subdivision process in Medellin.
This modification is the so-called normas minimas or minimum subdivision
standards program. It's establishment was in response to the Municipal
Planning Department's experience with pirate subdivisions and is intended
to encourage developers in the private market to provide serviced lots
under a reduced set of subdivision standards. To date, only one subdivi-
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sion in Medellin has been designed and developed under the program. Case
data from this subdivision is presented and assessed in light of data
available from a similar program in Bogota. It is suggested that the lack
of subdivision development under the normas minimas program in Medellin
may be due to limited land supply compgundedby zoning restrictions and
problems of developer access to capital and poor understanding of the pro-
gram. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes this author's conclusions relative
to the analysis presented in the preceding chapters; it also makes recom-
mendations relative to existing and proposed modifications in the legal
institutional framework which are intended to direct the dynamics of the
pirate submarket toward the improvement of the lower income housing
solution presently provided by that submarket.
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CHAPTER II
THE PIRATE HOUSING SUBMARKET OF MEDELLIN
A. Geographical and Historical Background
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief historical overview
of some of the principal physical and administrative developmental stages
of Medellin, and to describe the growth and present status of pirate sub-
divisions within the municipality. With this general framework as back-
ground, the remainder of the chapter will examine the structural factors
which appear to explain the growth of the pirate housing submarket in
Medellin. A detailed analysis of important characteristics of the pirate
submarket will be presented through two case studies in the following
chapter.
l. Demographic Growth of the City
Medellin, the Capital of the Department of Antioquia, is situated
in the Valley of Aburra at an altitude of 1500 meters (4921 feet) within
the Andean mountain range that cordons off the western region of Colombia.
The city's longitudinal axis is formed by the Medellin River which courses
by canal through its center. Because of its spring-like climate year
around (230 centigrade/730 Fahrenheit), the city has become known for its
1/flowers, in particular, for its exquisite orchids.-
Although Medellin was founded in 1616, it did not receive civil
administrative powers as a municipality until 1675. Its transformation
from a village to a growing urban center began during the period 1910-
1920. In 1912, the population of Medellin was approximately 71,000. By
Municipio de Medellin, Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
y S.T., Anuario Estadistico de Medellin 1976-1977 (Medellin: 1978),
p. 14.
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2/1938, the next officially approved census,- the population had more than
doubled, reaching a total of 168,000 inhabitants. During the intercensus
periods 1938-1951 and 1951-1964, the city grew at an annual rate of 6%,
and as a result, by 1964 the population of Medellin had become approximately
773,000. The 1973 census calculated the population at 1,151,762. During
this last intercensus period, the growth rate had dropped to 4.39%. On
the basis of the 1973 census the population of Medellin in 1975 was pro-
3/jected at 1,210,840.- These demographic characteristics will be discussed
in more detail below as part of the analysis of the structural factors
underlying the growth of pirate subdivisions in Medellin.
2. Municipal Planning and Administrative Structures
The city's first office of municipal planning was created in 1951
in conjunction with the adoption of the Plan Regulador "Regulatory Plan"
5/produced by Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester Weiner- during the period
1948-1950. The plan was intended to provide general directives for the
reorganization of land uses in the city and for the creation of plans by
6/the Planning Office for the control and regulation of land development.-
2/
- The 1928 census was not officially approved. Ibid., p. 32 n.3.
3/ Idem., Anuario Estadistico de Medellin 1975 (Medellin: 1975), p. 30.
- En Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 683 de 1951. The municipal
planning office was more formally established and empowered with respon-
sibility by subsequent legislative acts (ordinances) of the Medellin City
Council. See generally, El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 45
de 1960, Acuerdo No. 50 de 1962, Acuerdo No. 10 de 1970.
5/ Town Planning Associates, New York, N.Y. U.S.A.
6/
- Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester Weiner, Informe del Plan Piloto de
Medellin (Medellin: 1950).
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In 1959 the Medellin city council approved a Plan Director ("Director Plan")
7/proposed by the Office of Planning.- The Plan delineated the basic scheme
for principal streets and set forth broad zoning categories for the purposes
of guiding and limiting future development. The general zoning categories
established were the following: light and heavy industrial, commercial
industrial, central commercial, residential, open space ("green" zones)
and transition areas (for future commercial or residential use). Although
these general categories were somewhat modified in 1965, -/ it was not until
1968 that the city adopted a detailed set of land use sub-classifications
within the general zoning categories as well as corresponding subdivision
. 9/
specifications.-
The 1959 Plan Director legislation also established the new muni-
cipal administrative subdivision of comunidades -- groupings of two or
more barrios categorized as a comunidad or community on the basis of such
considerations as physical terrain, land uses, the proposed municipal
boundary line and the social class characteristics of barrio residents.-0
In 1963, these urban "communities" were grouped into 6 larger sectoral
subdivisions called comunas (see Figure 1).ll/
Since the lack of, or contraband nature of basic public services
7/
- El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 92 de 1959.
8/
- Ibid., Acuerdo No. 52 de 1963.
El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 338 de 1968 ("Reglamentaciones
de Urbanizaciones"). See also Idem., Decreto No. 474 de 1969, Decreto No.
352 de 1971, Decreto No. 109 de 1974.
10/
-- El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 92 de 1959, Art. 1(b).
li Idem., Acuerdo No. 52 de 1963.
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is a crucial issue in the evaluation of pirate developments, it is impor-
tant in this general overview to note briefly the planning efforts of the
Pi~blias de12/municipal services company -- Empresas Publicas de Medellin-- (hereafter
referred to as Empresas Publicas). From the viewpoint of the pirate
barrio resident, perhaps the most important planning policy of Empresas
Publicas is its technical planning approach to the installation of sewer
lines. Water for drinking and cooking purposes can often be obtained
from nearby streams or, if necessary, by breaking and diverting water mains.
The same stream, at points downstream, may be used for the elimination of
13/
sewage.-- Access to electricity may be similarly obtained by contraband
means. However, the temporary sewage disposal measures soon create serious
health hazards. As long as sources of water and electricity remain avail-
able, residents eventually place primary emphasis upon the securement of
officially approved sewer line extensions to their homes.
In the late 1950's, Empresas Pdblicas began efforts to plan for the
growth of the city's sewer system. At the request of the company, the
North American firm of Greeley and Hanson conducted a study during 1956-
1957 of the sewerage collection system in the metropolitan area. One of
the principal findings of the study was that the Medellin river and its
tributaries were seriously polluted as a result of the practice of con-
structing single collector systems in which rainwater and sewage fluids
12/
- By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1,816 of July 1, 1955 and
Acuerdo (Ordinance) No. 58 of the Administrative Council of Medellln the
same year, Empresas Publicas was given an "autonomous" status as a corpor-
ation within the municipality.
13/
- Patricia Ve'lez Mejia, "Flujos Migratorios a las Areas de Turgurios
y Factores Fisicas y Socio-economicas que Inciden en la Formacion y
Persistencia de este Tipo de Habitat." (Tesis de Grado, Universidad
Pontificia Bolivariana, Facultad de Sociologia, 1974), p. 26.
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14/were corbined and eventually emptied into nearby streams.-- The study
concluded that all future sewer construction should use a separated col-
15/lector system for the recovery of sewage and rainwater.--
It was upon this premise that the first stage of the Sewer Pilot
Plan (Plan Piloto de Alcantarillado Sanitario) was designed. Actual
construction of the first stage did not begin until 1968 and was completed
in 1972. A second stage, designed by the Colombian firm, Asesorias E
Interventorias Ltda., was slated for completion in 1977. (See Figure 2).
As will be discussed below, in retrospect, the decision to install a
separated collector system may have been unnecessary in terms of the cost
limitations and design needs of lower income housing developments; it may
have been a factor which discouraged pirate developers from providing such
infrastructure in their subdivisions.
3. The Historical Development of Pirate Subdivisions
The first pirate subdivision is reported to have existed in
16/Medellin as early as 1885 in Comuna No. 1.-- Studies and statistics
14/
-- Asesorias E Interventorias Ltda., Plan Piloto de Alcantarillado
Sanitario de Medellin, Segunda Etapa: Estudio de Factibilidad (Medellin:
Julio 27 de 1972), pp. 5, 8-9.
1-/ Ibid., p. 9.
16/
- San Pablo. Developer: Honorio Velasquez. See, Maria Carvajal
Suarez, Estudio sobre Nucleos Piratas, de Invasion y Tugurios de la Comuna
No. 1, Municipio de Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administrativo de
Planeacio'n y S.T., 1975), p. 7. Another illegal subdivision known as
Loma de Los Gonzalez is reported to have originated in 1850 in Comuna No.
2. However, it did not involve an actual purchase and sale transaction,
but rather a subdivision by legal heirs to the property. See, Gilma
Mosquera and William Hinestrosa, Diagndstico General sobre el Problema de
la Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administrativo de
Planeacio'n y S.T., 1976), p. 76.
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produced by the Municipal Planning Office of Medellin generally have not
distinguished between "clandestine" settlements established by means of
land invasion and those established by means of a purchase and sale trans-
action between a buyer and a pirate subdivider. Nevertheless, because the
greatest amount of land invasion in Medellin is generally agreed to have
17/.
occurred in the mid 1960's and early 1970's,-- it is reasonable'to view
the following figures as constituting primarily pirate settlements. Those
figures establish that by 1910 a total of 8 pirate settlements had appeared.
18/Between that year and 1940 another 19 settlements occurred.- During the
1940's, when the population of Medellin increased dramatically, 16 more
pirate settlements were established. 9-
A 1958 advisory commission report to the Mayor of Medellin calculated
that the number of pirate settlements had reached a total of 54, constitu-
20/ting 5.67% of the net area of the city and 10% of the population.- It
17/
- Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa, Diagnostico General sobre el
Problema de la Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administrativo
de Planeacion y S.T., 1976), pp. 79-80.
18/
- Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., pp. 77-78. In 1920, one pirate
subdivider in the sector Campo Valde's is reported to have exchanged lots
for work by the buyers. Ibid., p. 77.
19/
- Ibid., p. 78.
20/ .
- Comision Consultiva sobre Barrios Piratas, Informe de la Comision,
Informe sobre Barrios Piratas (Medellin: Agosto 22 de 1958), pp. 3, 6.
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is interesting to note that the report classified the pirate settlements
into three categories according to the perceived motives of the subdividers,
and the extent to which their settlements conformed to urbanistic norms:
(1) Unapproved settlements completely lacking any urbanistic design or
subdivision plan (haphazard lot layout); (2) Unapproved settlements estab-
lished in accordance with a simple lot and street plan sketched by the
subdivider, but without plans for basic services; (3) settlements whose
officially approved subdivision plan and plans for the installation of
services were never or were only partially completed. As regards this
latter category, the report stated:
To this classification belong those subdivisions whose owners may
well have had an honest understanding of their duties and obligations
as developers, and later, for personal or general economic reasons,
did not comply with their obligation.21/
The report and subsequent interviews with city officials suggest that at
least during this earlier period of the growth of pirate settlements, land-
owners' "pirate" behavior may be explained as much by their ignorance and
economic hardship as by a calculated desire to circumvent municipal plan-
ning authorities. Many owner-developers were simply ignorant of what to do
with their land in the face of the increasing demand for housing lots.
They lacked a "technical point of view" and found it easiest merely to make
a rough lot plan and to sell lots one by one with the use of poliza (re-
22/
ceipt) for simple bookkeeping.--
Table 1 summarizes the growth pattern of pirate subdivisions from
21/ Ibid., p. 5.
22/
- Interview with Dr. Francisco Leon Guerrero Castrillo'n, former Chief
of the Division of Technical Planning, Department of Municipal Planning
(Medelln: May 16, 1975).
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1958 through 1970. Keeping in mind the qualification made previously con-
cerning the inclusion of invasion settlements within the meaning of "pirate"
settlements, the data suggest that the growth of pirate settlements in
Medellin peaked in the late 1960's. In 1966, 23% of the population of
Medellin lived in pirate settlements. By 1970, however, there had been a
dramatic dropoff in the number of pirate settlements. In one respect, this
result is not surprising. In 1968 the Colombian government had passed a
national law which provided criminal sanctions against subdividers who
23/developed land outside municipal controls.- The law was administered
by the housing division of the Superintendancy of Banks and, at least as
enforced in Medellin, was relatively effective in reducing the rate of
24/
new pirate subdivisions.--
TABLE 1
GROWTH OF PIRATE SETTLEMENTS IN MEDELLIN 1958 - 1970
No. of No. of Percentage of Popula-
Year Settlements Population Households tion of MedelLrn (o)
1958 54 55,100 8,620 10.0
1963 64 118,826 15,279 15.0
1966 76 185,110 25,736 23.3
1970 42 91,329 9,849 8.1
Source: Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa, Diagnostico General Sobre
El Problema de La Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin: Departamento
Administrativo de Planeacion y S.T., 1976), p. 82.
23/
-- Congreso Nacional, Ley 66 de 1968. Regulations for the law were
promulgated in 1969 by means of Decreto 219. See also Decretos 1380 and
2244 of 1972.
24/
-- Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit. , p. 81.
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The sharp decrease from 76 subdivisions to 42 subdivisions within
four years, however, is somewhat misleading. It is primarily the result
of the classification system used by the Municipal Planning Department at
the time by which pirate settlements considered to be in the process of
rehabilitation by virtue of their having one or more basic services, were
excluded from the 1970 figure. The most recent housing study by the
Municipal Planning Department recognized this discrepancy and set forth
an updated estimate of those pirate settlements (defined narrowly to
exclude invasions) which could be categorized as still in the process of
development and those which could be considered normalized and integrated
into the urban system of Medellin. On the basis of the pirate settle-
ments identified within each category by the Planning Department, this
author made the calculations set forth in Table 2 (See Appendix A for
listing). It should be noted that the calculations for those pirate
settlements considered still in the process of development are based
upon only 40 of the total of 76 identified by the Department of Planning.
Many of the pirate settlements identified are part of larger barrios.
Because population and area data did not exist for these pirate "sub-areas"
of the larger barrios, the author decided to present a conservative
estimate based upon only those pirate settlement areas listed officially
by name in the statistical bulletins for Medellin. (See Appendix A for
full listing of settlements included and omitted in the calculation.)
The conservative estimates presented in Table 2 suggest that from
the viewpoint of pirate settlemtns in the process of normalization, the
pirate housing submarket has been and continues to be a significant source
of land and housing for lower income families. At least 14% of the
- Ibid., pp. 170-180.
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TABLE 2
EXTENT OF PIRATE SETTLEMENTS IN MEDELLIN 1975*
No. of Global % % of Total
Settle- Area Total Populationa Population
Category mentsa (Hectares)a Area (1975) (1975)
Still in Stages
of Dev.l
a. Within Urban
Perimeter 46 (23) (941.6) 10.4 (125,570) 10.4
b. Outside Urban
Perimeter 30 (17) (761.1) 8.4 (46,951) 4.0
SUBTOTAL: 76 (40) (1,702.7) 18.8 (172,521) 14.4
Normalized +
Integrated Within
Urban System 2
16 563.0 6.2 193,003 16.0
TOTAL: 92 2,265.7 25.0 365,524 30.4
Notes
Defined by the Department of Municipal Planning as subdivisions of
high density, uncompleted single family houses initiated originally without
building permits on unserviced lots but which are now in the process of
obtaining streets and basic services.
2 Defined by the Department of Municipal Planning as subdivisions or
settlements of pirate origin which by means of various rehabilitation pro-
grams and self-help have finally become integrated within the urban system
and receive all basic services including water, sewer and electricity,
garbage collection and bus transportation.
a Figures in parentheses represent pirate settlements for which area
and population data were available in the statistical bulletins of Medellin.
Data for the additional pirate settlements identified by the Department of
Municipal Planning were not available or were incomplete. All percentages
and totals are calculated in relation to municipal area and population
which includes so-called "peripheral" barrios officially designated as
Comuna No. 7.
Sources: Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit.;Anuario Estadistico de Medellin
1975; Anuario Estadistico de Medellin 1976-1977.
* See Figure 3.
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population of Medellin in 1975 was housed in pirate settlements which
had still not been fully normalized and integrated within the city. These
settlements constituted 19% of the total urban area (comunas 1-7, including
peripheral barrios). Because of the different scope of the definition of
pirate settlemtns used in the 1958-1970 Planning Department figures
(Table 1), it is difficult to construct rates of pirate urbanizing by time
periods for the years 1958-1976. However, on the basis of the 1976 data
it does seem reasonable to assert the following proposition. While the
rate of pirate urbanizing has descreased significantly since 1968 because
of legal constraints and the scarcity of available land within the metro-
26/politan area,-- pirate subdivisions nevertheless continue to occur at a
yet-to-be-calculated rate in the increasingly extended peripheral areas
27/of the city (Comuna 7 and beyond).-- On the basis of the data available
it can be estimated that at a minimum, 761 hectares, or 45% of the land
constituting pirate settlements within the urban area of the city (1702.7
hectares) are located in the "peripheral" areas (Comuna 7) surrounding the
city.
Although the city administration, through the Municipal Planning
Department and Empresas Pdblicas has sought to limit the continued expan-
sion of residential settlements in the peripheral areas, it has been
unsuccessful to date. It seems reasonable to conclude that despite policy
decisions to limit the availability of services to a certain perimeter,
etc., pirate urbanizing will continue into the semi-rural areas surrounding
the city so long as there is access to water in nearby streams and avail-
able bus transportation. This conclusion is supported by data from one
6/ The Municipal Planning Departments' most recent rough estimate of
land remaining within the urban perimeter (Comunas 1-6) considered suitable
for residential development is 1,597 hectares. This represents approx-
imately 19.5% of the total area of Comunas 1-6 (8,171 hectares). The
Planning Department further reduced this estimate to 1,200 hectares after
applying a density criterion of 200 persons per hectare. Ibid., pp. 58, 60-63.
Census data estimates made by the Department of Municipal Planning
for 1976 indicate that between 1964 and 1976 the population of the peripheral
areas (Comuna 7) increased 185%. Ibid., pp. 49-51. What proportion of the
population increase is represented by pirate settlements is unknown. See
Figure 6, p. 45A for map indicating "peripheral areas" designated as Comuna 7.
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of the case studies presented in Chapter III.- Before examining such
data, however, it is important to set forth the various factors which
appear to explain the growth of pirate settlements in Medellin.
B. Factors Underlying the Growth of Pirate Subdivisions
It is difficult if not impossible to demonstrate a neat, symetrical
cause and effect relationship between an array of factors and the growth of
a complex market phenomenon such as the pirate housing submarket. At pre-
sent, the best that planners and policy makers are able to do is to identify
and interrelate those structural factors which appear to define the context
within which the phenomenon occurs and then to devise policies which they
hope will enhance or diminish the believed impact of those factors upon the
outcomes of the market system. The following factors appear to define the
context within which the pirate housing submarket of Medellin has developed.
First, the city's rapid rate of growth is perhaps the most important
factor which explains the sheer quantity of demand for housing in Medelli'n.
In order to understand the development of a particular housing submarket
such as the pirate submarket in response to such demand, however, it is
necessary to view the city's urban growth rate in relation to two other
important factors: income and municipal policies and standards governing
urban growth and development. Of these two factors, income is the most
critical. The reason is that the distribution of income among households
determines the extent to which municipal (and national) housing standards
28/ The Department of Municipal Planning also lends support to this
conclusion in its most recent study on housing, in which it observes that
pirate "nucleuses" continue, though on a lesser scale, in such areas as
Guadarrama (Eduardo Santos), Manuel Morales, El Picachito, El Pinar and
others. Ibid., p. 170.
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can be sustained in the face of rapid urban growth. Government imposed
housing standards increase the cost of housing; it is the relationship
between the income distribution among households and the price of housing
29/that establishes the quantity of housing which a household can afford.--
To the extent that there is a negative mismatch between household incomes
and housing prices, families must either severely limit the amount of
housing they consume within the officially sanctioned housing market, or
seek alternatives outside that market. In Medellin, the pirate housing
submarket appears to have provided an alternative for lower-income families
whose financial capacity to purchase housing within the market governed by
municipal housing standards has been virtually nil.
The third factor, municipal policies and standards for urban growth
and development, is perhaps the most difficult to describe in cause and
effect terms. As already noted, the effect of such policies and standards
is reflected in the overall price of housing. However, the specific im-
pacts of various policies and standards over time upon the housing market
and growth of the pirate submarket in particular, are difficult to trace.
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the important elements of muni-
cipal policies and standards which may reasonably be said to have generally
increased the cost of housing and reduced the supply available to lower
income families.
A fourth factor explaining the growth of the pirate submarket is the
relatively high rate of return that can be realized by pirate owner-sub-
dividers who undertake only minimal land preparation and rarely provide
29/
-- Orville F. Grimes, Jr., Housing for Low-Income Urban Families
(IBRD Research Publication, JohnsHopkins Press: 1976), p. 10.
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infrastructure for urban services. This factor will be treated in more
detail within the context of the case studies and the chapter on the program
of minimum subdivision standards (normas minimas).
1. Rural to City Migration
Massive rural to city migration in Colombia began in the late
1930's and early 1940's. Within the Department of Antioquia, the Valley
30/
of Aburra, which encompassed Medellin and nine other municipalities,--
became the principal focal point for this migration. Between 1938 and
1973, the urban population of Antioquia grew from 329,702 to 1,916,753
persons, of whom 1,433,591 or 74.8% were located within the Valley of Aburra.
During the intercensus periods 1938-1951, 1951-1964 and 1964-1973 the annual
urban growth rates for the valley were respectively 7.14%, 7.03% and 4.19%.
During the same intercensus periods the annual rural growth rates for the
31/
entire Department of Antioquia were respectively 0.65%, 1.30% and -0.43%.--
Within the Valley of Aburra itself, the following table summarizes the
dramatic shift in the locus of the population:
TABLE 3
RURAL-URBAN POPULATION SHIFT WITHIN THE VALLEY OF ABURRA 1938-1973
Population 1938 1951 1964 1973
Urban 67.0% 80% 90.3% 93.9%
Rural 33.0% 20% 9.7% 6.1%
Source: Plan Metropolitano: "Inventario Demografico" (Diciembre,
1975), cited in Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa,
Diagno'stico General Sobre El Problema de La Vivienda
en Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administrativo de
Planeacion y S.T., 1976), p. 26.
30/
- The other municipalities within the Valley of Aburra are: Bello,
Copocabana, Girardota, Barbosa, Itaqu , Envigado, Sabaneta, La Estrella and Caldas.
31/
-- Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
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Of the municipalities within the valley, Medellin attracted the
greatest percentage of the urban-bound migration. By 1964, the population
of Medellin constituted 71% of the total population of the valley. Ten
32/years later Medellin contained 73% of the valley's population.-- As a
consequence of the attraction which Medellin held for the migrating popula-
tion, the city's overall annual growth rate maintained a level of 6%
during the period 1938-1964. Only during the last intercensus period
1964-1973 did that rate decrease to 4.39%. In order to understand the
extent of in-migration pressure upon Medellin, however, it is necessary
to distinguish between the urban area of the city and the re-
mainder of the city or municipality. During the 35 years between 1938
and 1973, the city's overall population grew to 1,151,761 persons of whom
1,109,748 or 96.4% were located within the urban area (Comunas 1-7) of
the city. As Table 4 below indicates, calculations based upon this geo-
graphical dichotomy reveal even higher growth rates for the urban area of
the city and suggest indirectly the intense demand for housing and other
services which could reasonably be expected to have flowed from such con-
centrated in-migration.
TABLE 4
POPULATION GROWTH RATES FOR MEDELLIN DURING THE PERIOD 1938-1973
Intercensus Periods Total % Per Year Urban Area Remainder of Municipalit
1938-1951 6.05 6.62 1.62
1951-1964 6.00 6.30 1.72
1964-1973 4.39 4.54 1.25
Source: DANE. Population Censuses 1938-1951-1964-1973.
-- Ibid., p. 33.
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In order to describe the nature of the housing demand that would
be expected to flow from such an influx of population, it is necessary to
examine levels of income and unemployment relative to the availability of
housing for that population.
2. Income Levels and Housing Deficits
According to statistics published by the National Department of
Planning in 1975, the incomes of 59% of the families located within
Medellin's urban core (Comunas 1-7) fell within the low-income category
(monthly income of $4,000 pesos or less). Thirty-five percent (35%) had
incomes within the middle-income range of $5,001-16,000 pesos; six percent
(6%) has monthly incomes of $16,001 or more (see Table 5).
Calculations made by Medellin's Department of Planning on the basis
of the 1973 census indicated that 58% of the households within the seven
municipal districts had monthly incomes of $3,000 pesos or less, while
45% had monthly earnings of $2,000 pesos or less. Approximately 23% of
the urban households had monthly incomes of $1,000 or less.--
The preceding income figures provide a framework within which to
assess the financial capacity of families to satisfy their housing needs
from among the various solutions, private and public, provided in Medellin.
It is important to note, however, that especially for lower income families
in Colombia, the reported incomes do not necessarily reflect participation
in the formal economy. The rapid flow of unskilled rural migrants into
33/
- The income figure of $2,000 pesos per month was considered by the
Department of Municipal Planning to be the average monthly income of a
working class household. See, Departamento Administrativo de Planeaci6n
y S.T., Estudio para la localizacion de los Centros de Atenci6n integral
al Preescolar in Medellin (Medellin: 1975), cited in Mosquera and Hine-
strosa, op. cit., p. 102.
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TABLE 5
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES LIVING WITHIN
THE URBAN AREA OF MEDELLIN AS OF JUNE 1975
MONTHLY INCOME RANGES MEDIAN MONTHLY PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
BY INCOME LEVEL ($)* INCOME ($)* FAMILIES (%) PERCENTAGE (%)
Low Income
0 - 1,500 750 7.24
1,501 - 3,000 2,250 21.78 59
3,001 - 5,000 4,000 30.33
Middle Income
5,001 - 7,000 6,000 14.94
7,001 - 9,000 8,000 9.63 35
9,001 -12,000 10,500 6.03
12,001 -16,000 14,000 4.38
High Income
16,001 - 20,000 18,000 2.70
20,001 - 29,000 24,500 1.47 6
more than 29,000 N.A. 1.50
Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeacion. Table adopted from presen-
tation in Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa, Diagnostico
General sobre el Problema de La Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin:
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion y S.T., 1976), p. 101.
*Note: As used here and throughout this thesis the dollar sign ($)
refers to Colombian pesos.
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Colombia's urban areas and the incapacity of industry to absorb the influx
of labor, has resulted in various forms of subemployment such as self-
employed street vendors and odd-job laborers. The significance of this
employment reality underlying the income figures cited is that the income
earned by many of the lower income families is not necessarily stable or
dependable. As a consequence, their financial capacity to allocate con-
sistently a fixed portion of their income over time to meet conventional
housing finance schemes is severely limited. This point will be discussed
in more detail in relation to the case studies presented in Chapter III and
in the later evaluation of the pirate housing submarket.
In addition to the observed financial limitations upon the capacity
of many families to successfully demand housing in the market place,
there are also limitations of supply. In 1976, on the basis of the 1973
census figures and a limited survey, the Department of Municipal Planning
estimated Medellin's housing deficit at 26,050 units. The distribution of
this deficit by income groups is shown in Table 6 below.
TABLE 6
HOUSING DEFICIT BY INCOME LEVELS IN MEDELLIN 1976
Monthly Income Level ($) Deficit Percentage (%)
$4,000 or less 21,621 83
$4,001-$10,000 3,387 13
$10,000 or more 1,042 04
Source: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion y S.T.
(Medellin, 1976).
The income, employment, and housing deficit data described above
have provoked both the municipal and national governments to intervene in
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the housing market by means of various housing programs. Such programs
constitute an additional structural factor which must be considered in
evaluating the importance of the pirate housing submarket. This factor
will be considered in Chapter III in the form of a comparative analysis
of essential characteristics of certain government housing programs with
those characteristics identified in the pirate housing market.
3. Municipal Policies and Standards Governing Urban Growthand
Development
The relationship of income to prices in the urban -property market and
the resulting capacity of families to purchase housing is greatly influenced
by related municipal policies and standards. In a relatively free property
market, the price of land consists of four principal components: (1) the
value of land in agricultural condition; (2) the cost of developing and
servicing land for urban uses (roads, water, sewers, etc.); (3) the incre-
ment over agricultural value paid to obtain the land for urban use; (4) the
premium paid for land whose location in contrast to peripheral areas pro-
34/vides greater accessibility to the city.--
Municipal policies and standards established to govern the urbaniza-
tion process influence all four price components. The most direct influence
may be observed upon the second price component, namely, costs incurred
to develop and service land for urban use. Planning, subdivision and build-
ing regulations as well as policies and standards which govern the provision
of municipal service lines determine the amount of increased costs which
are added to the agricultural land value. The degree of increased costs
-/ G. Max Neutze, The Price of Land and Land Use Planning: Policy
Instruments in the Urban Land Market (Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, Paris: 1973), pp. 1-2.
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depends not only upon the absolute level of standards imposed but also upon
the strictness with which they are applied. The third price component,
the increment over agricultural value paid to obtain land for urban use, is
a speculative value. Normally, land speculators can realize a speculative
margin by holding land vacant which is intended for eventual development
under a general land use plan until its urban value is very high. It is
the planning regulations which govern their land which insure that their
land appreciates rapidly. Pirate subdivisions, however, often occur on
land which is not intended for urban development under the general land use
plan. Indeed, it is the peripheral location of the land and its poor pros-
pects for services which lower the cost for prospective low-income purchasers.
Nevertheless, the pirate owner-subdivider may still realize a speculative
margin above the agricultural value by demanding a price premised upon
his own promises to provide services, or, upon his ability to point to a
municipal policy which practically insures that services eventually will be
provided. This margin may be widened to the extent that the pirate deve-
loper can charge a premium for the risk he takes in subdividing in violation
35/
of municipal and national laws.-
Finally, as regards the first and fourth price components, perhaps
the most important municipal policy is the definition and administrative
enforcement of the municipality's urban perimeter. It is the initial demar-
cation of the urban perimeterwhich determines exactly what land is intended
- Under the national law, Law 66 of 1968, a developer who subdivides
without registering with the Superintendency of Banks may be imprisoned
for 2-6 years. The Superintendency may also seize the pirate developer's
property and transfer the administration of it to the national housing
agency, El Instituto de Credito Territorial. See, Ley 66 de 1968, art. 5,
ord. 5; art. 11; art. 12.
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to be preserved as agricultural land or natural areas and what land is
intneded to be developed and serviced for urban uses. The extent to which
the urban perimeter is enforced by means of restrictive transportation and
services policies, however, affects the price differential between peripheral
36/
areas and those areas with greater accessibility to the urban center.--
The following discussion of Medellin's municipal policies and
standards will treat "growth policies" apart from "development standards."
The distinction is somewhat artificial since both dimensions of the urbaniza-
tion process are intimately related. However, for purposes of analysis it
is useful to make the distinction in order to highlight the municipal
administration's efforts to halt the rapid urban growth on the periphery
as well as to insure certain standards for residential developments.
a. Growth Policies
In response to the influx of population from the Department of
Antioquia, Medellin sought to enforce an urban perimeter through a number
of policies. As early as 1946 proposals existed for the establishment of
a green belt (cordon verde) around the city to prevent further expansion
-6/ As used here and throughout this thesis, the term "peripheral" is
defined to mean not only those areas located beyond the formal "urban
perimeter" established by municipal authorities, but also those areas
which while technically within the urban perimeter, are located beyond the
service network as it exists at that point in time. For example, land owned
by a potential pirate developer may be located outside a "sewerage zone"
and may require the building of a major interceptor line before the area
can be serviced. Under municipal regulations, therefore, the land cannot
legally be subdivided. Because the property's location is "peripheral" to
the service network which exists and is unlikely to be extended for a number
of years, the property's value reflects a price differential similar to
that observed between land outside the urban perimeter (prohibited services)
and land inside the urban perimeter.
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37/
and to limit density around the defined perimeter.-- There is no evidence
that the policy was ever seriously implemented. More recently, however, the
38/policy has been revived and given legislative backing.-
The establishment of six formal sectors or comunas by the city
administration in 1963 may be viewed as an action which helped to rigidify
the demarcation line between urban and non-urban or peripheral areas within
the municipality. Comunas 1-6 were defined in accordance with water pro-
vision feasibility estimates as the urban area and all land outside those
sectors was designated semi-rural or rural. As a result of the conscious
effort to delimit the "urban" area, the immediately peripheral areas
which ringed Comunas 1-6 were consistently designated rural or semi-rural
despite the growth of numerous pirate barrios in those areas and a corres-
39/ponding population growth of 176% between 1964 and 1973.1-/ This peripheral
population which officially was constituted as Comuna 7 was not even
- Juan Carlos Duque, Fabio Botero, Gilberto Arango, Inventario y
Anilisis de las Areas de Posible Uso Residencial a Nivel Urbano y Suburbano
en el Area Metropolitana de Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administra-
tivo de Planeacidn y S.T., 1972), p. 22.
38/
-- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 283 de 1977. The Decreto adopted
the Planning Department's Resolution of April 14, 1977. The Resolution
modified the existing zoning classification for the rural sector (R-S)
(minimum area: 4,000M) in order to permit the development of "small sub-
urban farms" (pequenas granjas suburbanas) at the fringe of the urban
perimeter. The lot sizes within this proposed green belt may range from
1,000-1,500M2 and 1,500-2,000M 2 . It is hoped that the "micro-farms" per-
mitted on these reduced lot sizes will provide a rural-urban transition
line for the city.
1-/ Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., p. 92. Population growth
estimates for the period 1938-1964 for the peripheral areas is not reliable
because no distinction was made in the censuses of that period between the
urban area and populated areas. Ibid., p. 37.
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included in Medellin's "urban" census until 1973.L- In an effort to halt
growth beyond the defined perimeter, the Municipal Planning Department and
Empresas Publicas entered into an informal agreement under which Empresas
Publicas agreed not to extend water, sewer, electrical or telephone services
to any development which had not been licensed and approved by the Planning
Department. 41/
The effect of the municipal administration's urban perimeter
policies on the one hand, was to restrict the supply of urban land and
thus insure that its value would rise rapidly. Adding to this rising cost
of urban land, of course, was the effect of the city's land development
and services standards which will be discussed below. On the other hand,
the urban perimeter policies locked the peripheral land into a rural-un-
serviceable status, which along with other factors such as poor topographical
condition, helped to depress its price in the land market. Because of
the rapid growth of the urban population, however, demand for this cheaper,
unserviced land nevertheless existed among lower-income families who could
not afford the higher priced land and housing within the perimeter. Owners
of land in the peripheral areas responded to this demand. They perceived
correctly that by subdividing their land on a large scale and selling lots
with or without the promise of services, they could sell their land at a
value which far exceeded the value of rural land located above the estab-
- Ibid., p. 51.
-/ Instituto de Credito Territorial, Secoional de Medellin, Tugurios:
La Competencia Municipal en el Asentamiento Habitacional No Controlado
(Presentado al XIII Congreso de la Organizacion Interamericana de Coopera-
cidn Intermunicipal, Julio 4-8 de 1970), p. 9.
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42/lished water service line.--
In view of the dramatic urban population growth which Medellin
experienced, it is unlikely that as a market phenomenon the actual sale of
land on the periphery could have been prevented. However, with the benefit
of hindsight, it is suggested that had the city administration's urban
perimeter policies as well as its development and service provision stan-
dards been more flexible, owners of peripheral land might have been persuaded
to subdivide in accordance with municipal planning regulations. The reason-
ing in support of this view is the following. Given the understanding that
development and the provision of services were possible on the periphery
at realistically adjusted standards, many potential pirate subdividers
might have chosen to delay development in the hope that their properties
would appreciate in value. As regards those owners who chose not to forego
development, the city might reasonably have persuaded them that they could
offer serviced lots at prices lower income families could. afford and still
realize profits comparable to those under a pirate system of unserviced
lots. Recent data on subdivisions developed under the minimal standards
program (normas minimas) in Medellin, and in Bogota particularly, suggest
that subdividers under the program may be able to make a greater profit
than pirate subdividers. This data is discussed in Chapter V.
The conclusion stated above rests upon two assumptions. First,
it is assumed that fear of land invasion was not a significant motivation
behind owners's decisions to subdivide their land quickly in pirate
fashion. Studies by Medellin's Municipal Planning Department suggest that
the majority of invasions that occurrEdduring the growth period of pirate
42/
-- See footnote 36, supra.
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settlements occured in more centrally located areas or often on publicly
owned land.1- A dramatic increase of land invasions, including invasions
of pirate developer land, did not occur in Medellin until approximately
1970, following the national prohibition against uncontrolled subdivisions.4 4/
Thus there was no motivation to develop land prematurely through pirate
subdivision sales in order to avoid the possibility of invasion.
The second assumption is that pirate subdividers had sufficient
capital resources to provide the service infrastructure. Interviews with
local planning officials and case studies suggest that this assumption may
45/be incorrect in many cases.- The incorrectness of this assumption, how-
ever, does not invalidate the overall conclusion. Rather, it indicates
that the provision of services may have been a question of timing as well
as of appropriate standards. A minimal standards program which permitted
the developer either to finance the infrastructure in stages in accordance
with receipts from lot sales or to repay the utilities company in the
same manner for financing the entire outlay, could arguably have been
successful.
Although the city did not change its definition of the urban perimeter,
it eventually did modify its policies and standards for the development
and servicing of land. In retrospect, as described below, it would appear
43/
- See, Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., pp. 78-86; Velez, op. cit.,
pp. 8-10, 18-19.
4/ Ley 66 de 1968. See, Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., p. 79.
-5/ Interview with Dr. Francisco Leon Guerrero Castrillon, former
Chief of the Division of Technical Planning, Department of Municipal
Planning (Medellin, May 23, 1975). See also footnote 58 infra., and El
Diamante case study presented in Chapter III.
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that these modifications were only partially successful because of problems
of timeliness, improper focus and insufficient coordination.
b. Development Standards
(1) Empresas Publicas
Empresas Publicas fashioned its policies and standards for
pirate subdivisions in terms of the family users of the services and their
ability to pay, rather than the developer. This is understandable since
it was the entity responsible for the planning and provision of services; it
was the Municipal Planning Department's responsibility to insure that the
developer's plans were properly approved and included the installation of
the necessary infrastructure. In view of the difficulty of controlling
the demand for plots of land, however, the "user" focus of Empresas Pub-
licas' policies effectively reduced the pressure upon the pirate developer
to provide services. This policy focus coupled with the insistence upon
high technical standards gave the pirate developer little incentive to
undertake the cost of providing necessary service infrastructure.
The development of these policies began in 1957 when the board
of directors of Empresas Publicas decided to establish a Barrio Committee
(Comite de Barrios) to respond to the policital pressure from pirate settle-
46/
ments (particularly Brasilia) for services.- In accordance with the
terms of the "agreement" referred to earlier between Empresas Publicas
and Municipal Planning, the committee authorized the provision of services
to a limited number of pirate barrios. Empresas Publicas, however, charged
the full price of service installation to the users and gave only short
46/
- Interview with Dr. Leon Dario Uribe T., Chief of the Housing
Rehabilitation Division, Empresas Publicas of Medellin (Medellin, May
19, 1975).
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47/terms of payment.- It should be recalled that it was also during this
period that the study of Medellin's sewer collection system by the North
48/American company of Greeley and Hanson was completed.- Its recommenda-
tion that rainwater and waste fluids be handled by the more expensive
separated collector system was incorporated into the design standards of
Empresas Publicas in 1959.- As an autonomous entity- about to embark
upon a major planning program Empresas Pidblicas' principal concern was that
proper design standards be applied and that it control the decision to
51/
provide services.- As a result, Empresas Publicas adhered strongly to
the position that subdivisions must comply with all legal and planning
52/
requirements before services would be extended.--
By 1964, however, political pressure created by the growing
53/demand for services from the pirate barrios-- forced the Medellin city
-7/ Ibid.
- 1956-1967. See, Asesoria E. Interventorias Ltda., op. cit., pp. 8-9.
- Ibid.
50/ See footnote 12, supra.
51/
-- For example, the Planning Office of the Plan Regulador had proposed
that public water taps (pilas) be used in peripheral areas, but Empresas
Pdblicas opposed the idea. Interview with Dr. Javier Agudelo Dominquez,
former Chief of the Plan Regulador (Medellin: July 23, 1975).
-- Instituto de Credito Territorial, Seccional de Medellin, op. cit.,
p. 19.
- The principal source of political pressure for services and the
prime motivation for the action taken by the city administration in 1964
was the barrio "Castilla," one of the largest pirate subdivisions in Medellin.
Although criticized along with other "pirate" barrios at the time, Castilla
has since come to be viewed by some local planning officials as somewhat of
a "model" to compare with government sponsored housing developments in the
city. See Appendix D for brief summary of the barrio's development and
characteristics.
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council to act. It approved the establishment of a Rotating Fund for the
Rehabilitation of Barrios (Fondo Rotatorio de Habilitacion de Barrios) to
finance the provision of water, sewer and electrical services to pirate
settlements.- The fund included contributions from the municipal treasury
as well as monies loaned at 9% interest for four year periods by Colombia's
national housing agency (Instituto de Cre'dito Territorial -- I.C.T.).
Measured by the sheer quantity of services financed and in-
stalled in the pirate settlements since its inception, the Rotating Fund
has been extremely successful. (See Figures 4 and 5.) However. the con-
sensus of some planning officials in Medellin is that the fund indirectly
served as a further stimulus for pirate development. - This conclusion
seems correct. In effect the Rotating Fund provided pirate subdividers
with a financial mechanism through which to promote their developments.
They could point to the Fund and give prospective purchasers reasonable
assurance that services would eventually be provided.
The principal defect of the Rotating Fund appears to have been
its focus upon service users rather than upon the developer. By restricting
the use of Fund monies to the provision of user services after the creation
of the problem (i.e., dwellings constructed on unserviced lots), the Rota-
54/
- El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 37 de 1964; Acuerdo
No. 23 de 1966.
-5/ Instituto de Cre'dito Territorial, Seccional de Medellin, op. cit.,
p. 20.
56 /
-' Interviews conducted with Dr. Leon Dari'o Uribe T., Chief of the
Housing Rehabilitation Division, Empresas Piblicas of Medellin (Medellin,
May 19, 1975) and Dr. Francisco Leon Guerrero Castrillon, former Chief of
the Division of Technical Planning, Department of Municipal Planning
(Medellin, May 19, 1975).
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ting Fund effectively structured the pirate subdivider out of the deve-
lopment process. The objective should have been to draw the pirate deve-
loper into the process of infrastructure development before the creation
of the problem.-- This objective would have recognized the fact, apparent
even before 1964, that many pirate developers did not have sufficient
capital to finance the necessary infrastructure. Their principal assets
were the land itself and the small installment accounts of buyers which
only over time could amount to significant profits.-8 The Rotating Fund,
therefore, might have served as the financial mechanism through which
developers could have received funds to finance the installation of service
infrastructure. Under such a program a developer's repayment schedule
might have been adjusted to coincide with the stream of installment pay-
ments he received from his subdivision. If the availability of such a
financial mechanism had proven to be an insufficient incentive for pirate
developers to cooperate with the mudcipal administration, other political
57/
-- The use of the fund in this manner apparently had been presented
to Empresas Pdiblicas, but the proposition was rejected on the ground that
Empresas Publicas could only provide services after sufficient demand
existed. Interview with Dr. Francisco Ledn Guerrero C., former Chief
of the Division of Technical Planning, Department of Municipal Planning
(Medellin, May 23, 1975).
58/
- This conclusion would appear to be supported indirectly by the
fact that a proposal by the 1958 advisory commission on pirate barrios
(Comision Consultiva, op. cit., p. 21) that the Department of Valorizacion
impose the special assessments tax (valorizacio'n) upon pirate developers
to finance the necessary subdivision costs, was never implemented. The
reason, according to the then chief of the Plan Regulador, was that it
was realized that in most cases the necessary assessment monies could not
be obtained from the pirate developer, and even if obtainable, it would
require a protracted legal effort. Interview with Dr. Javier Agudelo
Dominquez, former Chief of the Plan Regulador (Medellin, July 23, 1975).
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strategies might have been necessary to insure such cooperation.-5
The preceding discussion has suggested that from an institutional
perspective it is important to recognize the restrictive influence of
Empresas Publicas as an autonomous "technical" entity upon the degree of
flexibility permitted within municipal development policies and standards.
Whatever the overall technical wisdom of the Pilot Plan for Medellin, its
employment of the separated collector system reflected an infrastructure
model based upon the higher-income suburbs of North America. rather than a
model based upon the more limited financial resources of the subdivider
and the lot purchaser in Medellin. The discrepancy between the model and
financial realities was finally recognized by planning and utilities of-
ficials in the modifications made in 1975 to the minimum development
standards, discussed in Chapter 60--/
(2) The Department of Municipal Planning
Although it is important to emphasize the particular influence
of Empresas Publicas upon municipal development policies and standards,
-9/ For example, known pirate developers might have been informed
that the city would no longer provide their lands police protection.
60/
-- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 334 de 1975. The Decreto
modified the previous Decreto No. 204 (1973) which had established the
"minimum standards" program, by providing for the first time that sub-
divisions under the program could use the combined sewer collector system
(rainwater and sewage fluids) Ibid., art. le. The motivation for the De-
creto itself had been the recommendations of the "Housing Committee"
established informally in 1975 by the administrative heads of the city's
Public Works Department, Planning Department, Department of Valorizacion,
as well as the directors of Empresas Publicas and the Instituto de Credito
Territorial, in order to improve coordination and to propose solutions to
the housing problem. The Committee has since been established formally in
conjunction with the Department of Municipal Planning. See, Idem., Decreto
No. 577 de 1976.
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that influence must be weighed within the larger context of standards and
regulations established by Medellin's Department of Municipal Planning.
These standards and regulations in the form of zoning classifications,
building permits and subdivision requirements are perhaps less easily linked
in specific cost terms to the behavior of pirate subdividers than are in-
frastructure requirements. However, it is generally recognized that they
do impose costs which influence private land use decisions. To the extent
that such standards and regulations embody unrealistic levels of performance,
market behavior will reactin ways to circumvent them.
The standards and regulations established by the first office
of municipal planning in accordance with the Plan Regulador produced by
the North American firm of Sert and Weiner in 1950 were unrealistic. In
a 1958 study of the causes of pirate settlements in Medellin, local officials
concluded that "the Plan Regulador had no discriminating criteria for [the]
demands and requirements" placed upon owners who wished to develop their
property. The lack of "sufficient amplitude" in the Plan's development
criteria had made it impossible for developers who complied with planning
61/
requirements to offer land inexpensively to lower income groups.- The
study concluded that the resulting high cost of land, along with other
62/ s 6 3/factors,- had contributed to the growth of the pirate submarket.
61/
- Comision Consultiva, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
62/ The other factors cited were the massive rural to city migration;
living conditions created by industrial development in Medellin; the lack
of national planning; the inadequate design and coordination of urban
legislation; the disparity between living costs and wage levels, and the
fiscal poverty of the municipalities. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
- Ibid., pp. 13-17.
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There is no evidence following the study that any significant
modifications were made in the technical standards regulations governing
64/the planning office's approval of developments.- However, in 1965 the
Medellin city council did pass an ordinancewhich authorized so-called
"popular subdivisions" or developments (urbanizaciones populares) in zones
65/
specifically delimited by the Office of Planning.- As sort of a precursor
of the "minimum standards" program established in 1973, the ordinance re-
duced the subdivision standards for such developments to 80M lots with
a minimum frontage of 5 meters; it exempted the developer from the obliga-
tion of ceding land to the municipality for purposes of open space, parks
and community services. Such land would be purchased from the developer
66/by the city through a number of alternative financing schemes.-- The
resolution also called upon Empresas Publicas to study means of reducing
the technical specifications for the design and construction of the service
67/
network in such areas.- The purpose of the ordinance was to stimulate
68/private competition with the pirate subdivider.--
-- A proposal was made in 1960 by the Director of Municipal Planning
to employ a "minimum standards" pirate subdivision-type strategy but it
was rejected by the municipal administration and Empresas Publicas. Inter-
view with Dr. Gustavo Suarez, Chief of the Technical Division, Instituto
de Cr4dito Territorial (former Director of Municipal Planning) (Medellin,
June 12, 1975).
65/
-- El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 7 de 1965. See also,
El Correo, February 27, 1965, p. 7.
66/ El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 7 de 1965, art 2.
67/ Ibid., art. 6.
68/ Interview with Dr. Evelio Ramirez Martinez, former Mayor of MedellIn
(Medellifn, July 28, 1975).
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For reasons that are not entirely clear from interviews con-
ducted with local officials, the "popular subdivisions" regulations received
no response from developers and had little impact upon the pirate market
e 69/in Medellin.- One reason appears to be that by restricting such develop-
ments to specifically designated areas within the residential zones, the
regulations did not significantly increase the supply of land available
70/for development through the official planning process.- Secondly, some
of the reduced standards intended to lessen developer costs may not in fact
have been implemented. Although upon the establishment of the Rotating
Fund in 1964 Empresas Publicas modified its policy regarding the legal con-
ditions required for provision of services, it continued to resist proposals
71/that it reduce its technical design requirements.- Also, the 1965 ceding
exemption was later changed and the developer was required to cede corrunity
72/
service and green areas (Zonas Verdes) to the city without compensation.--
The required transfer of property to the city without compensation for such
public purposes is a cost which may have deterred some developers from under-
taking a "popular subdivision." All of these reasons of course may be second-
-- It should be noted that this category of subdivision is still present
in the zoning regulations for Medellin. See, Departamento Administrativo de
Planeaci6n y S.T., Reglamento de Urbanizaciones (Medellin, 1974), Primera
Parte, Capitulo 1, arts. 6-9, Capitulo 3, art. 22; Segunda Parte, Capitulo 3,
art. 38.
70/
- The locational restrictiveness of these zoning regulations was rein-
forced by the pattern of land ownership at the time, namely most of the land
was controlled by a relatively small number of landowners. Evelio Ramirez
Interview, op. cit.
--L Ibid.
72/
- Reglamento de Urbanizaciones, op. cit., Primera Parte, Capitulo 2,
art. 8.
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ary to such broader explanations as the fact that by 1965 the pirate form of
subdividing had become well established and had achieved a momentum sustained
by the demand of the increasing numbers of lower income families present in
the city.
The enactment by the city council of the Planning Department's
normas minimas or minimum standards program in 1973 authorized minimum lot
2 73/
sizes of 100 M and minimum frontage of 6.5 meters.- In 1975 these
standards were further reduced to 90 M and 6.0 meters respectively.7 4
To date only one (1) developer has actually developed a subdivision under
the program.2--/ The possible reasons for this result and the potential
application of the normas minimas program in Medellin will be discussed in
Chapter VI.
By way of summary, the preceding analysis of the impact of
municipal development policies and standards upon the growth of the pirate
submarket has suggested a number of general conclusions. These conclusions,
of course, must be understood in relation to the previously discussed
factors of income levels and population growth rate for Medellin. First,
the rigid urban perimeter policy and the high technical standards which
governed land classification, subdivision and the provision of services,
together raised the price of land dramatically within Medellin's urban
- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 204 de 1973.
74/ Idem., Decreto No. 334 de 1975.
75/
- Data supplied by the Division of Technical Planning, Department
of Municipal Planning, Medellin, April, 1979.
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area. Lower income families, unable to afford land within the urban peri-
meter, purchased the cheaper land on the periphery from owners whose land
was prohibited services under municipal policy. Second, even when services
became available beyond the urban perimeter through the 1964 Rotating Fund,
technical design standards and insufficient developer capital appear to
have been significant obstacles to pirate developers' ability (and willing-
ness) to provide serviced lots. The Planning Department's planning approval
and subdivision regulations also contributed to the cost obstacles per-
ceived by developers in Medellin. Finally, modifications in development
standards and policies appear to have been implemented in some cases without
sufficient coordination between the municipal bodies involved and without
properly defined objectives. The example of the latter problem was the
Rotating Fund which was structured to respond to user needs in post facto
fashion rather than to draw the pirate developer into the process of pro-
viding infrastructure. As implemented, therefore, the Fund indirectly
acted to stimulate further pirate development in peripheral areas. The
lack of coordination surrounding municipal policies and standards was best
illustrated by the mismatch between the technical design standards of Empresas
Pu blicas and the modified subdivision regulations of the Planning Department.
These two aspects of a minimum standards program were not brought into
line with each other until 1975.
4. Profit Incentives in the Pirate Submarket
It is reasonable to expect that the supply-demand disequilibrium
in the Medellin urban land market which gave rise to the pirate submarket
would provide pirate sellers with the opportunity to make substantial pro-
fits. To the extent that high profits are realizable in the pirate market,
therefore, they constitute a fourth important factor explaining the growth
-44-
and persistence of pirate subdivisions. Studies of the pirate submarket
Bogoa suportthis76/
in Bogota support this proposition.- In Medellin, data on pirate deve-
loper profits is limited and incomplete. Records of the sectional office
of the Superintendency of Banks which regulates such developments did not
include both purchase and sale inforration for parcels. What data does
exist, therefore, is in the form of case studies, two of which are pre-
sented in Chapter III.
76/
- See, Alan Carroll, "The Supply of Residential Land by Pirate Sub-
dividers in Bogota ," (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Preliminary
Discussion Paper, December 1978); Rodrigo Losada Lora and Hernando Gomez
Buendla, La Tierra en el Mercado Pirata de Bogota (Bogota: Fundacion Para
le Educacion Superior Y el Desarrollo -- FEDESARROLLO, 1976); and William
A. Doebele, "The Private Market and Low Income Urbanization in Developing
Countries: The 'Pirate' Subdivisions of Bogota" (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Department of City and Regional Planning, Discussion
Paper No. D75-ll, October 1975).
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDIES: EL DIAMANTE AND LA CASCADA
A. Introduction
The two case studies in this chapter are presented for the purpose of
illustrating important characteristics of the pirate housing submarket in
Medellin. These characteristics fall essentially into three broad cate-
gories: (1) the socio-demographic characteristics of lot purchasers in
pirate subdivisions; (2) the physical characteristics of the subdivisions;
(3) the economic aspects of pirate subdivisions. The concluding section of
this chapter will compare the characteristics observed in the pirate
subdivisions with those identifiable in other housing submarkets, particu-
larly, the government sponsored housing market.
El Diamante was chosen as a case study because the problems it presented
to municipal officials forced the fromulation of minimum development stan-
dards for the subdivision, which in turn led to the design of the minimum
standards program (obras minimas). It also illustrates some of the institu-
tional conflict between the Planning Department and Empresas Publicas over
the proper technical standards for the provision of services. The data
for the case is drawn primarily from documents and studies available at
the Department of Municipal Planning, the Superintendency of Banks and
Empresas Publicas, and from interviews with local officials.
La Cascada is a case study developed from the author's own survey of the
subdivision's residents over a two month period in 1975. Its importance
as a study is threefold. First, unlike El Diamante, La Cascada is one of
the most recent pirate subdivisions to have appeared in Medellin and there-
fore provides information about the earlier growth stages of such subdivi-
sion. -It was chosen by this author for the survey because in 1975 it was
considered by planning officials to be the subdivision of most recent origin.
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Second, its location in the semi-rural periphery of Medellin provides
evidence that notwithstanding the criminal sanctions against unapproved
subdivisions, the pirate submarket continues, albeit at a slower rate, to
supply peripheral land to lower income families, most of whose prior resi-
dences were in Medellin. Third, the case study provides data on residents'
attitudes and understandings concerning the legal norms which govern their
land purchase transactions. This data will be presented in Chapter V as
part of the comparative analysis of the pirate submarkets of Medellin and
Bogota. Finally, it is important to note that the sample size of the La
Cascada survey is quite small (n=23). The data, therefore, is illustrative
only. However, it is this author's view that the data nevertheless has
considerable explanatory value since it is consistent in most respects with
the findings derived from larger survey samples of pirate subdivisions in
Medellin and in Bogota.
B. El Diamante
1. Physical Setting and Origin
The barrio El Diamante is situated on rocky, inclined terrain in the
northwestern comuna of Medellin (Comuna 2) known as Robledo. The owner of
the tract was related to a well-known family which had engaged in a large
amount of pirate subdividing in Medellin. The same family held title to
numerous other properties in the peripheral areas surrounding the city.
Newspaper accounts date a limited number of lot sales in the area as early
as 1964.-/ The event received newspaper coverage for reasons which illus-
1/
- The owner was Juan Gregorio Arango Cock.
2/
- El Correo, Articles, October 31, 1964, p. 2; November 9, 1964,
p. 6; November 16, 1964, p. 17.
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trated the conflict which existed in Medellin between market demand for
land and the zoning classifications which restricted supply. The emerging
pirate settlement was on land located within a larger semi-rural zone of
Robledo in which wealthy residents had built expensive homes on lots
ranging from 300 to 600 meters squared. When it became apparent to
these owners that the adjacent land was being sold in small lots as part
of a pirate subdivision they formally protested to the city against the
loss in property value which they alleged they would suffer.- The Depart-
ment of Municipal Planning responded by drawing up a tentative subdivision
plan and advising the pirate subdivider that he must provide roads, curbs,
4/complete sewerage and water.- Thus began a lengthy series of negotiations
between the pirate subdivider and the offices of Municipal Planning and
Empresas Publicas which were not completed until 1974. The economic aspects
of these negotiations as they affected the costs and profits of the sub-
division will be discussed below. In the meantime, lots continued to be
sold,- with the bulk of sales and construction occurring between approximately
-/ Ibid. In a subsequently published "memorandum" to the public and
municipal officials, the residents of the area complained:
Within the traditional division between urban and semi-urban zones,
Medellin is going to be left without any lands suitable for the latter
type of housing, all because of pirate developers. This is an injus-
tice which falls upon the social groups who prefer a quieter life
without the complications of the central zones or the concentrated
type of housing. . . . The . . . ordinances which establish minimum
requirements for class 'D' subdivisions are not sufficient to put an
end to pirate developers, since they will continue to violate the
law in order to avoid the cost of the minimum requirements. . . .
Ibid., "Memorando," February 13, 1965, p. 11.
4/
- Concejo de Planeacion Municipal de Medellin, Acta No. 33-65
(October 5, 1965).
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1968 and 1973.
2. Socio-Demographic Characters of Lot Purchasers
The socio-demographic data presented here is taken from a survey of
40 families in El Diamante which was conducted as part of a larger survey
and study by Molina and Ariad1976). IThe authors' data indicated that the
prior residence of approximately 60% of the families who purchased lots in
El Diamante had been in either Medellin or some other municipality of the
Valley of Aburra. Of these families 92% had come from residences located
in other barrios of Medellin.- In other words, most of the purchasers were
local residents of Medellin in search of an opportunity to purchase a lot
7/
and build their own homes.- The average monthly income of families in El
8/Diamante in 1975 Colombian pesos was $2,435.- This places most families
of the barrio within the medium low range of the "Low Income" category ($0-
5,000) which encompasses 59% of Medellin's population. (See Table 5 presented
in Chapter II.) Residents earned income
5/
- Luis Eduardo Molina and Juan Antonio Arias, Estudio sobre
Estructura Financiera del Submercado de Vivienda (Medellin: CEIE, Escuela
de Administraciony Finanzas: 1976). The authors based their study upon a
survey of three pirate subdivisions, including El Diamante. The total
survey sample from the three subdivisions was 100 families. The distribution
was as follows: El Diamante (40%); Barrio Miramar (40%) and La Esperanza
No. 2 (20%). Where the authors' data on physical and economic aspects of
the subdivision vary from Planning Department data (obtained from the
developer), this author has relied upon the Planning Department data.
6/ Ibid., p. 12.
-/ No data was available on the residents' dweller status (renter,
homeowner, etc.) in their prior places of residence.
8- Figure adjusted from 1976 income figure of $3,531 indicated in
Molina and Arias, op. cit., p. 15. Adjustment was based upon the inflation
index for the price of all categories of goods for year 1975 compared to
year 1976 for Medellfn, averaging inflation for both "employed persons" and
"workers." Source: Revista del Banco de la Republica, January, 1978,
Table 8.4.1. Because incomes have increased at a slower rate than price
inflation in Colombia, the adjusted figure somewhat understates the average
family income for El Diamante in 1975.
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from jobs or activities which fell within the following general employment
9/
categories:-
Industry: 48.4%
Commerce and Services: 16.2%
Government: 12.9%
Independent: 22.5%
The percentages indicate that the majority of those employed work in
factory or construction jobs. It is generally regarded in Medellin as a
working class barrio (obreros).
3. Physical Characteristics of the Subdivision
The physical characteristics of El Diamante as regards roads, net
area developed, etc., changed over time in response to the negotiations
between the developer and the Department of Municipal Planning. However,
10/the following figures taken from Planning Department records-- closely
approximate the final physical dimensions of the subdivision:
- The employment categories listed are defined as follows: (1)
Industry: includes those employed in manufacturing jobs in factories as
well as those employed in public works and construction jobs. The term in
Spanish for this category, broadly speaking is obrero. (2) Commerce and
Services: includes those employed in various service capacities, such
as watchman, doorman, maintenance person in industrial companies, and
those employed in businesses as salespersons, helpers, etc. (3) Govern-
ment: those employed by municipal (most often) or national government
departments or agencies. (4) Independent: includes "self-employed"
persons such as street vendors, tailors, and owners of small commercial
enterprises.
10/ Junta Municipal de Planeaci'aiy S.T., Acta No. 7 (Session: Junio
26, 1973).
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Land % of Total
Total Area 91,940 M 100
Open Space (zonas verdes) 22,077 M2  24
Roads (9 & 11 mts. by section) 25,950 M 28
Net Area for lot development 43,912 M 48
No. of Lots: 380
Average Lot Size: 128M2
-Frontage: 6.4 mts.
Depth: 20.0 mts.
4. The Economics of the Pirate Subdivision
This section presents the economics of the pirate subdivision in-
cluding the basic transaction between the pirate developer and the purchasers.
Additional costs subsequently assumed by the developer in response to pres-
sure from the Department of Municipal Planning will be discussed below in
a separate section which includes the calculation of developer profits.
The figures and calculations presented here are based upon data supplied
by the developer to the Department of Municipal Planning in 1973.11/
The entire cost of the tract of land before subdivision was
$1,379,000 Pesos ($15.00/M ). Except for the design of a basic subdivision
plan (see Figures 7 and 8), the developer did minimal land preparation.
The buyers themselves did the heavy rock removal necessary to prepare
excavations. Water was initially taken from a tank constructed by the
residents near a stream which flowed across the upper part of the subdiv-
ision. Electricity was taken by contraband means. Latrines were constructed
12/by the residents, but sewage fluids were left to flow through surface areas.--
11/ Specifically, this data on costs and terms of purchase was presented by
the developer to the Division of Technical Planning, which in turn presented
the data in its report to the Planning Board. See Ibid.
12/ Molina and Arias, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 87-88.
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The basic transaction between the developer and the purchasers
described in average figures was as follows:
Lot Sale Price: $12,032.
Downpayment: $ 1,500.
Monthly Installment Payments: $ 227.
(60 Months)
Finance Charge of '%: $ 60.
Most of the residents purchased their lots on an installemnt basis.- In
this regard it is important to note that the monthly installment payments
of $227 pesos over a sixty month period ($227 x 60 = $13,620) amounted to
an implicit interest charge of 2.0% a month on the unpaid principal.
Therefore, the total cost of the lot for the installment purchaser was not
$12,092 pesos (sale price plus 0.5% finance charge) but rather $15,180
pesos, of which $3,148 pesos consisted of interest charges. In other words,
the developer whose net area land cost was approximately $31.00 pesos per
square meter ($1,380,000/43,912-~M was able to sell unserviced lots in
the subdivision for $94.00 pesos per square meter ($15,180/128-M).
The developer informed the Department of Municipal Planning in
14/1973 that all 380 lots in the subdivision had been sold.-- Of this total
13/
-- Approximately 78% of the residents in the survey sample purchased
their lots on credit. Ibid., p. 28.
14/
--- Junta Municipal de Planeacion y S.T., Acta No. 7 (Session: Junio
26, 1973). This information appears to be contradicted indirectly by the
findings of Molina and Arias op. cit., who indicated that in 1976 the
average price of a lot in El Diamante had risen to $45,000 pesos and that
the developer's terms of purchase had changed and now required a downpayment
of $30,000 and the remainder ($15,000) in one year at an interest rate of
1.5% per month. Ibid., p. 30. If the authors' information is correct, it
would confirm the observations of some local officials interviewed by
this author, namely, that it was typical of pirate developers to hold
some lots off the market until after services were installed in order to
charge a higher price.
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number of lots, there was evidence that approximately 80 had been sold for
the average price of $12,032 ($15,180 on installment purchase), while the
remaining 300 had been reportedly sold for an average price, including
interest charges, of $18,000. It would be incorrect to calculate the
developer's margin of profit on these figures alone since the developer
did incur additional costs for infrastructure as a result of negotiations
with the Municipal Planning Department. These costs and the related cal-
culation of profits will be presented below.
As previously indicated, the majority of purchasers in El Diamante
acquired their lots on an installment basis. In order to finance their
purchase over time, residents employed a variety of resource combinations
which may be divided by the principal categories of salary, savings, and
loan, as follows:
TABLE 7
RESOURCES USED BY PURCHASERS OF LOTS ON INSTALLMENT BASIS IN EL
DIAMANTE
Resources Used Percentage of Residents (%)
1. Salary only 8.82
Salary and cesantias- 2.94
Salary and bonus 2.94
2. Savings only 35.32
Savings and cesantfas 11.76
Savings and bonus 5.88
Cesantias and bonus 11.76
3. Loan only 5.88
Loan and cesantlas 5.88
Loan and savings 5.88
Loan and bonus 2,94
Source: Molina and Arias, op cit., p. 29.
Notes
- The term cesantlas refers to "severence pay" which by Colombian
law every employer must pay to each employee upon termination of employ-
ment. However, the law also allows the employee to obtain advances
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from the employer on the amount of severance pay accumulated, for the
specific purposes of purchasing, constructing or improving housing.
See generally, Ccdigo Laboral de 1951: Resolucidn del Ministerio
del Trabajo y Seguridad Social No. 4250 de 1973. See also, Alfredo
L. Fuentes and Rodrigo Losada, Implicaciones Socio-econdmicas de la
Ilegalidad en Tenencia de la Tierra Urbana de Colombia (Bogota:
Fundacidn Para La Educacion Superior y El Desarrollo, 1978), pp. 19-21.
The above information indicates that in general residents relied primarily
upon savings and salaries to finance the purchase of their lots. These
two resources figures in approximately 68% of the purchasers' financing
schemes. Very few residents had access to loans, whether through their
place of work (factory most often) or through friends or relatives. The
issue of credit resources will be discussed in more detail within the
context of the second case study (La Cascada) and in Chapter VII.
5. The Process of Legalization and Developer Profits
a. The Legalization Process
Perhaps because of its impact upon the higher land values of
surrounding residents, as well as its precipitous growth during the period
following approval of National Law No. 66 in 1968, to control subdivisions,
El Diamante received particular attention from municipal authorites. The
principal actors in the effort to insure that the barrio met the legaliza-
tion requirements concerning subdivision layout, services and property
titles were the Department of Planning, Empresas Publicas and the Medellin
Housing Division Office of the National Superintendency of Banks. The
latter, it will be recalled, is the national entity charged with the enforce-
ment of the 1968 law.
It is interesting to note that early in the negotiations in
response to pressure from the Planning Department, the developer apparen-
tly agreed to construct road-beds and to provide water and sewerage in
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accordance with the specifications of Empresas Publicas.-- The developer
16/later reneged on the water and sewarge commitment.- It was unclear from
interviews whether the developer was simply unwilling or was financially
unable to undertake the cost. The Planning Board of the Department sub-
sequently concluded that the developer and others whose land was peripherally
located could not in fact satisfy existing municipal standards and regula-
tions for subdivisions. Therefore, in late 1972, provisional approval was
given to El Diamante within a program of "minimum requirements." These
requirements called for the developer to:
(1) open up roadways in the subdivision;
(2) provide water by means of water taps (pilas) or
through an alternative "minimum" system recommended
by Empresas Publicas;
(3) pay for the cost of individual latrine units (sanitarios
campesinos) provided by the Department of Health;
(4) cede 20% of the tract for open space (zonas verdes)
and community services; and
(5) cede all land necessary for roads.
For its part, the Superintendency of Banks agreed to exercise
strict control over the sale of lots under the minimum requirements pro-
gram. The developer was required to register with the housing division
office in Medellin. Only after the latter's approval of the development
15/
- Interview with Dr. Leon Dario Uribe T., Chief of the Housing
Rehabilitation Division, Empresas Publicas of Medellin (Medellin: May
19, 1975); Letter from developer to the Department of Municipal Planning
(May 28, 1965).
16/ .
-- Uribe i.nterview, of. cit.
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plans and its inspection of the purchasers' property titles would sale
of the remaining lots be authorized.17/
It was more than a year, however, before a final program of
minimum requirements was agreed upon by the parties involved. In part,
the delay was due to the institutional conflict between the Department of
Municipal Planning and Empresas Publicas over the proper standard to be
required of the developer for the provision of water and sewerage. The
Empresas Pdblicas rejected the minimum requirements for water and sewerage
which the Planning Board had provisionally approved. It argued instead
that the developer should provide the domiciliary sewer lines and that water
could be provided by means of the previously mentioned "Rotating Fund."
The Planning Board, however, was reluctant to "require" the developer to
construct the local sewer lines. In its final subdivision approval there-
fore, it reiterated the same water and sewer requirements it previously
had approved provisionally and voted only to "recommend . . . without im-
plying an obligation" that the developer construct the sewer lines. 1 8/
The Empresas Publicas stood firm against the services proposal as approved
by the Planning Board; in a subsequent memorandum of agreement reached
with the developer, the utilities company stated its position clearly:
"[The 'minimum] standards' . . . required the construction of
public water taps on each of the street corners . . . and latrines
with 'taza campesina' for the sewerage. As is obvious these 'standards'
cannot be accepted by the company which has its own properly approved
standards and it is not the Board of Municipal Planning . . . which
is empowered to modify them."19/
-- Junta Municipal de Planeacion y S.T., Acta No. 15 (Sesion:
Noviembre 21, 1972).
18/
-- Idem., Acta No. 7 (Sesion: Junio 26, 1973).
19/
- Empresas Publicas, Division Habilitacion de Viviendas, Acta Sobre
Barrio "Bello Horizonte" [E.1 Diamante] (Agosto 13, 1974).
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Another reason Empresas Publicas opposed the minimum standard
proposal, especially as to sewerage, was that the El Diamante residents
themselves had told the utilities company that they preferred the cost of
Permanent sewer lines in order that they might later "obtain water and
20/electricity legally."-- In other words, the residents preferred a final
rather than an intermediate solution for the critical service area of
sewerage in order that they might more easily obtain legitimate access to
the remaining services provided by Empresas Publicas. This resident view-
point suggests that the proposition that the issue of the level of techni-
cal standards relative to service costs may be of little concern to lower-
income families provided they are given a financial program through which
to purchase desired services over time. Such a financial program of
course usually requires some degree of subsidy; but the principal concern
of pirate barrio residents who build by increments appears to be.the timing
of costs. A similar argument was previously made as regards most pirate
developers. High technical subdivision and service standards which are
not complimented with financing mechanisms that give such developers
access to capital at critical points in the development process can lead
to market behavior which circumvents those standards.
In the particular case of El Diamante, it appears that the
pirate developer alone could have undertaken the costs of the subdivision
infrastructure as originally proposed by Empresas Publicas.- The arrange-
20/
- Ibid; Letter from Dr. Francisco J. Ramirez M. to Empresas Publicas
("Resumen de puntos tratado en la reunion sobre 'Servicios Publicos Barrio
Bello Horizonte - Diamante") (Superintendencia Bancaria: Expediente 01,
Noviembre 9, 1973).
21/
-- The developer had actually submitted water and sewerage plans to
Empresas Publicas but later declined to execute them. Uribe interview, op. cit.
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ment ultimately agreed upon between the developer and Empresas Publicas
was as follows:
DEVELOPER EMPRESAS PUBLICAS
1. Sewerage: investment of 1. Sewerage: completion
$400,000 pesos in con- of remainder of construc-
struction of domiciliary tion not covered by deve-
lines, loper's investment --
charged to users.
2. Water lines: constructed
in total by means of Rota-
ting Fund -- charged to
users.
3. Electricity: constructed
in total by means of pro-
gram "Habilitacion de
Viviendas" -- charged
to users.
The costs and finance terms of this infrastructure for the residents of
El Diamante were estimated in December, 1974 as follows:
SERVICE CONNECTING LINE DOMICILE TOTAL
1. Water $1,956.73 $870.20 $2,816.93
2. Sewerage 2,198.89 619.00 2,817.89
22/3. Electricity-- 1,346.92 915.70 2,262.62
$7,897.44
Terms of Payment: (1) no downpayment; (2) term: 100 months
(3) interest: 6% annually.
Under the finance terms indicated above, the total infrastructure cost
amounted to a payment schedule of $100.55 pesos per month for each house-
hold. This means that residents who purchased their lots at the $12,032
price on an installment basis had monthly installment expenses of $327.55
22/
-- The cost figure for electricity was limited to one half () the
cost of installation by resolution of the Board of Directors of Empresas
Publicas. See, Acta No. 753 (July 1, 1974).
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23/pesos ($227 + $100.55).--
b. Developer Profits
It is instructive at this point to examine the developer's pro-
fits in relation to three cost models derived from the infrastructure
solutions proposed during the legalization process of El Diamante. The
calculations are derived from cost figures submitted by the developer and
Empresas Publicas to the Department of Municipal Planning in 1973. Before
presenting these calculations it is important to identify the assumptions
which govern this analysis and to note certain caveats.
First, although some lot sales in El Diamante occurred as early
as 1966-1967, the majority of sales apparently occurred after 1968. Since
it was the developer who furnished the Planning Department in 1973 with
average lot prices, it is assumed that the 1973 figures can be used in re-
lation to 1973 cost figures without seriously distorting the gross profit
calculation. Second, as regards installment purchasers, it is assumed that
there is no lateness or default in lot payments.- Third, it is assumed
that administrative and professional services costs add approximately 14.5%
to the developer's overall costs. This estimate is derived from similar
costs in a subdivision developed under the official "normas minimas" pro-
23/
-- See Section D of this Chapter, infra, for relative comparison of
this monthly installment cost with monthly installment costs in government
sponsored housing programs. See also Chapter VI for analysis of monthly
installment costs in a subdivision developed under the minimum standards
(normas minimas) program.
24/
-- The Cock family indicated that approximately 50% of the purchasers
in their subdivisions were behind in their payments, but that all pur-
chasers did eventually pay. Interview with Elisa Cock of Cock Alvear
Hermanos y Cia Ltda. (Medellin: June 13, 1975).
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gram in Medellin -- presented as a case study in Chapter VI.
A number of caveats in interpreting the data should also be
noted. First, no information was obtainable concerning the terms under
which the developer purchased the tract. Therefore there is no discount-
ing for interest charges which the developer may have incurred. Second,
the developer's income from lot sales is received over a 5 year period in
monthly installments which include interest. Since the greater the period
of time over which income is deferred, the lower its present value, the
1973 average lot prices should be discounted accordingly. Given the ab-
sence of complete information, however, this calculation was not done.
Finally, the calculations presented below do not account for Colombian
rates of inflation which would reduce the developer's profit in real terms.
In order to simplify the presentation, the various kinds of
solutions per infrastructure category (where applicable) and their corres-
ponding costs are presented first. These kinds of solutions are then com-
bined into the three models as considered by municipal officials during
the legalization process. For each model, three weighted average lot
prices are used as presented below.
25/
-- Recent data analyzed by the World Bank concerning pirate subdivi-
sions in Bogota suggests that this estimate may in fact be too low for
pirate developments. See, Alan Carroll, "The Supply of Residential Land
by Pirate Subdividers in Bogota," (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
Preliminary Discussion Paper, December 1978). However, in the absence
of average data from a sample of Medellin pirate subdivisions, it seems
reasonable to use the 14.5% figure.
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SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES *
1. PURCHASE PRICE OF LAND:
a. Entire Tract (91,940 M ): $1,380,000
b. Net Area cost per square meter ($1,380,000/43,912 M ): $31.43
2. BULLDOZING OF ROADS: $200,000 ($4.55/M )
3. SEWERAGE:
a. Latrine system (sanitarios campesinos): $25,000 ($0.57/M )
b. Complete sewer system: $556,000 ($12.66/M )
4. WATER: $531,000 ($12.09/M2
5. ELECTRICITY: $220,400 ($5.00/M )
AVERAGE LOT PRICES
(Total No. of Lots = 380)
1. Lowest average lot price as reported by developer, assuming no
interest charges, for 380 lots.
a. Total price: $12,032
b. Cost per square meter: $94.00
2. Weighted average lot price assuming 95 lots (25% of total) sold
for $12,032 in cash and 285 lots (75% of total) on installment
method for $15,180.
a. Weighted average price: $14,393
b. Cost per square meter: $112.00
3. Weighted average lot price assuming all 380 lots sold on install-
ment method, 80 lots for $15,180 and 300 lots for $18,000.
a. Weighted average price: $17,406
b. Cost per square meter: $136.00
The potential range of profits realizable by the developer in
El Diamante depending upon the infrastructure solution implemented and upon
the lot price charged is presented below.
*Data supplied by the developer to the Division of Technical Planning,
Department of Municipal Planning. See footnote 11 supra.
-61-
TABLE 8
POTENTIAL DEVELOPER PROFITS: EL DIAMANTE 1973
COST M PER
INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS SOLUTION* LOT PRICE PROFIT (%)
A. Solution provisionally ap-
proved by Municipal Plan- 2
ning Dept., June, 1972 $12,032($94/M 69
(Acta No. 15)
22
a. Bulldozi g of roads $55.69/M $14,393($112/N ) 101
($4.55/M )
b. Latrine 5ystem 2
($0.57/N )($0.5/m / ) 2$17,406($136/M ) 144
c. Water ($12.09/m2
B. Solution actually imple-
mented in accordance
with memorandum of agree-
ment between developer
and Empresas Publicas, 2
August, 1974 $12,032($94/M ) 82
a. Bulldozigg of roads 2 2($4.55/M ) $51.63/M $14,393($112/M ) 117
b. Developer contribution
of $400,000 5or sewer- $17,406($136/M 2 ) 163
age ($9.11/M ) con-
structed by Empresas
Publicas
C. Solution: all service in- 2
frastructure provided by $12,032($94/M ) 25
developer
a. Bulldozigg of roads $75.26/M2 $14,393($112/M ) 49
($4.55/M )
b. Sewerage ($12.69/M) $17,406($l36/M 2 ) 81
c. Water ($12.09/M ) 2
d. Electricity ($5.00/M
Includes purchase price of net area ($31.43/M ) plus 14.5% for costs of
administration and professional services.
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Whatever refinements could be made in the calculations of the exact profit
ranges pursuant to the previously mentioned qualifications, it is clear
from the above figures that the developer could indeed have provided all
service infrastructure and still have realized a reasonable profit. The
fact that the developer ultimately declined to provide services except in
the partial manner described in Solution B suggests that either the institu-
tional pressure placed upon him was insufficient or that he lacked the
initial capital or later cash flow necessary to provide services. The
deferring posture of the Planning Board on the issue of sewerage require-
ments may have led the developer to conclude that he could successfully
renege on his earlier commitment to provide the permanent infrastructure.
An equally plausible explanation, however, may be that the developer's
capital as well as cash flow circumstances did not permit him to commit
more than the $400,000 pesos agreed to in the memorandum negotiated with
Empresas Publicas. The issue of developer's capital needs will be addressed
more directly in Chapters VI and VII which consider respectively the ques-
tions of subdivision development under the "minimum standards" (normas
minimas) program and credit needs of lower-income purchasers.
Since the El Diamante case was the principal motivation for
the development of the minimum standards program discussed in Chapter VI,
it is useful here to add the following postcript to the case. It will be
recalled that the problems presented by the El Diamante subdivision con-
vinced the Planning Board that in general, developers whose lands were
located on the periphery could not satisfy municipal standards and regula-
tions for subdivisions as presently structured. The minimum requirements
program for El Diamante, therefore, was proposed and discussed with the
view that a set of uniform minimal requirements should be established for
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peripherally located land intended for lower income housing subdivisions.
It is significant, however, that in the discussion of minimal development
standards, the "cost barrier" rationale was linked to a second rationale,
namely the fear of land invasion. The planning staff presented the minimal
requirements program for El Diamante to the Planning Board as a program for
[slubdivisions in the peripheral zones of the city, bordering
on pirate zones invaded or in the process of invasion, due to the
impossibility of the owners of such lands t execute the subdivision
tasks according to municipal requirements.2
In order to understand the viewpoint as quoted it is necessary to remember
that the national law to control subdivision activity was enacted in 1968,
four years prior to the planning staff presentation. In interviews con-
ducted with planning officials by the author, it was the general consensus
that the national law as enforced by the Banking Superintendency's housing
division had significantly reduced if not actually stopped the growth of
pirate settlements in Medellin. Planning officials expressed the addi-
tional view, however, that as a result of the prohibition against illegal
subdivisions, invasions had greatly increased beginning around 1970 in
the same peripheral lands, many of which belonged to well-known pirate
27/
subdividers.-- Viewed in the context of these views and the previous
26/
- Junta Municipal de Planeacion y S.T., Acta No. 15 (Sesion:
Noviembre 21, 1972).
- It is interesting to note that the developer of El Diamante pro-
vided the author with the following "Memorial" (undated) signed by 50
"invaders" of land in El Diamante:
The undersigned inhabitants of the barrio El Diamante, fraction
of Robledo, municipality of Medellin, have presented ourselves at
the office of the Messrs Cock and we have indicated that we are pre-
pared to pay for the land which, due to our need and lack of housing
we have occupied. . . .
It was the argument of this developer and others in Medellin that the
National Law No. 66 (1968) as administered by the Superintendency of (cont.)
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analysis of some of the causes of pirate developments, the quotation from
the Planning Board minutes involves a certain irony. It might be stated
as follows: to the extent that unrealistic development standards helped
stimulate the growth of the pirate submarket, it is ironic that those
standards were not seriously modified until the criminal sanctions which
cut off land supply through the pirate market in turn stimulated the growth
of invasions.
Notwithstanding the generally recognized success of the Bank-
ing Superintendency in controlling pirate subdivisions in Medellin, the
pirate submarket continues to operate, albeit at a slowed rate, in the
semi-rural peripheral areas. The following case study provides one of the
more recent examples of the market at work.
28/
C. La Cascada-
1. Physical Setting and Origin
The bus which winds its way from the center of Medellin up the
Palmitas road to San Cristobal passes close by the pirate settlement known
27/cont .
Banks prevented them from selling the land to the invaders.
On the other hand it was the view of some planning officials that some
pirate developers encouraged invasion by certain families with whom the
developers were acquainted in order to present the city administration and
the Superintendency of Banks with an accomplished fact and to require the
provision of services. These same families, it was suggested, later paid
the developer for the lots.
28/
-- The analysis presented in this section of the La Cascada pirate
subdivision is derived from the author's written survey and open-ended
interviews during March, April and May, 1975 of all but four of the families
living in the subdivision. Because of the limited sample size (n = 23), the
data presented is illustrative only. A description of the author's
research methodology may be found in Appendix B.
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Fig. 9: Aerial view of Medellin indicating Pirate subdivision "La Cascada"(see arrow) . Source: Instituto Geograf ico "Agustin Codazzi.
Fig. 10: Aerial closeup of pirate subdivision "La Cascada" (circled).
Source: Instituto Geografico "Agustin Codazzi"l.
65B
Fig. 11: Hillside view of "La Cascada" (foreground). Barrio
Santa Margarita in background. Source: Author's photo.
Fia. 12 View of Ue ellin frora "La Cas;x . In foreground
is parcela project of Barrios de Jesus. See p. 87 n. 56.
Source: Author's photo.
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PIRATE SUBDIVISION: LA CASCADA
6
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FIG.13 FREQUENCY OF LOT PURCHASES BY YEAR
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3
VERBAL PURCHASE WRITTEN PURCHASE
AND SALE AGREEMENT AND SALE
CRECEIPTS FOR AGREEMENTS
MONTHLY PAYMENTS ONLY)
FIG. 14 TYPES OF DOCUMENTS HELD BY PURCHASERS
REGISTERED TITLE
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Note: Percentages adjusted to reflect the fact that one family still
lived in a residence elsewhere in Medellin.
The median period of time families had resided in their last residences
prior to purchase was 3.4 years. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the families
had been renters in their prior places of residence. Approximately 17%
had been home owners, and another 17% had either lived with relatives or
received housing as managers or caretakers of estates. The data is con-
sistent with the findings of other studies in Medellfn which indicated
that most lower income families, whether originally from Medellin or from
rural or small town areas, pass through a "renter" stage in Medellin during
which they accumulate some savings and begin to inquire about lots avail-
29/
able for sale.- The percentage of families migrating directly from
rural or small town areas to pirate settlements in MedellIn is relatively
small.
b. Income Levels and Employment
Table 10 presents the distribution of monthly family income
30/for La Cascada- within the context of the overall income distribution
for Medellin. The incomes of all the families in La Cascada fell within
29/
-- See, Patricia Velez Mejia, "Flujos Migratorios a las Areas de
Tugurios y Factores Fisicas y Socio-economicas que Inciden en al Forma-
cion y Persistencia de este Tipo de Habitat" (Medellin: Tesis de Grado,
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Facultad de Sociologia, 1974), p. 30;
Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa, Diagnostico General sobre el
Problema de la Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin: Departamento Administrativo
de Planeacion y S.T., 1975), pp. 223-243.
30/
-- The incomes of families were all self-declared. The author was
not able to verify them. For purposes of this analysis they will be
assumed to have been correctly reported; however, the reliability of the
specific numbers should be viewed with caution.
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TABLE 10
LA CASCADA: INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES COMPARED WITH FAMILY
INCOME DISTRIBUTION FOR URBAN AREA OF MEDELLIN 1975
MONTHLY INCOME RANGES % OF % OF
BY INCOME LEVEL ($): FAMILIES FAMILIES TOTAL %
MEDELLIN MEDELLIN LA CASCADA MEDELLIN LA CASCADA
Low Income
0 - 1,500 7.24 39.13
1,501 - 3,000 21.78 47.82 59 100
3,001 - 5,000 30.33 13.04
Middle Income
5,001 - 7,000 14.94 0.0
7,001 - 9,000 9.63 0.0 35 0
9,001 - 12,000 6.03 0.0
12,001 - 16,000 4.38 0.0
High Income
16,000 or more 6.00 0.0 6 0
Note: Table adapted from table presented in Mosquera and Hinestrosa,
op. cit., p. 101. Income categories are those defined by the
National Department of Planning. Author's data is added to table.
the low income category which comprises 59% of Medellin's population. The
median monthly income was $1,632 pesos. Approximately 87% of La Cascada's
families had monthly incomes of less than $3,500 of which 45% had incomes
no greater than $1,500 per month, and 55% had incomes which ranged between
$1,500 and $3,500. In most cases, family income depended upon the earnings
of the household head alone. Only 25% of the families had more than one
member employed.1- The jobs held by family members may be grouped among
31/
- The term "family member" as used here includes relatives living
in the home.
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the previously defined employment categories as follows:
Industry: 45%
Commerce and Services: 42%
Government: 0%
Independent: 13%
The data suggest that as in the case of El Diamante, a large percentage of
the employed work in factory or construction jobs which generally provide
a stable form of income. The average monthly income of workers in this
category was $1,593. In contrast to El Diamante, a high percentage of the
La Cascada residents' jobs also fell within the commerce and services
category. These consisted primarily of service type jobs such as a watch-
man, a taxi or truck driver, or a salesperson. According to the residents
surveyed, these jobs also tended to be relatively stable. The average
monthly income for workers in this category was $1,252. In contrast,
residents who were independently employed (lottery ticket seller, smelter,
mechanic, tailor, etc.) emphasized the variability of the amount of work
they received. Their average monthly income, however, was $1,275, slightly
better than those employed in commercial and service jobs.
3. Physical Characteristics of the Subdivision
The total area of the subdivision is 6,400 square meters, of which
approximately 3,789 M or 59% was subdivided into 31 lots.2- The developer
apparently did not make his own subdivision plan but relied instead upon
32/
-- The net area indicated is an approximate estimate based upon
the lot dimensions reported to the author as well as the author's own
estimates of the sizes of 4 additional lots whose owners could not
be reached for interviews. The author was told in 1975 that all lots
in the subdivision had been sold.
-69-
an old plan that had been drawn in 1952.-/ A rough entrance road was
cleared, but what little street and walk way areas that exist were done
primarily by the residents themselves. Although lot sizes vary in the
subdivision, two lot sizes predominate: 160 M and 147 M . Approximately
one half of the lots are 160 M with a frontage of 8 meters and a depth of
20 meters. Another third of the lots are 147 M with frontage and depth
dimensions of 8 meters by 18.4 meters. The remainder of the lots are
2 2
considerably smaller, ranging in size from 31 M to 118 M . Except for
the smaller and irregular lot sizes just mentioned the lot sizes in La
Cascada are approximately 15-25% larger than the average lot sizes of El
Diamante and most other pirate subdivisions within the urban perimeter of
to 34/Medellin.-- The larger lot sizes purchased by the residents indicate the
cheaper price of unserviced, steeply sloped peripheral land as well as the
articulated desire of most families to have a backyard area or solar in
which to grow food crops such as yucca, plantains, etc. As regards the
latter point, it is important to emphasize thatthe purchasers in La Cascada
were not recent rural immigrants but rather previously established resi-
dents of Medellin who sought land and home ownership where it was still
available, namely on the periphery of Medellin.
4. Economic Aspects of the Subdivision
Prior to their decisions to purchase a lot in La Cascada, only 30%
33/
- This plan is referred to in the written installment sale agreements
which the developer gave to a limited number of purchasers. A copy of
the actual plan was not obtainable. See Appendix C for a copy of the
written installment sale contract used by the developer in La Cascada.
34/2
-- The average lot size in El Diamante was 128 M . For other pirate
subdivision lot size averages see, Molina and Arias, op. cit., p. 20. One
exceptioi was the pirate barrio Castilla, which included some lots as large
as 256 M . See Appendix D.
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of the residents had inquired about the availability of lots in other
barrios. Those residents who did check first, reported that the minimum
lot prices found ranged between $2,000 and $9,000 pesos; the maximum prices
ranged between $10,000 and $30,000 pesos. All but one of the barrios had
partial or complete services. The reasons why these residents chose to
purchase in La Cascada instead were varied. Some identified negative
qualities about the other lots considered, such as the greater expense of
the serviced lot and the lack of confidence in the contemplated "deal".
Others stated their reasons in terms of La Cascada, namely it was a healthy
area to live in and the lot size provided space for a backyard. However,
the predominant reason cited by most residents, including those who had
not checked elsewhere in the market, was the connection of a friend or re-
lative who either lived in La Cascada or knew of the availability of lots
for purchase.
Except for the highest segment of the price range, the other barrio
lots examined by families prior to their purchase in La Cascada were not
significantly more expensive. This fact together with the reasons noted
for purchasing in La Cascada suggest the hypothesis that it is the plot
34A/
of land itself rather than its serviced status that is most important.-
Some support for this hypothesis can be found in the result of
the author's survey of La Cascada in which 30% of the residents indicated
that the developer had not promised services prior to their purchase. Lo-
sada and Gomez in their study based upon a larger sample of residents in
Bogota found that 41% of the residents asserted that they had not been pro-
mised services prior to purchasing lots. The authors hypothesized from
this response that at least 2/5 of the purchasers in pirate barrios bought
lots knowing tht the lots would lack all public services indefinitely.
See Losada and Gomez, og. cit., p. 142. The hypothesis stated in the text
is also indirectly supported by La Cascada residents' responses to the
legal issue of whether it was best to have legal title to their lots or
the provision of services. Over 80% of the residents indicated that given
that choice they would prefer to obtain legal title. Some, of course,
noted the link between having legal title and being able to obtain services (cont.)
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The purchasers in a pirate subdivision appear to expect that one way or
another (legally or by contraband), they will eventually obtain services.
In the meantime, the possession of a plot of land and the opportunity to
build according to one's needs are most important.
a. Terms of Purchase
As previously indicated, a few of the La Cascada residents
received legal title to their property as a result of the sale of the
first two lots by means of a registered deed. Thereafter, however, the
developer stopped transferring by deed and instead entered into "install-
ment sale" agreements with purchasers. Approximately 35% of the residents
had received written agreements; but the majority received only a "verbal"
promise to transfer title upon payment of the purchase price. The legal
significance of this distinction as well as resident attitudes toward other
aspects of the legal system which governs their transaction, will be dis-
cussed in Chapter IV.
Under both the written and the verbal installment agreements,
the terms of purchase, except for the price, were essentially the same:
Downpayment: $2,000-
Monthly Installments: No less than $100.00
Term: 4 years
Late Payment Charge: 18% per year on balance overdue.
34A/cont. legitimately. In contrast, however, it should be noted
that Doebele in his study of Bogota pirate barrios found that in response
to a similar question, 73% of those surveyed thought both legal title and
obtaining services were equally valuable. See Doebele, op. cit., p. 53
n. 2. The difference in response may be attributable to the way the
question of comparisons was asked by the interviewer(s) in the respective
surveys.
35/.
-- This figure was the most frequently reported amount of downpayment
for the purchase period 1970-1974. Other downpayment amounts in order of
frequency were $1,500 and $1,000.
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During the period 1970-1975, the price for the $160 M lots ranged between
$7,500 and $15,000 pesos, and the price for the 147 M lots ranged between
$9,000 and $17,000 pesos. This means, for example, that in order to pay
off the balance due on a lot priced at $15,000 with a $2,000 downpayment,
the purchaser had to pay monthly installments of approximately $270 pesos
in order to avoid the 18% late payment charge (1.5% a month). As stipulated,
however, the purchase terms did give the purchaser the flexibility of
paying as little as $100 pesos on a given month if his finances were tight
and making up the difference over subsequent months.
In order to pay the initial downpayment on their lots in La
Cascada, purchasers relied upon the following resources:
Resource Purchasers (%)-/
General savings 35.2
Cesantias 23.5
Salary 5.8
Sale of prior home 11.8
Loan of relative or friend 23.5
The purchasers' responses indicate that in order to pay the relatively
large initial downpayment amount most purchasers obtained the necessary
sum either from savings accumulated in anticipation thereof (35%) or
through external resources such as cesantfas and the loans of friends or
relatives (47%). Only 6% of the purchasers used their weekly wages to
finance the downpayment. In contrast, over 90% of the purchasers reported
that they paid the monthly installments from their salaries.
36/
--- Percentage adjusted to reflect purchasers excluded from total
by virtue of their having paid the full purchase price, already having
legal title, or having received the lot as a gift from a relative.
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b. Construction
Once the downpayment had been made, approximately 30% of the
purchasers reported that they began construction of their homes within 1
month, another 13% within 3 months, 9% within a year, but surprisingly,
almost 22% began construction more than a year after purchasing their
37/lots.- An examination of the circumstances of the individual families
who delayed construction for more than a year reveals the following. In
two of the cases, the families were the transferees of the lots which had
originally been sold by registered deed. These families unlike those with-
out legal title, may have felt less compulsion to begin some form of con-
struction to establish physical possession of their lots. In addition,
one of the families already owned a home elsewhere. Exceptional difficul-
ties in accumulating sufficient resources to begin construction may have
explained the delay of two other families. This conclusion seems reason-
able in view of the fact that one of the families purchased only 32 square
meters, while the other limited its construction on its 160 square meter
lot to 10.2 square meters. Another family became so disillusioned after
witnessing flooding through its lot that upon failing to obtain a "written"
installment contract from the developer (so that it could try to resell
the lot) it left and did not return for over a year.
In order to finance the construction of their homes, the pur-
chasers relied upon single resources as well as resource combinations to
the following extent:
37/
-- Of the remaining 26% interviewed, 22% had no response and for 4%,
a house was already in existence on the lot.
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TABLE 11
RESOURCES USED BY LA CASCADA RESIDENTS TO CONSTRUCT THEIR HOMES
Construction Resource(s) Families (%)
1. Salary only 17.39
Salary and cesantlas 4.34
Salary and savings 13.04
2. Savings only 13.04
Savings and cesantias 8.69
3. Loan only 13.04
Loan, savings and sale of other home 4.34
4. Cesantias only 4.34
Cesantlas and gift 4.34
Cesantias and accident compensation 4.34
5. Sale of prior home 8.69
6. Income from rented agricultural plot 4.34
From the resources indicated above it appears that salaries and savings
were the two individual resources most relied upon, both alone and in com-
bination with other resources (for 57% of the families). Loans, alone or
in combination with other resources, were used by 17% of the families.
Although cesantlas was not used frequently as a single resource, it was
used in combination with other resources by 26% of the families. In fact,
salaries, savings and cesantlas, alone or in combinations with one another,
were ueed by 60% of the families.
Table 12 sets forth by monthly family income subcategories,
38/each family's amount of construction investment-- in relation to the
38/
- These figures in most cases represent residents' estimates based
upon memory rather than upon written records. The figures, therefore,
should be viewed as indicative of the general amounts invested rather than
specific cost estimates.
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TABLE 12
AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION BY LOT PURCHASERS IN LA CASCADA AS OF 1 97 5a
Family Yearly
Monthly Lot Resource(s) Used Area Time Total Average
Income Price To Finance M2 Period Amount Amt. Inves-
Range ($) ($) Construction Constr. (yrs) ($) ted ($)
3,000 cesantlas + accid. 64.0 4.5 32,000 7,111
compensation
7,500 cesantlas + savings 51.2 5.0 20,000 4,000
1,500 7,500 cesantlas + savings 10.2 0.8 6,540 6.540
or 7,500 loan from factory 15.0 1 week 12,100 12,100
less 15,000 cesantlas 64.0 2.0 18,000 9,000
13,000 rent from agric. 31.7 1.5 18,000 - 12,000
plot
17,000 salary 16.0 1.0 1 2,000 2,000
16,000 sale of prior home 32.0 1.0 15,000 15,000
5,000 salary + savings 32.0 3.0 8,000 2,660
6,250
6,250
9,500
7,500
9,003
10,000
17,000
15,600
(gift)
5,000
16,000
sale of prior home
salary + savings
salary
general savings
general savings
loan, relative/friend
loan through company
"housing fund"
cesantlas + salary
censant2as + gift
general savings
salary
35.2
70.4
32.0
64.0
51.2
35.2
16.0
44.8
23.2
61.4
9.0
7.0
4.0
1.0
!.0
2.0
0.2
0.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
40,000
25,000
1,000b
8,000
40,000
10,000
35,000
20,000
18,000
1,100
13, 000
3,001 8,050 salary + savings
14,000 loan, savings, home
, sale5,000 15,000 salary
4,444
3 ,571
250
3,000
13 333
5,000
35,000
20,000
13,000
1,100
13,000
18,000
10,160
13,333
Notes
a Investment totals include cost of materials and contracted labor, but do
not include the unpaid labor of family members.
b House already constructed on lot at time of ourchase.
-,501
3,000
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square meter area constructed, the period of construction and the financial
resources employed. The initial purchase price of each lot is also in-
cluded. In general, the figures suggest that those families who invested
the largest total amounts in the construction of their houses most often
relied upon such resources as loans, the cesantias or a property sale, all
of which provided ready lump sums in addition to the cumulative sums
achieved through saving. This observation is particularly true for the
families whose monthly incomes fell within the "1,500 or less" subcategory.
Only a few families (21%) in the higher monthly income subcategories
($1,501-3,000; $3,001-5,000) were able to invest comparatively large total
amounts in construction from salary and savings resources, alone or combined.
A comparison of averages for the three family income subcate-
gories in La Cascada with respect to amount of area constructed, period of
construction and total amount invested reveals the following:
TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS OF LOT CONSTRUCTION OF
LA CASCADA FAMILIES BY MONTHLY INCOME SUBCATEGORIES
Family Monthly Average Area 2 Average Time Average Amount
Income Range ($) Constructed (M ) Period (yrs) Invested ($)
1,500 or less 35.1 1.9 14,626 (417/M2
1,501 - 3,000 46.3 2.7 19,645 (424/M2
3,001 - 5,000 59.7 2.3 27,800 (466/M2
As regards the amount of area constructed and the amount invested in con-
struction, the results seem reasonable; namely, other things remaining
equal, the higher a family's monthly income the greater the amount of area
and the amount of money it is likely to use to construct its home. It
might be expected, however, that the average period of time used to con-
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struct the dwelling would consistently decrease as income increased. The
reasoning would be that families with higher incomes presumably could afford
to subcontract more of the construction tasks and thereby reduce the amount
of time typically required where the owners themselves do most of the con-
struction in incremental fashion over many weekends. It does appear to be
true that higher income families in pirate subdivisions use a greater pro-
portion of subcontracted labor than families with lower incomes. For
example, Molinas and Arias (1976) in their study of the housing submarket
in Medellin found that families in El Diamante, the highest income pirate
barrio of the three studied, subcontracted 53% of the labor compared to
39/32% and 23% in the other two barrios.- However, consistent with the La
Cascada data, they also reported that the time period required for each
stage of construction was, in most cases, greater in El Diamante than in
40/.the other barrios.-
A number of factors, taken together, appear to explain the
longer construction period in pirate subdivisions for higher income families
despite their capacity to subcontract a larger proportion of the labor
than families with lesser incomes. First, of course, the amount of con-
struction required is greater because most families with higher monthly
incomes choose to build upon a greater number of square meters and design
a floor plan that usually involves more rooms and consequently more materials
and construction time. The second factor which perhaps is most important
in combination with the first, is the fact that regardless of the amount
of contracted labor, it is the family head who nevertheless supervises the
--/ Molina and Arias, op. cit., p. 58.
40/
-- Ibid. , pp. 31-40 .
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41/construction.- As a result, work is still restricted primarily to week-
ends and holidays. The greater quantity of construction involved, there-
fore, naturally extends the number of time periods (weekends) required to
complete construction. Finally, since the higher income families utilize
a greater quantity of quality materials in their construction,- this
fact together with the care exercised by contracted labor under the owner's
supervision may tend to further lengthen the time period.
c. Other Economic Aspects
In studies of pirate subdivisions in Bogota,- it has been
observed that once purchasers have built their basic one story structure,
they often rent a portion of their housing unit to another family or in-
dividual and may often add a second floor for rental purposes as well.
Thus, the land, which appreciates in value, together with the house itself,
provide the means for a family to gradually increase its economic worth
and status. Consistent with this general model, approximately 74% of the
families surveyed in La Cascada indicated that they intended to add a
second floor. And 27% indicated an intention to rent the additional space. 4 4"
41/ Ibid., p. 60.
42/
-- Ibid., p. 41.
43/
-- Georges Vernez, "Bogota s Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity for
Metropolitan Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1973), p. 104; Rodrigo Losada and Hernando Gomez,
La Tierra en el Mercado Pirata de Bogota (Bogota: Funcacion Para la Educa-
cion Superior y el Desarrollo, 1976), pp. 92-93. The survey cited by Vernez
found that approximately 1/3 of the pirate barrio families rented a portion
of their dwelling. Losada and Gomez's survey indicated that approximately
10% of the families rented.
44/
- In response to a related question in the author's survey, approx-
imately 15% of the residents indicated an interest in buying and selling
other lots for added income. Author's Survey Question No. 3.10.
5. Provision of Services and Developer Profits
a. Provision of Services
Over 70% of the residents in La Cascada stated that at the
time of purchase the developer had promised at least one or more of the
basic services of water, sewerage and electricity. In fact, none were pro-
vided. In the meantime, therefore, residents satisfied their service needs
by taking water from the nearby Iguana tributary of the Medellin River and
taking electricity by contraband.-5 By 1973, thirteen homes had been
constructed in the subdivision. That same year a group of residents made
an official complaint to the Superintendency of Banks about the developer's
failure to provide services and his refusal to give written purchase and
sale contracts. Following an inspection by the Superintendency residents
were reportedly advised to stop installment payments to the developer;
46/approximately 3/4 of the residents did stop payments.--
The residents subsequently sought water and sewerage services
directly from Empresas Publicas. Following a study and plan of the area,
- One resident indicated that when the electricity had first been
connected by contraband means, the Empresas Publicas had cut down the
lines. The next time, after residents had reconnected the electricity
in the same manner, they each allegedly paid the company's representative
$100.00 pesos not to cut the lines down. Author's Interview Notes
(Medellin: La Cascada, February 9, 1975).
46/
- Author's Interview Notes (Medellin: La Cascada, January 19, 1975)
and Survey. A memorandum dated March 14, 1973 in the files of the Medellin
Sectional Office of the Superintendency of Banks indicated that the
Superintendency representative who inspected the La Cascada subdivision
advised the Chief of the Sectional Office to send a notice to the developer
prohibiting the further sale of lots. There is no evidence, however, that
this notice, if sent, had any effect upon the developer's activities. By
1975, fourteen (14) more houses had been constructed upon lots, 7 of
which were sold after 1973.
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however, the utilities company concluded it was too costly to install the
sewerage and water systems.-- After residents' sewage began to seep into
neighboring lots, the residents appealed to the Department of Health which
agreed to supply La Cascada with the necessary materials to install the
subdivision sewerage lines through a mixed program of resident self help
and monetary contributions. The Department used the study and plan of
Empresas Publicas to calculate the following 1975 budget per family:
Total cost per family (including connection): $1,200
Minimum contribution for sewerage connection
by Empresas Publicas: $ 800
Self help labor: calculated at $5 pesos per hour on
the assumption that the typical unskilled laborer
earned approximately $40 per day.
At the time of the author's survey in 1975, approximately one third of the
families had contributed money and labor equivalent to the $800.00 minimum.
As regards the remaining families, the subdivision leaders were having
difficulty obtaining the necessary cooperation. A satisfactory solution
for the provision of water had still not been found.
b. Developer Profits
The calculation of developer profits in the case of La Cascada
is largely hypothetical since the majority of residents had ceased to make
installment payments. In addition, it is not known what costs the developer
47/
-- Interview with Dr. Juan Esteban Duque, Health Inspector, Secretary
of Health -- San Crist6bal Section (San Crist6bal: February 3, 1975).
The provision of water to the subdivision presented the most difficult
technical problem for Empresas Publicas. The utilities company determined
that in order to supply La Cascada with water, large quantities of water
would have to be pumped between two storage tanks, which apparently was
too risky and costly. Interview with Dr. Leo'n Dario Uribe T., Chief of
the Housing Rehabilitation Division, Empresas Pnblicas of Medellin
(Medellln: May 19, 1975).
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may have incurred, if any, in what appeared to be minimal preparation of
the subdivision site. Therefore, the following calculation of profit is
derived from the following figures, known and estimated:
1. Purchase p5ice of land 2(6,400 M : approx. $4.00/M ) $25,000
2. Administration and professional
services (estimated on the basis
of 14.5% af cost) $ 6,372
3. Cost of bulldozing entrance road
and streets (estimated on the
basis of $5/M2 of the net area,
3,789 M2 ) $18,945
4. Total sales $230,650
The preceding developer costs and total lot sales as of 1975 may be pre-
sented in the following manner to show net profits:
Total sales $230,650
Costs:
Purchase price of land $25,000
48/Cost of bulldozing roads- $18,945
Administration and professional
servicesi49 $ 6,372 $ 50,317
Net Profit $180,333
In other words, on an initial investment of $25,000 and assumed (though
unlikely) additional costs of $25,317, the developer hypothetically made
a profit of $180,333 pesos or 258%.
As in the case of El Diamante, it would appear that the deve-
48/
- Estimated using 1975 bulldozing costs for "minimum standards"
subdivision ($10.00/M2 for net area), adjusted to 1966 prices, based upon
the inflation index average for "housing" costs for "employed persons"
and "workers". Revista del Banco de la Republica, September 1978, Table
8.4.1 and December 1973, p. 1863. The correction for price inflation
(260%) gave a cost per square meter of $3.80. This figure was increased
to $5.00/M 2 to allow for the difficulty of the terrain. Net area for La
Cascada was estimated at 3,789 M2.
- Estimated at 14.5% of costs.
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loper, assuming he had the necessary capital, could have provided at least
the water and sewer infrastructure for the subdivision. This may be
illustrated by using budget estimates provided by the Department of Health
for the entire cost of the sewer and water infrastructure, using the self
help of the community, which arguably the developer could have solicited
from the residents of La Cascada. The Department of Health estimates were
the following:
1. Sewerage Cost Allocations
a. Department of Health (or Developer) $24,750
b. La Cascada residents $17,164
SUBTOTAL $41,914
2. Water (without community contribution) $10,000
TOTAL $51,914
These additional infrastructure costs give the following calculation of
net profits:
Total sales $230,650
Costs:
Purchase price, bulldozing of roads
and overhead: $50,317
Infrastructure: $51,914 $102,231
Net Profit $128,419
The net profit, with infrastructure installed for sewer and water, would
have been $128,419 or 26%.50/
6. Conclusion
The case study of La Cascada was presented to illustrate the
characteristics of a developing pirate subdivision in the semi-rural peri-
phery of Medellin. It is hypothesized that La Cascada is representative
50/
-- The same caveats in interpreting these profit percentages as were
noted in the case study of El Diamante would apply. See Section B, supra.
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of a slow, perhaps less visible process of pirate subdividing that has
continued and will continue to occur in small areas of the semi-rural
periphery despite the generally successful efforts of the Superintendency
of banks in Medellin to halt uncontrolled subdividing. This hypothesis
seems reasonable in light of a number of considerations. Before presen-
ting these considerations, however, one background observation should be
made. That is, that it is important to recognize the high degree of in-
dividualism which exists among Colombians and which in turn fuels the
desire for single family ownership as opposed to rental or cooperative
housing solutions. This characteristic was emphasized to the author in
some of the interviews with local officials and was very evident in the
responses given to the author in his survey. This individualism combined
with the common sense perception that land appreciates in value and that
ownership of a plot can provide means for economic self-improvement, give
the average Colombian family strong incentives to find and purchase a lot
by whatever means possible. (See Figure 15A,)
With the above observation in mind, the following considerations
would seem to support the hypothesis stated. First, as mentioned previously,
the Municipal Planning Department estimates for 1973 indicated a housing
deficit of 26,050 units, of which 83% existed among families with incomes
of $4,000 pesos or less. Medellin continues to increase in population
by approximabely 55,000 persons per year. In 1976 the Planning Department
estimated that assuming 6 persons per household, the annual population
growth would require the construction of approximately 9,100 units per
year. Between the end of 1973 and the end of 1974, however, only 3,000
units were constructed, leaving an accumulated deficit in 1975 of approx-
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51/imately 40,000 units.-- It seems reasonable to expect that given the
increasing deficit of housing, particularly for lower income families,
that such families will continue as before, to create their own housing
solutions. While such solutions may require land invasion, the data
presented in Chapter V suggest that the majority of potential pirate lot
purchasers reject that alternative in favor of some sort of purchase and
sale transaction.
Second, the pattern of "renter to pirate lot purchaser" observed
in La Cascada, El Diamante and other pirate subdivisions appears to exist
and continue even for the lowest income group of renters, the inquilinato,
52/or tenement-type house renter.- This form of housing has not received
much study in Medellin. However, a preliminary study of inquilinatos by
the Department of Municipal Planning in 1976 indicated that only about
43% had some form of economic activity, and that income was derived pri-
marily from the service sector, most often as street vendors. Of those
who had some form of employment or subemployment, 80% had monthly incomes
of less than $1,500. Despite the low income level of most of the inquilinatos,
the Planning Department discovered in this 1976 study that various families
Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., pp. 197-198.
52/
-- This form of renting is distinguishable from commercial apartment
renting. The term "tenement-type" house renter is used here because the
inquilinatos find rooms to rent not only in centrally located buildings
which have been converted to typical tenement houses, but also in the
peripherally located pirate barrios. The important characteristic of the
inquilinato family is that it rents limited space at a high rent. The
1973 census of Medellin indicated that there existed 870 housesof inquil-
inatos located in central downtown locations as well as in some of the
peripheral Pirate barrio areas. These inquilinato houses were occupied
by 6,262 households, or 7.2 households per tenant house. Mosquera and
Hinestrosa, op. cit., p. 232.
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(no statistic was given) nevertheless had already purchased a lot in a
pirate barrio or were in the process of paying for it.
Viewed in the context of the La Cascada data, the Planning Depart-
ment's findings are particularly significant. Approximately 87% of the
total number of families in La Cascada reported monthly incomes of $3,000
pesos or less. Of these families, 45% reported monthly incomes of $1,500
or less. Of the total number of families reporting incomes of $3,000 or
less, 60% had been renters in such barrios as Castilla, Berlin, El Diamante,
Manrique, Santa Cruz and others -- barrios, most of which were identified
by the Planning Department as containing the greatest concentration of
.53/inquilinatos.-- More than 90% of these families purchased their lot in
La Cascada after 1970, many in 1974. The inference which can be drawn
from both sources of data is the following. Despite institutional con-
straints upon the pirate market and the decreasing availability of land
within the urban area, low income families in Medellin, even those with
incomes of $1,500 or less, continue to aspire to land ownership and manage
to accumulate sufficient savings to create a demand which is being met in
small semi-rural pirate subdivisions.
A final consideration which supports the hypothesis of a continuing
pirate submarket in the semi-rural areas, is the physical difficulty of
policing such activity through the Superintendency of Banks. Technically
it is the police department's "control of construction" unit which is res-
ponsible for discovering illegal construction and informing the Superinten-
dency. However, by law, the Superintendency may only act to control a sub-
- Ibid., p. 228B.
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54/divisionof 5 units or more.-- With a staff of 8 persons, including
secretarial help, and only two or three staff members routinely available
to make insepctions, the Superintendency is not equipped administratively
to do follow-up inspections of small, slowly developing pirate subdivisions
in the semi-rural areas. In La Cascada, for example, 13 houses had been
built before the Superintendency made its first inspection in 1973. Lot
sales and construction continued thereafter despite a written warning
from the Superintendency to the developer.
The preceding considerations suggest the reasonableness of the
hypothesis; they do not prove the hypothesis. Proof of continued pirate
market activity in the semi-rural periphery depends upon future studies by
the Department of Municipal Planning. The Department has acknowledged that
the semi-rural as well as rural areas surrounding Medellin have not been
studied in much detail.-- Few statistics are available. Presumably stat-
istics will become available as the Department seeks to implement the
"micro-farm" or green belt policy at the urban perimeter.
4/ Congreso Nacional, Ley 66 de 1968, art. 2. The Chief of the Super-
intendency's Housing Division in Medellin indicated that the Medellin
office construed the subdivision requirement of "5 units or more" to mean
that the sale of lots and construction thereon need not be continuous.
Thus, technically a pirate developer could not avoid the law by selling
lots through multiple agents (comisionistas) in quantities of less than
5 units each. Interview with Dr. Alvaro Cordoba Garcia, Chief of the
Medellin Sectional Office of the Superintendency of Banks (Medellin:
July 2, 1975). However pragmatic the Sectional Office's interpretation
of the unit requirement, it nevertheless was clear that the Superintendency
of Banks in Medellin did not have sufficient personnel to repeatedly
inspect small, slowly growing pirate subdivisions such as La Cascada.
-- See, Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit. pp. 129-131.
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D. Comparison With Other Housing Submarkets in Medellin
In order to understand the vitality and viability of the pirate housing
submarket as illustrated in the preceding case studies, it is necessary to
view it within the comparative context of other housing submarkets in
Medellin. These submarkets may be grouped into three general categories.
The first category consists of housing produced by private commercial
companies. Government housing programs, national and municipal, constitute
a second housing submarket; and a third, relatively smal, housing submarket
exists through the efforts of private, nonprofit organizations. This sec-
tion will briefly consider the first category; the remainder of the analysis
will be devoted to the second category, namely, the government housing
programs, since they provide the largest quantitative alternative to the
pirate housing submarket. Because of the limited quantity of housing solu-
tions which the private nonprofit sector can provide, the third category
56/
will not be discussed in the text.--
56/
-- The most significant organization in this sector in Medellin is
Barrios de Jesus, founded in 1961. In 1975 the organization had three prin-
cipal kinds of housing programs: (1) single family homes; (2) single family
homes on semi-rural plots (parcelas); and (3) a program for loaning building
materials to squatter-type dwellers (tugurianos). The most recent projects
representative of these three program categories were the following:
Program/ No. of Down- Monthly
Project Yr. Solutions Price payment Installment
(1) La Frontera '72 10 s.f. $35,000 $6,000 $300 for 2 yrs. then
$50.
(2) Fuente Clara '75 75 parcelas $70,000 $8,000 $500, 14% on bal.
(3) La Maria '74-'75 100 families $5-8,000 $ 100 $100, 8-12% on bal.
Information source: Interviews with Dr. Alvaro Duque Ramirez, Director of
Barrios de Jesdfs and Dra. Luz Elena L6pez, Social Worker, Barrios de
Jesu's (Medellin: March 17, 1975).
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1. The Commercial Housing Market
In 1975, the minimum price of a house produced by commercial firms
ranged from $120,000 to $200,000 pesos, the most typical minimum price
being approximately $150,000.-/ None of the commercial firms provide
financing schemes for purchasers. The full price must be paid upon trans-
fer. Many employers in private companies, however, do provide a "housing
fund" (fondo de vivienda) through which "workers" (obreros) and "employees"
(empleados) may obtain housing loans backed by future severance payments
(cesantlas). In 1976, one of the larger housing fund loan amounts avail-
able for "workers" was $45,000 (maximum) at 4.0% per year with a late pay-
ment charge of 1.0%. For "employees" the maximum loan amount from the
same fund was also $45,000 but the respective interest charges were 8.0%
58/per year and 1.0% for late payments.-- As the data from the two case
studies indicated, however, few of the pirate barrio residents worked in
59/places of employment that had housing funds.- Moreover, it is apparent
that even if workers (or employees) had had access to a housing fund, the
minimum priced house ($120,000) would have been beyond their financial
-- Data provided by the commercial housing firm, Humberto Ochoa y
Compania, Medellin. In 1979, the minimum cost of a commercially produced
house was approximately $400,000. Ibid.
58/
-- Information obtained from Dr. Gilberto Barrero, Official Appraiser
of the Housing Fund for Empresas Pdblicas (Medellin: April 7, 1979). Al-
though the housing fund of Empresas Piblicas is larger than most company
funds, and its loan amounts are somewhat larger, its structure and operation
are similar to housing funds in private companies. Some companies provide
housing loans without interest. Ibid.
59/
-- Only one resident in La Cascada (see Table 11, supra) indicated he
had obtained a loan ($35,000) from his company's housing fund. No "housing
fund" resources were cited by Molina and Arias, op. cit., in their survey
of El Diamante.
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reach.
2. Government Housing Programs
a. National: Institute de Credito Territorial
In June, 1975, the Antioquia sectional office of Colombia's
national housing agency, Instituto de Credito Territorial (hereinafter
referred to as I.C.T.), ran the following newspaper advertisement:
YOU KNOW THAT A HOUSE COSTS WHAT YOU PAY FOR THE DOWNPAYMENT
The rest is like paying rent for oneself.
Any family with limited income can acquire a house for only a
$12,000 downpayment in the Residential Unit DOCE DE OCTUBRE
/12th of October/.
And housing is not just the house. Housing is a house with all basic
services.
Your house in DOCE DE OCTUBRE has: Legally installed water, sewer
and electrical services, access roads, schools and transportation.
Additional services such as: Health centers, recreation areas, a
church, a swimming pool etc. You may expand and improve your house
little by little according to your own taste, initiative and resources.
Your house in DOCE DE OCTUBRE will cost you practically the same as
a lot in a pirate barrio. But in DOCE DE OCTUBRE your family will
enjoy all the services of a modern and pleasant development. And we
turn over the house to you with an officially registered deed.
And all for only $12,000 downpayment, which you can pay using your
cesantias and your June bonus. This father's day, give yourself
this big gift.20/
The content and tone of the advertisement indicate a clear attempt by I.C.T.
to appeal to potential purchasers in the pirate housing market. Indeed,
it was the opinion of the manager of the sectional office that the housing
units offered in the Doce de Octubre development could successfully compete
with the offerings in the pirate housing market; the development simply
60/
-- El Colomnbiano, June 15, 1975.
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61/
needed to be properly marketed.--
As regards the "marketing" issue, it would appear that the
I.C.T. manager was correct in at least one respect, namely, in general,
potential purchasers in pirate subdivisions may have had limited awareness
of I.C.T. programs. If residents surveyed in La Cascada are at all repre-
sentative of residents in other pirate subdivisions, this conclusion would
appear to be correct. Approximately 57% of those surveyed indicated that
they had not heard of I.C.T.'s programs prior to their purchase of a lot
in La Cascada. Another 26% acknowledged having heard of the housing pro-
grams prior to purchase, but did not apply. Only 13% of the residents had
actually applied to I.C.T for housing and had either been unsuccessful in
their application or had decided to purchase a lot instead. Of those resi-
dents who were aware of the I.C.T.'s programs and declined to apply, the
following reasons were given for their decisions. First, approximately
22% expressed the view that they preferred to build their own homes, and
that the I.C.T.'s housing programs offered only "prebuilt" homes.- Over
65% of the residents, however, expressed concerns related to cost. Specif-
ically, some residents expressed the view that the initial downpayment was
too high. Others indicated that the installment payments were high; and
some asserted that the total cost of a house in an I.C.T. program was too
61/
-- Interview with Dr. Diter R. Castrill6n 0., Manager of the Sectional
Office of the Instituto de Credito Territorial (Medellfn: June 19, 1975).
Dr. Castrillon indicated at the time that there were 700 vacancies in
Doce de Octubre. The $12,000 downpayment was premised on the view that a
potential purchaser could accumulate that amount in cesantlas over a 4
year period.
62/ This view was not entirely correct, since as early as 1970 the I.C.T.
in Medellin had instituted "minimum solution" programs. See text at footnote
77, infra.
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high. 6 3
It is important to examine the reasonableness of the La Cascada
residents' views as opposed to the view that an I.C.T. housing development
such as Doce de Octubre could be successfully marketed among potential
pirate lot purchasers. If we used the residents' critical views as indica-
tors -of the essential factors which they identify in weighing choices in
both the private and the government housing markets, they would appear to
be the following:
Purchasers' Viewpoint or Concern Related Housing Factor
A. Opportunity to build one's 1. Lot size
own house in accordance
wthonee nd acdre 2. Lot area already constructed
with needs and desires o osrcal
or constructable
B. Total cost of housing 3. Purchase price
(lot + house).
C. Amount of downpayment 4. Downpayment
D. Amount of monthly installment 5. Scheme for installment
payments payments
The list of housing factors translated from expressed purchasers' concerns
is simple and straight-forward. It is noteworthy, however, that unlike the
elements or attributes listed in the I.C.T. advertisement, the purchaser
list does not include direct mention of services. Certainly they figure
implicitly in the determination of total cost; but as observed in the La
Cascada case study, it would appear that pirate lot purchasers place priority
upon the potential value of the lot itself, and make the assumption that
services can eventually be obtained legally or otherwise. In addition, while
one of the purchasers' principal concerns in addition to the downpayment is
the installment amount required, the I.C.T. advertisement neglects to pro-
-/ The remainder indicated that they had not had the time to investigate
the I.C.T. programs.
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vide the specific figure in conjunction with the downpayment amount. The
specific figures are provided in brochures at the I.C.T. office; but its
ommission in the advertisement suggests a failure to appreciate the emphasis
placed by pirate lot purchasers upon the amount of the monthly installment
calculated in relation to their low, often unstable, incomes, Finally, the
purchasers' list of concerns, and the advertisement reflect two different
ways of viewing total cost. From the viewpoint of the purchaser, the total
cost of housing consists first of the total lot price and second, of whatever
the purchaser is able to invest in the construction of a dwelling. In
this context, the advertisement's assertion that the "house in Doce De
Octubre will cost . . . practically the same as a lot in a pirate barrio"
has little meaning. The total cost for the I.C.T. house is fixed; the total
cost of the purchasers' house in a pirate subdivision is not fixed, and
may vary among individual purchasers over time in accordance with income
and needs.
The above comparison is superficial, but is intended to high-
light the essential factors which appear to shape the pirate lot purchaser's
evaluation of housing choices. In a table set forth below the pirate
housing market vs. government (I.C.T.) housing market choices available
to the potential purchaser will be presented in specific cost terms.
Before making the specific cost comparisons, however, it is
important to understand some background information about the specific
government programs used in the comparative analysis. In 1969, the I.C.T.
commissioned a study of housing demand by the Center for Economic Investiga-
tions of the University of Antioquia. The study concluded that as of March,
1969, 35,431 low income and medium low income families lacked their own
housing. Of this total, 16,000 of the families fell within the low income
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category with incomes less than $900 pesos per month (1969). The perceived
housing deficit as well as the conclusion that the National Law No. 66
(1968) had practically paralyzed the activities of pirate developers, led
the I.C.T. to conclude that a large construction program of housing units
was necessary and possible. One factor in particular supported the I.C.T.'s
belief that such a quantitative solution was feasible. As a result of the
general paralysis of pirate developer activities, some land owners, many
of them pirate developers, were willing to sell large tracts of peripheral
land at relatively low prices. Accordingly, the I.C.T. purchased large
tracts of peripheral land, particularly in the northwestern part of the
.64/
city.-- Another factor which reinforced the belief in the need for a
large scale solution was the general view that a massive rationally imple-
mented housing program was necessary in the peripheral areas to prevent
the invasion of those areas by low income families. As previously noted,
land invasions did begin to increase significantly in Medellin around
1970. 65/
The solution proposed by I.C.T. was the Doce de Octubre deve-
lopment on land purchased in 1969 (in part from a pirate developer) by
I.C.T. in accordance with the recommendations of the study on housing demand.
As approved collectively by the boards of directors of I.C.T. and the
Departments of Valorizacion and Planning in 1971, the development contem-
plated 6,500 single family units constructed in a number of stages. The
64/
-- Instituto de Credito Territorial, Seccional de Medellin, Tugurios:
La Competencia Municipal en el Asentamiento Habitacional No Controlado
(Presentado al XIII Congreso de la Organizacion Interamericana de Coopera-
cion Intermunicipal, Julio 4-8 de 1970), pp. 27-30.
65/
-- See Chapter II, footnote 17, supra.
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I.C.T. Sectional Manager presented the housing development as one intended
for "low income persons such as workers in construction and for those sectors
of the population with monthly income less than $1,500 /19717 or employed
. . .66/in sporadic jobs."-- In other words, Doce de Octubre qui+e clearly was
intended to provide an alternative solution to that segment of low income
families which heretofore had sought housing in the pirate market.- The
development offers three types of houses, Types A, B and C, on the same
lot size of 72 square meters. (See Figures 16 and 17.) House Type A is
the least expensive of the solutions and is used as the model in the cost
comparisons presented below.
The other I.C.T. development presented in the housing case com-
parison is the second stage of Francisco Antonio Zea (hereafter referred to
as Zea II), also built on land purchased by I.C.T. in 1969.-1 (See
Figures 18 and 19.) Because of the higher economic classes living around
the proposed development area and zoning restrictions on density, the solu-
66/-
-- Departamento Administrativo deaianeacion y S.T., Acta No. 5
(Abril 6, 1971).
-- It should be noted, however, that the first stage of Doce de Octubre
included the transfer to the housing development of approximately 150
familes from an invasion area called Tenche in the Barrio of Fatima as
part of a program to erradicate slum areas in the central zones of the city.
See, Gloria Eugenia Echeverry V. et al., "Evolucio'n de las Familias Erradi-
cadas del Sector de Tugurios Tenche a la Urbanizacidn Doce de Octubre,
1972-1975" (Medellin: I.C.T., 1975).
6 8 Because of limited funds and the low-income status of the purchasers
in the first stage of the development (Zea I), the I.C.T. actually experi-
mented with the provision of minimum services (water taps and latrines)
for approximately 6 months. This minimum services approach, however, was
rejected by the city administration and Empresas Publicas as violative of
necessary standards. Interview iwth Dr. Gustavo Suarez, Chief of the
Technical Division, Instituto de Crddito Territorial, Seccional de Antio-
quia (Medellin: June 12, 1975).
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tions constructed by I.C.T. (two floors-single family) and offered in 1972
69/
were necessarily more expensive than those offered in Doce de Octubre.--
Nevertheless, the units were intended for lower income families and must be
considered representative of the kind of housing solution offered by the
70/government housing market in 1972.--
Table 14 presented below is constructed from data available
for specific years which cover the period 1971-1976. Instead of presenting
the cost data in relation to a oarticular base year, the table presents the
data in the actual time sequence in which it occured or was relevant. It
is believed that this format represents more realistically the nature of
the housing markets as perceived by the potential pirate lot purchaser.
If the data from the El Diamante case study, and particularly the La
Cascada case study are indicative, it would appear that the typical pirate
lot purchaser spends at least 3-4 years as a renter before seeking to pur-
chase housing. During that time it is probably reasonable to assume that
the potential purchaser at least takesnotice of kinds of housing available
for purchase. However, if the La Cascada data is correct, it would appear
that very few pirate lot purchasers actually "survey" the housing market(s)
at the point they are ready to purchase. Rather, the more typical pirate
lot purchaser model appears to be that of the purchaser who opts to buy a
lot or house upon hearing of its availability -- without inquiring further
-- as long as the choice meets the housing factors or criteria set forth
69/
-- Ibid.
- The I.C.T. did not officially shift its housing strategies in
order to include more "minimum standard" solutions (i.e., lots with
services) until 1974, (Board of Directors' Resolution No. 002). See,
INSCREDIAL, Politica de Vivienda (Bogota: I.C.T., Seccion Publicaciones,
1974).
TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT HOUSING MARKET AND PIRATE HOUSING MARKET, MEDELLIN: 1972-1976
Characteristics
Total Area
Net Area
Total No. of Lots
Lot Size
Avg. Lot Area 2Constructed f4)
ICT: 12 de
Octubre "Type
A" 1 9 7 1 a
4G8,000 M
180,000 ft
1,200
72 ti
20.26 M
ICT: ZEA
,,a 1972
26,941 M 2
448
60 .2
1st fl. 40.05 M 2
2nd fl. 20.89 M
El Diamante
1973
2
91, i40 M2
43,912 M 2
128 M2
88.56 M42a
ICT: 12 de
Octubre "Type
A" 19 7 4 a
4 bb,000 M-
180,000 M2
1,06]
12 ti
20.26 P12
La Cascada
1975a
6,400 M-
3,789 M2
31
160 M-
147 42
235-60 M
ICT: 12 de
Octubre "Type
A" 1976
468,000 M2
180,000 M2
130
72 t2
20.26 M
Unurban i zed Total no information $8,t029.00c 4r023.00b no information 
_Qb 0,00Lot Cost r no information $ 1 31 . 3 c 31.43b no information $ 6.59
Trbanized otal no information $19,15.00 $0 8 3 2 . 0 0)c no information no verifiable no information
LAt Cost Pur M2 no information $ 314.47 $ (6 9 . 0 0)c no information cost data no information
House Construc- no information $28,450.00 $13, 2 8 0 -26 ,5 60 d no information $14-20,000.00
tion Cost no information $32-,000 $45,300.00a
TOTAL COST no information $47,645.00 $20-40,000e no0 information $32-38,000 $75,300.00a
SELLING PRICE
Downpayment
Installment
Payments/Mo.
Payment Period
Interest Charges
Services
Open Space (%)
Community Services
$22,500.00
$26,873.00C
1$13,7 62. 00d
0 or $3,000
$ 85.47c
$118.00d
15 yrs (180 mos)C
18 yrs (216 mos)d
6% on annual bal.
2% for insur.
all provided
26%
health ctr/ 2
schools/pol ice/
church/market/
sports area
$49,000.00
$9,800.00
1st yr: $417.39
(5% increase/yr)
13 yrs (156 mos)
11% on annual bal.
2% for insur.
all provided
31,427 12 (33%)
school, hospital
(nearby) , church
($20-40,000)f
$1,500. 009
$ 2 2 7 . 0 0 9
5 yrs (60 mos)9]
24% on annual bal.9
0.5% finance chq.
none provided
(contraband)
22,077 M 2 (24%)
school
$55,000.00
$10,000.00
1st yr: $527.51
(5% increase/yr)
12 yrs (144 mos.)
12% on annual bal.
2% for insur.
all provided
26%
health ctr/ 2
school s/pol ice/
church/market/
sports area
($32-38,000)
$2,000.00
$ 270.00
4 yrs (48 mos.)
18% annually on
bal. overdue after
4 yr term
none provided
(contraband)
mininal
school & church
in nearby barrio
$90,000.00 b
$17,000.00
1st yr: $ 8 55.0 0
(5% increase/yr)
12 yrs (144 mos)
12% on annual bal.h
2% for insr.
all provided
26%
health ctr/ 2
schools/police/
church/market/
sports area
NOTES
12 de Octubre 1971
a Data source: Molina and Arias, Estudio sobre Estructura Financiera de Submercado de Vivienda
Medellin: CEIE, Escuela de Administracion y Finanzas, 1976), p. 101.
b Purchase price if paid in full upon transfer.
c Financed cost and term if downpayment if $3,000.
d Financed cost and term if no downpayment.
Francisco Antonio Zea II
Source for cost figures and terms of purchase: Gustavo Suarez Vasquez, Director Tecnico, I.C.T.,
"Barrio Francisco Antonio Zea -- Medellin Liquidacion Definitiva de 616 Casas UF de Dos Plantas" (Medellin:
Febrero, 1974); Gerencia Seccional, I.C.T., "Memorando: Liquidacion de Venta Plan Francisco Antonio Zea
448 Soluciones Casas-tipo Etapa 2A" (Medellin: Febrero 21, 1972).
b The actual lot total was 464. Calculations exclude a 16 lot section.
Purchased originally in 1969 at $25.00/M 2 . Cost represents the "financed" cost per square meter
of undeveloped lot as of March, 1972, the date the houses were offered for sale.
El Diamante
Source: Molina and Arias, op. cit., p. 20.
b
Net area cost of land to developer according to information received by the Dept. of Municipal
Planning, 1973.
c Hypothetical cost, assuming developer had provided all service infrastructure in accordance with
cost estimates presented in case study, supra.
d Based upon survey (n=40) of residents' housing costs, estimated in current prices for construction
between 1966-1975. Housing construction costs for period indicated, averaged 66.4% of the total housing
cost (lot + construction). Molina and Arias, op. cit., pp. 23, 63-64, 68-69.
NOTES: El Diamante, cont.
e Total cost range of 67.5% of residents surveyed. Ibid., p. 63-64.
Hypothetical price based upon total cost of incremental construction over time. Lot with con-
structed house, if actually sold by owner, presumably could demand a higher price.
g Finance terms based upon information received from developer by the Dept. of Municipal Planning,
1973.
12 de Octubre 1974
Data source: Gerencia Seccional, I.C.T., "Memorando: Liquidacion definitiva 1,802 casas Uab.
12 de Octubre" (Medellin: Octubre 22, 1974).
La Cascada
Data source: Author's survey, interviews and document research, 1975.
b Original net area cost of land to developer.
12 de Octubre 1976
Source: Arias and Molina, op. cit., pp. 104, 115.
b Source: I.C.T., Seccional de Antioquia, Confirmacion de datos acerca Doce de Octubre a INSCREDIAL,
Bogota (Medellin: Diciembre 14, 1976).
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above. Table 14is constructed upon this purchaser model and assumes, for
example, that the potential purchaser, having become aware of the avail-
ability of government housing (12 de Octubre) in 1971, may also learn
during the following year (1972-1973) that housing in another government
project (Zea II) is available, and that there are lots for sale in El
Diamante. Assuming that at some point within the 5 year period the potential
purchaser has accumulated sufficient savings or possible cesantias advance-
ments, which market provides the best choice as judged by the purchaser
criteria set forth above? These criteria were: (1) lot size; (2) lot
area constructable; (3) purchase price; (4) downpayment; and (5) install-
ment payment scheme.
If we assume that the potential purchaser as early as 1971 in
fact had sufficient savings or cesantias to consider the possibility of
purchasing, the "Type A" solution offered in 12 de Octubre, judged by the
criteria mentioned, might have been attractive. Except for the issue of
lot size and constructable area, the other criteria or terms of payment
were quite favorable. The purchaser could have opted to pay no downpayment,
paid monthly installment payments whose incremented value per year would
not have reached $200 for approximately ten years, and have obtained a
fully serviced house for $26,873 pesos.
As regards the question of lot size and constructable area, it
is conceivable that the possibility of eventually expanding the home
from 20 scuare meters to approximately 50 square meters, or 75% of the total
lot (72M), would have been satisfactory. For example, constructed areas
2
on the very large lots in La Cascada ranged from 35-60 M2. However, if the
case studies of pirate lot purchasers are representative, it would appear
that it is not the specific amount of family space constructable on the lot
-100-
which is most important, but rather the flexibility of the use of the space
on the lot. In the 12 de Octubre development, the units were not designed
71/
to allow for a second floor,- a feature which was observed in the La
Cascada study to be important to the residents for potential rental value
as well as for personal use. In addition, a 20 square meter house expanded
to 40 or 50 square meters would have little space for other uses such as
a garden or small business which can serve as sources for additional eco-
nomic gain.
However the potential purchaser would have resolved the spatial
issues presented in the Type A housing model, it is apparent that after
1971, the financing cost for both the 12 de Octubre units as well as the
two story units offered in Zea II, greatly reduced the attractiveness of
the government housing market in comparison to alternatives available in
the pirate housing market. Between 1971 and 1974 the purchase price of a
Type A unit in 12 de Octubre rose from $22,500 to $55,000 or 144%. Simil-
arly, the downpayment, originally none or $3,000, increased to $10,000, an
increase of 333% above the original $3,000 amount. The minimum first year
monthly installment payment had increased more than 6 times. The Zea II
units required a downpayment in 1972 of $9,800 -- practically the same
downpayment required two years later in 12 de Octubre. The units themselves
while offering two floors of living space covering 60 square meters, cost
in 1972 almost twice the amount of a Type A unit offered the year before
in 12 de Octubre.
During the same three year period, a potential purchaser who
71/
- A second floor could technically be added, but the roof would
have to be torn down, at considerable expense. See, Molina and Arias,
op. cit., p. 116.
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had learned of available lots in El Diamante would have discovered undeve-
loped 128 square meter lots requiring on the average, a downpayment of
$1,500 (one half the amount for a Type A house in 1971)--/ and a monthly
installment charge of $227.00 (less than half that required the first year
of purchase of a Type A unit in 1974). If we recall that the pirate lot
purchaser's criteria emphasize spatial flexibility and the most feasible
financial terms rather than services and existing housing structure, it is
reasonable to expect that the potential purchaser would opt for a lot in
the pirate subdivision market during the period in question.
A similar dramatic increase in the financing requirements for
a Type A unit in 12 de Octubre can be observed during the period 1974-1976
(approximately 160%). In contrast, the purchase terms set by the pirate
developer in La Cascada as well as the amount of area purchasable, make the
unserviced subdivision lot the more viable alternative when evaluated from
the perspective of the purchaser's housing criteria.
An examination in Table 14 of the respective costs incurred by
I.C.T. and the pirate developer prior to sale, suggests one of the reasons
why the pirate submarket competes successfully against government housing
alternatives. The Zea II development and El Diamante provide a good com-
parative illustration. In 1969, the I.C.T. purchased the first part of
2
the tract for the Francisco Antonio Zea development at $25.00/M . It was
from this portion that the Zea II subdivision was developed. The unurban-
ized lot cost in 1969 of the Zea II development was $90.16 per square
72/
- The survey by Molina and Arias of El Diamante residents revealed
that some downpayments were as high as $3,000, and in one case, $12,000.
However, the majority of downpayments ranged beteeen $400 and $1000.
Ibid., p. 28.
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73/
meter.-- However, in order to purchase the Zea tract as well as other
large tracts which the I.C.T. had decided to buy in the peripheral areas of
Medellin, the purchase was financed. By 1972, therefore, the "financed"
2
unurbanized lot cost had become $131.53/M . The cost of urbanizing the
lots, including the provision of infrastructure, brought the cost in 1972
to $314.47/M , or approximately $19,195 per lot, before the cost per
housing unit was added ($28,450). In contrast, the developer's costs in
El Diamante remained unchanged from $31.43/M since he incurred no finan-
cing costs and undertook minimal subdivision preparation. In this sense
he was typical of pirate developers in Medellin whose peripheral land was
either inherited or purchased by them at low prices years before. Because
the pirate developer incurred no significant additional costs in the form
of financing charges or subdivision preparation over the time period prior
to lot sales,.-/ he could offer land at prices well below the land value
which had accrued in the I.C.T. development prior to the sale of the
75/housing units.-
2/ Gustavo Suarez Vasquez, Director Tecnico, I.C.T., Seccional de
Antioquia, "Barrio Francisco Antiono Zea -- Medellin Liquidacidn Definitiva
de 616 Cases UF de Dos Plantas" (Medellin: Febrero, 1974).
--- The pirate developer does, of course, incur the cost of real
estate taxes. However, by not officially subdividing his land and by
issuing only "receipts" (recibos) for purchasers' installment payments on
their lots, he can maintain the tract of land in its global form and keep
the original, low, farm land assessment.
2- In fact, with the reasonable expectation that services would even-
tually be provided to the subdivision by means of the Rotating Fund of
Empresas Publicas, many pirate developers could even decide to keep some
lots off the market in order to sell later at a higher "serviced lot"
price. Interview with Dr. Leon Dario Uribe T., Chief of the Housing
Rehabilitation Division, Empresas Publicas of Medellin (Medellin: May
19, 1975).
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It should be noted that in 1970, the Antioquia sectional office
76/
of I.C.T. had initiated a form of "sites and services" program-- entitled
"Minimum Solutions" (soluciones minimas) by which lots with individual
latrines and public water taps and a small outbuilding (10 M ) were pro-
77/vided.- A sites and services approach for lower income families was
given further emphasis in 1974 as a result of the formulation of a new
78/housing policy by the national office of I.C.T.- Under a strategy
defined as "Construction of Houses for Progressive Development" (Construc-
cion de Viviendas Para Desarrollo Progresivo), the I.C.T. began to provide
low income families with a serviced lot on credit (lote con servicios), and
to provide additional financial assistance for subsequent self-help or
contracted housing construction (soluciones minimas). The I.C.T. central
office in Bogota estimated in 1975 that on a nationwide level, the average
cost of a "lot with services" was $18,000 pesos. The terms of finance for
the lot were: no downpayment, 12 year repayment period at 9% per year, and
a 5% annual increase in monthly installment payments. For the program years
1974 and 1975 the "lot with services" program nationally produced 6,473
serviced lots. The corresponding figure for houses constructed under the
76/
-- The term "sites and services" is used to refer to publicly sponsored
subdivisions in which the basic urban infrastructure (building lots,
water supply, waste disposal, surface drainage, street lighting and access
ways) is provided for low income owners to progressively build upon. The
"sites and services" program may include additional components such as the
"outbuilding" provided in the I.C.T. program as well as social services
and technical assistance. See, generally, The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Sites and Services Projects
(Washington, D.C.: April, 1974).
-- / Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
78/
-- See, footnote 70, supra.
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"minimum solutions" program was 26,759, the majority (87%) of the houses
having been constructed primarily with contracted rather than self-help
79/labor.- For the program year 1974, the I.C.T. Antioquia sectional office.
financed 232 serviced lots under the "lot with services" program and 504
80/houses under the "minimum solutions" program.--
The relatively low numerical total cited for the "lot with
services" program largely reflects the start-up period of the program. It
seems reasonable to expect that as a national entity, the I.C.T. would
have the administrative capacity to greatly increase its program rate of
producing serviced lots. As regards implementation of the program in
Medellin, it would appear that at least within the urban perimeter of the
city, the "lot with services" program theoretically could provide serviced
lots at a rate sufficient to meet demand, and at a price competitive with
unserviced pirate lots. The I.C.T. has already purchased a large proportion
of the land remaining within the urban perimeter considered suitable for
81/
residential development.-- Moreover, the I.C.T. could effectively coor-
dinate the provision of services to new subdivision lots through the
Housing Rehabilitation Division of Empresas Publicas, which has so effic-
iently administered the Rotating Fund.
However, for at least two reasons, the theoretical feasibility
of such a sites and services undertaking by I.C.T. within the urban peri-
--/ Data supplied to the author by Dr. Eduardo Pelaez Herrin, Chief
of the Physical Programming Section, I.C.T. (Bogota: February 13, 1975).
80/ Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., p. 221. Data for the 1975
program year was unavailable.
81/
--Ibid., pp. 136-137.
meter may not have much practical feasibility or likelihood. First, zoning
restrictions upon I.C.T. purchased land and the socio-economic character-
istics of surrounding barrios may limit the amount of land which the I.C.T.
82/can develop under a sites and services program for lower income families.--
Also, because the amount of developable land remaining within the urban
83/perimeter is extremely limited,-- the "lot with services" would have an
effectiveness of only limited duration; it is unlikely that the I.C.T.
would be willing to purchase significant amounts of land outside the urban
perimeter of Medellin. This latter point is made clearer in the discus-
sion which follows.
The effectiveness of a "lot with services" program in competi-
tion with the pirate submarket outside the urban perimeter depends upon a
number of factors, the most important of which is a determination of the
actual rate of pirate subdividing in the peripheral areas. It has been the
hypothesis of this thesis that pirate subdividing, as illustrated by the
La Cascada case study, continues in the semi-rural peripheral areas, al-
though in smaller "pockets" of land and at a rate far below the rate ex-
perienced by Medellin prior to the passage of National Law No. 66 (1968).
Before assessing the potential competitiveness of a "lot with
services" program with the pirate submarket outside the urban perimeter,
it is necessary to evaluate from a policy viewpoint whether such a program
would even be undertaken by the I.C.T. in conjunction with municipal
authorities. It is unlikely for at least two reasons. First, and most
importantly, such a program of fully serviced lots would violate existing
municipal planning policy to restrict development particularly in the
82/
- See, ibid., p. 137.
83/
-- The most recent "rough" estimate is 1,200 hectares. Ibid., p. 137.
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eastern and western peripheral areas of the city to the water line level
-84/defined by Empresas Publicas.- Second, an I.C.T. program of land acquisi-
tion in the peripheral areas for the purpose of providing serviced lots
could act as a stimulus for land invasion once it became known that services
85/
would be provided.--
Even if such a program were contemplated, it is doubtful that
the I.C.T. could be competitive with the pirate market in such peripheral
terrain. The pirate market consists of owners who are willing to supply
land irrespective of its urbanistic quality. In contrast, the I.C.T. in
consultation with the Planning Department presumably would be unable and
unwilling to purchase and sell lots on land which did not meet its urban-
86/istic standards for development.-- It is largely because of the unsuit-
84/
-- This policy was explicitly agreed to by the administrators of the
municipal departments, Empresas Publicas and the I.C.T. in the so-called
"Housing Committee" policy memorandum of June, 1975. See, Comite de Vivienda,
"Conclusiones Generales sobre el Analisis del Problema de Vivienda de
Intere's Social" (Medellin, Junio de 1975), p. 2.
-- It is noteworthy, for example, that in 1970 a portion of the I.C.T.'s
Francisco Antonio Zea tract was invaded. This area, now called Zea IV or
Lenin by the squatters, became the focus of an I.C.T. "rehabilitation" pro-
gram, begun in 1973 to properly subdivide the invaded terrain and to even-
tually charge squatter families individually for the cost of the land and
for the provision of services through the Rotating Fund of Empresas Publi-
cas. In 1972, prior to beginning the sites and services program, the Manager
of the I.C.T. Section in Medellin expressed the concern that publicity
attending municipal efforts to rehabilitate tugurios (see footnote 86, infra)
could help "stimulate" invasions, by giving would-be invaders the idea that
the city administration would help them acquire the land they invaded and
that the I.C.T. would give them assistance in the financing and construction
of their homes. See, Junta Municipal de Planeacion y S.T., Acta No. 1
(Sesion: Febrero 16, 1972).
-- For example, in 1971 the Medellin City Council passed an ordinance
(Acuerdo No. 34) to permit the municipal administration to buy up invaded
land for the purpose of "rehabilitating" squatter areas. The ordinance was
subsequently amended to also permit the city to purchase uninvaded terrain
for low income housing. The Department of Municipal Planning subsequently (cont.)
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ability of much of the peripheral land for urban development that the "green
belt" policy has been adopted for the peripheral areas just outside the
urban perimeter. The implementation of that policy has been entrusted to
the municipal housing entity known as Casitas de la Providencia, which is
discussed briefly below in the analysis of municipal housing programs.
In conclusion, it would appear that to the extent that the
pirate submarket continues to operate inside and outside the urban perimeter
it is too late and too impracticable for the I.C.T. to compete successfully
with it by means of a "lot with services" program in Medellin. Of course
to the extent that the I.C.T. is not hindered by zoning restrictions and
political considerations in implementing a "lot with services" program on
87/its presently owned land, it would seem advisable to do so.--
In the meantime, it is possible that the real arena for testing
the ability of a "lot with services" program to compete with the pirate
submarket will recur in other rapidly growing cities and towns of the De-
partment of Antioquia, both inside and outside the Valley of Aburra. For
example, during the last intercensus period (1964-1973), such municipalities
86 cont./ undertook a survey of land to determine what parcels might be
considered urbanistically suitable for purchase. Of the 16 uninvaded
properties it examined, representing approximately 2,670,770 square me ers,
it was able to recommend as "favorable" only 6 properties (1,190,000 M )
of which 3 (972,800 M2 ) were favorable only for granjas or mini-farm lots,
of limited density. This meant that only about 217,000 square meters were
found suitable for low income housing at normal densities. The principal
defects found in the other tracts were soil erosion, steep topography and
location beyond the water line. See, Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
y S.T. (Departamentos de Planeacion Fisica y Social), "Informe Sobre Tierras
Ofrecidas Con Destinacion a Vivienda Popular" (Medellin: undated).
- A "lot with services" policy was agreed to by members of the "Housing
Committee" in their 1975 memorandum. See, Comite de Vivienda, op. cit.,
p. 3.
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within the valley as Copacabna, Itagui, Envigado, Girardota and Bello
experienced annual urban growth rates respectively of 7.91%, 5.25%, 4.93%,
4.43% and 3.15%. Outside the Valley of Aburri during the same period, high
growth rates were experienced by the following municipalities: Caucasia
88/(9.50%); Apartado (15.03%); Turbo (6.30%); and Rionegro (6.11%) .-
If the high population growth rates experienced by these urban
areas spur pirate subdividing, the successful implementation of a "lot
with services" program in competition with the market will depend primarily
upon questions of scale and diversity. It is this author's view that while
the I.C.T. may have the administrative capacity to successfully produce
(i.e., subcontract out) the necessary quantity of serviced lots to meet
demand, it would likely fail to compete with the pirate submarket in two
respects. First, apart from the question of administrative capacity to
actually produce lots, it seems doubtful that the I.C.T. could assemble a
sufficient amount of land efficiently and quickly enough to compete with
the offerings of the many actors (developers) in the pirate market. More-
over, even if it could efficiently assemble the necessary quantity, it is
The 1977 and 1980 population projections for the urban areas of
these cities were the following:
City 1977 1980
Copacabana 26,950 33,864
Itagul 115,638 130,374
Envigado 77,775 89,854
Girardota 8,852 10,081
Bello 130,392 143,106
Caucasia 19,074 25,043
Apartado 23,031 35,073
Turbo 16,832 20,218
Rionegro 27,874 33,302
Mosquera and Anestrosa, op. cit., pp. 7, 12, 15, 17, 27.
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possible that the market price it would have to pay to do so would raise the
cost of producing serviced lots above the lot prices offered in the pirate
market -- even allowing for economies of scale. Second, and perhaps most
important, in light of the case study data, is that the I.C.T. program
could not provide the variety of lot sizes (and prices) which the diverse
economic circumstances of low income families require. The I.C.T. program
as presently defined provides for a fully serviced lot and financial assis-
tance for the self help or contracted construction of no more than 40 square
89/meters of housing.-- While these conditions could presumably be varied
somewhat, the tendency of large scale programs for purposes of efficiency
is to provide a relatively standard offering. As was observed in the La
Cascada case study, potential purchasers seem primarily concerned with the
flexibility, both spatially and- financially, that the market offerings
provide.2-- It is argued, therefore, that provided developers could be
induced to install service infrastructure, and purchasers had greater
access to financial resources, the pirate market could function in an auto-
89/
-~- INSCREDIAL, op. cit.
90/
- With respect to the factor of spatial flexibility, it is interest-
ing to note that the importance of this factor to low income families was
impressed upon some local planning officials in the process of their de-
signing and implementing a program to "rehabilitate" certain "invasion"
areas, specifically, Playon de los Comuneros and Marco Fidel Suarez. They
noted that even though the ultimate size of the lots designed had to be
relatively small (60 M2 ), the families were satisfied, since they as
owners, over time, could design and construct a house upon the lot area
as they chose. Interviews with Dr. Francisco Leon Guerrero Castrilldn,
former Chief of the Division of Technical Planning, Department of Municipal
Planning (Medellin: May 19, 1975) and Dr. Juan Carlos Duque, former Chief
of the Department of Social Planning, Department of Municipal Planning
(Medellin: July 1, 1975). See also, Juan Carlos Duque, "Programa de
Rehabilitacidn de Tierras" (Medellin: Depto. Planeaci'n Social, Planeacion
Municipal, Mayo 3, 1972).
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nomous fashion to provide a large percentage of lower income families with
serviced lots. Institutional reforms which would enhance the workings
of such a market are considered in Chapter VII.
b. Municipal: Fundacion Casitas de la Providencia
The housing solutions offered by the municipal government of
Medellin have been through the entity known as Fundacion Casitas de la
Providencia (literally translated: "Little Houses of Providence Founda-
tion"). For reasons briefly described below, however, the municipal en-
tity has not been a significant provider of housing solutions in Medellin.
As established in 1956, by the Medellin city council, the entity's purpose
was to "construct houses for the poor classes of Medellin."- Additional
legislation the following year authorized it to rehabilitate slum areas
(tugurios) in Medellin and established a social service to "raise the
moral, economic, social and sanitary level" of families in such areas and
to "integrate them into the life of the community." 2
As the entity's name and founding legislation imply, the orig-
inal concept behind Casitas was charitable in nature. Although Casitas
did construct approximately 1,600 solutions between 1959 and 1973, its
93/
charitable image,-- decreasing funding authorizations from the city
91/
-- El Concejo Municipal de Medellin, Acuerdo No. 69 de 1956, art. 1.
92/
- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 1 de 1957, arts. 2 and 3.
-- / It was the view of most municipal officials interviewed by this
author that the "charitable" image of Casitas compounded the entity's fin-
ancial difficulties by giving the low income occupants of its housing units
little incentive to keep up with their payments. For example, in 1975, in
three of the entity's 5 housing projects, Villa Socorro, Efe Gomez and
Paulo Sexto I, 16%, 21% and 56% of the occupants respectively were 1-5 years
behind in their payments. Source: Accounting office of Casitas de la
Providencia. One official expressed the idea as well that low income
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94/
council,- and its inability to compete with the major housing programs
and larger financial resources of the I.C.T. diminished its role as a
provider of housing in Medellin. In 1975, municipal officials were con-
sidering restructuring the entity and giving it the responsibility for
carrying out the so-called "green belt" policy (cordo'n verde) of estab-
lishing mini-farms or granjas around the urban periphery of Medellin.95/
93/cont. families did not like the idea of "little houses," and if
they were from "Providence" why pay for them?
94/
-- For example, under 1965 legislation, the entity was supposed to
receive 1.5% of the yearly municipal budget. Between 1966 and 1975, how-
ever, the authorized statutory amounts were cut by the Medellin city coun-
cil a total of $17,565,709 pesos. Money for Casitas was not even included
in the municipal budget in 1974 and 1975. Source: Casitas de la Providencia,
"Cuadro de Obligaciones del Municipio de Medellin con Casitas de la Prov-
idencia hasta la Vigencia de 1975 (segun exigencia acuerdo 69/56)".
95/
-- The author regrets that changes in the original scope of the
thesis prevent a larger presentation of data obtained through the coopera-
tion and help of the staff at Casitas de la Providencia concerning the
entity's role in the development of MedellIn's housing policy.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPARISON OF THE PIRATE SUBMARKETS IN MEDELLIN AND IN BOGOTA
A. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compare to the extent that it is pos-
sible, the pirate submarkets of Medellin and Bogota with respect to the
characteristics of lot purchasers, the physical characteristics of sub-
divisions and the economic characteristics of the transactions in the two
pirate markets. The qualification is noted in order to underscore the gen-
eral conclusion of this author and others who have examined the pirate sub-
market; namely the pirate subdivisions exhibit a wide variety of lot sizes,
prices, terms of purchase and provide housing for lower income families
with varied ranges of monthly incomes. Because of the variability of sub-
division characteristics within the pirate market, generalizations are
difficult, especially in view of the limited sample sizes used in this study
- 1/
particularly, and in those of Bogota.- Nevertheless, it is instructive to
set forth the comparative evidence as it exists for both cities and to sug-
gest some related hypotheses in the hope that further research can clarify
and extend the analysis.
The Bogota data presented in this chapter is drawn principally from three
Gome (196) ad Caroll2/recent studies: Doebele (1975); Losada and Go'mez (1976) and Carroll (1978).-
- The other Medellfn study referred to in this Chapter is that of
Molina and Arias, op. cit., whose survey sample size was 100.
- See, William A. Doebele, "The Private Market and Low Income Urbaniza-
tion in Developing Countries: The 'Pirate' Subdivisions of Bogota" (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Department of City and Regional
Planning, Discussion Paper No. D75-11, October 1975); Rodrigo Losada Lora
and Hernando Gomez Buendia, La Tierra en el Mercado Pirata de Bogota
(Bogota: Fundacidn Para la Educacio'n Superior y el Desarrollo -- FEDESARROLLO
1976); Alan Carroll, "The Supply of Residential Land by Pirate Subdividers
in Bogota" (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Preliminary Discussion
Paper, December 1978).
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It is important to note that the studies each reflect somewhat different
purposes and perspectives. The study by Doebele primarily examined the
legal and institutional context of the pirate market in Bogota; he relied
upon the earlier studies by Vernez (1973) and Bogota's Department of Dis-
trict Planning (1973) for descriptive economic data of pirate subdivisions
3/(and to confirm the results of his own survey).- Losada and Gomez's
study included an analysis of the social and economic aspects of pirate
subdivisions as well as an analysis of the legal framework which impacts
upon the market. Carroll's study was limited to an examination of the pir-
ate market as a land development business and did not include socioeconomic
data on specific pirate subdivisions. Because the study of Losada and
Gomez presents detailed descriptive data of pirate subdivisions which is
current with the author's own data (1975), it is used most frequently for
the comparisons presented in this chapter. However, data from the other
studies mentioned are also used where helpful to broaden the analysis.
B. Geographic and Demographic Characteristics: The Scale of Pirate
Market Activity
Perhaps one of the most important differences which underlie the pir-
ate markets in Bogota and Medellin is their physical settings. MedellFn
is situated in the relatively narrow, limited land area of the Valley of
Aburra, at an altitude of 1,500 meters (4,921 feet) and enjoys a warm,
spring-like climate year-round. Its annual growth rate during the last
3/
- See, George Vernez, "Bogot's Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity
for Metropolitan Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley, 1973); Departamento Administrativo de Planea-
cion Distrital, Mercadeo de Tierras en Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota
(Bogota: 1973) (hereafter cited as Mercadeo de Tierras).
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intercensus period (1964-1973) has slowed to 4.39% from the pre-1964 rate
of over 6%; two thirds of its growth is now from within the city itself.
The area remaining within the urban perimeter that is suitable for resi-
dential development is estimated at only 1,200 hectares. In contrast,
Bogota is located on a large triangular plateau approximately 64 kilo-
meters (40 miles) in length and as wide as 40 kilometers (25 miles) at
some points. The capital city's altitude (2,621 meters) and location
in the Andes give it a rainy, cool climate; therefore warmer clothing and
more substantial housing are required. Its population in 1975 was approx-
imately three and a half million (more than three times Medellin's popula-
tion) and it is estimated that it will reach over eight million by 1990.
This projection translates into an annual growth rate of approximately
6.8%. Moreover, almost half of Bogota's growth is attributable to migrants
from the three departments nearest the capital.
The pirate submarkets in Bogota and Medellin reflect these topograph-
ical, climatic and demographic differences in terms of the scale and the
present rate of growth of pirate subdivisions. It may be argued that in
Medellin, the city's more limited land area and decreasing population
growth rate over time made it easier for the municipal administration and
the Superintendency of Banks to police and eventually stop most pirate
subdivision activity within the urban perimeter. It is generally conceded
by observers in Medellin that the consequence of this successful control
was increased land invasions after 1970 particularly on the northeastern
slopes of the city. The persistence of the invaders in the temporary
shelters was certainly aided by Medellin's warm climate. The pirate sub-
dividing which continues within the urban oerimeter of Medellin is minimal;
what remains to be calculated is the amount of pirate subdividing which
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now appears to be occurring at a slow rate beyond the perimeter into the
semi-rural areas, where vigilance and control by the Superintendency and
municipal authorities is more difficult.
In the capital city, however, geographic and demographic conditions
have supported quite a different scale of pirate market activity. Bogota's
persistent high rate of growth and its expansive flat land area- have
enabled the pirate market to continue to flourish despite policing efforts
of the city administration and the Superintendency of Banks. In 1975, the
Superintendency's Housing Division in Bogota had a professional staff of
only 29 persons to enforce the national law against uncontrolled subdivid-
* 5/ing.- It was estimated in 1972 that approximately 31% of the city's land
area and 54% of the city's population constituted pirate settlements. In
1973, the city's Planning Department estimated that there would be a 25%
increase in the demand for land between 1973 and 1978, that is, a demand
6/for an additional 24,270 lots.- Even if greater control could be exercised
over the pirate market in Bogota, land invasion, while likely to increase,
might not occur in the same proportion as in Medellin. Vernez suggests
that the possibility of invasion should be assessed in terms of the past
efficiency of police action in Bogota against invasion and the factor of
4/
- This factor should be understood in conjunction with the fact that
Bogota has a very cheap and relatively effective bus system which runs
most of the city's length (approximately 14.5 miles on the north-south
axis). This means that the low income resident has less locational con-
straint upon his living place than in many other cities the size of
Bogota. Doebele, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- Losada and Gomez, 00. cit., p. 50.
6/
- Mercadeo de Tierras, op. cit., p. 80.
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climate. Because of Bogota's cool, rainy climate year-round, shelter must
be constructed of durable materials and "low income families are often
reluctant to make such an investment in the face of the probably forced
removal . . . and of the destruction of the temporary shelter."-
C. Lot Purchaser Characteristics
1. Prior Residence
The data from the five barrio Bogota survey of Losada and Gomez
underscore the attraction which the capital city exercises upon the sur-
rounding departments as well as more distant departments. Only 25% of
the pirate lot purchasers indicated that they always lived in Bogota',
although another 24% indicated that prior to coming to Bogota they had
lived in other parts of the Department of Cundinamarca. Other purchasers
indicated that they had come from the Departments of Boyaca (24%), San-
tander (13%), Tolima (4%) as well as the Departments of Antioquia, Quindio
and Risaralda (7% for all three departments); the remainder (4%) indicated
other parts of the country.- The comparative analysis of this data rela-
tive to the Medelli'n data leads to the conclusion that unlike the Medellin
pirate market which services demand primarily from the Department of Antio-
quia, the Bogota pirate market responds to a demand much wider in scope.
Only about 49% of the purchasers were originally from the Department of
Cundinamarca; the remainder came from other departments.-
As regards purchasers' residence and dweller status immediately
- Vernez, op. cit., p. 28.
8/
- Losada and Gomez, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
9/ Ibid., p. 81.
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prior to their purchase, the Losada and Gomez data generally supported the
earlier hypothesis of Vernez, namely, that the majority (over 80%) reside
as renters or inquilinatos in peripherally as well as centrally located
10/buildings.- Their findings are consistent with the findings in the La
Cascada survey in Medellin which indicated that approximately 65% of the
purchasers had resided as renters in barrios located in peripheral and
central areas of that city.
2. Income Levels and Employment
a. Income
One of the principal observations made by Vernez in his 1973
study was the extent to which the pirate market in Bogota serves the
family income groups within the low-middle and middle-income levels. He
estimated that the pirate market housed approximately two-thirds of Bogota's
families with incomes ranging between $500 and $2,500 pesos (1970). With-
in the pirate settlements themselves, he estimated that almost 85% of the
families had incomes within this range, as indicated in Table 15 below.
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME WITHIN PIRATE SUBMARKET OF BOGOTA 1970
Monthly Family Percentage Percentage Distribution
Income Ranges Income Distribution Pirate Submarket
($) (1970) Category Bogota (%) (%)
0 - 500 Low 7.4 4.6
501 - 1,250 Low-Middle 26.9 43.0
1,251 - 2,500 Middle 26.9 41.7
2,501 - 4,000 High-Middle 20.8 10.7
4,001 and more High 18.0 --
Source: George Vernez, "Bogota's Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity for
Metropolitan Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1973), p. 25.
10/
-- Ibid., pp. 93-94. See also Vernez, op, cit., pp. 118-129.
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The results of Doebele's study, derived from March, 1974 data,
were consistent with Vernez's estimation of the income distribution within
pirate barrios, making an adjustment of the same income categories to
ll/1974 prices.- However, Losada and G6 mez's results for the income distri-
bution within their pirate barrio sample in 1975 do not agree with Vernez's
findings. Rather, their results suggest that in 1975 Bogota"s pirate
barrios contained a greater composition of low and low-middle income families
than was estimated to inhabit the pirate barrios in 1970.
This proposition is suggested by the data in Table 16. The
table sets forth the comparison of Vernez's 1970 data for pirate barrios'
family income distribution and Bogota's family income distribution, (as
presented in the preceding table), with the 1975 family income distribution
for the pirate barrio sample of Losada and G6mez and the family income
distribution for Bogota in 1975. Vernez's income ranges were inflated to
1975 levels using the National Planning Department's correction factor of
100% for 1970-1975. Since there is no 1975 data for Bogot&'s overall fam-
ily income distribution, it was assumed for purposes of this analysis that
the income distribution remained the same. This assumption, of course, pre-
sumes that inflation affected all income ranges equally over time. In the
absence of 1975 data, however, it is necessary to make such an assumption.
The data presented in Table 16 indicate that in 1975 the pirate
barrio families were relatively poorer in comparison to the overall family
income distribution of Bogota than they were in 1970. Stated in other terms,
the data suggest that the pirate barrios in 1975 were dominated not by low-
1- Doebele's results were: Low (0.9%); Low-middle (43.0%); Middle
(37.0%); and High-middle (8.0%). Doebele, op. cit., p. 22, n. 2.
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middle and middle income families, as estimated by Vernez in 1970, but
rather by low and low-middle income families. This is evidenced by the
degree of percentage difference for income ranges observed between the
pirate sample income distribution and Bogota's overall income distribution
for the two periods, 1970 and 1975. Thus, where Vernez's estimates indi-
cated that the incomes of 4.6% of the pirate barrio families were low in-
come, compared to 7.4% of Bogota's families, and 43% were low-middle com-
pared to 26.9% for Bogota, the 1975 data suggest a significant shift in
pirate barrio composition. That is, the 1975 pirate barrio sample indica-
ted that 38% of the families were low income compared to 7.4% in Bogota,
and 53% were low-middle compared to 26.9% for Bogota overall.
COMPARISON OF
TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME WITHIN PIRATE BARRIOS
OF BOGOTA IN 1970 AND IN 1975
Distri- Distri-
Distri- bution Distri- bution
Monthly Family bution Pirate Monthly Family bution Pirate
Income Ranges Bogoti Barrios Income Ranges Bogota Barrios
Cs) 1970 (%)a (%)a 1975b () ()C
Low
0 - 500 7.4 4.6 0 - 1,000 7.4 38.0
Low-Middle
501 - 1,250 26.9 43.0 1,000 - 2,500 26.9 53.0
Middle
1,251 - 2,500 26.9 41.7 2,500 - 5,000 26.9 10.0
High-Middle
2,501 - 4,000 20.8 10.7 5,000 - 8,000 20.8 --
High
4,000 and more 1 18.0 -- 8,000 and more 18.0 --
Notes
a Source: Vernez, op. cit., p. 25.
b Income adjustment made using the National Department of Planning cor-
rection figure of 100% for period 1970-1975. Mosquera and Hinestrosa, op. cit., p.10C
c Source: Losada and G6mez, op. cit., p. 89.
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It is possible, or course, that the assumption as to Bogota's
family income distribution in 1975 may be incorrect and that therefore the
lowest income bracket is underestimated because of the relative difference
in how well that income group kept up with inflation. Thus, the 7.4% may
be the "lower bound" and the actual percentage may be higher. However, to
dismiss the discrepancy observed between the lowest income percentage for
the sample (38%) and the 7.4% figure for Bogota overall, the latter would
have to be so much larger that it would seem difficult to argue that the
difference observed is not significant.
The purpose in presenting the data available for the two time
periods is to suggest an hypothesis only. That is, that assuming Vernez's
estimations were correct, then on the basis of the 1975 data of Losada and
Gomez it may be hypothesized that there has been a change in the demographic
composition of pirate barrios in Bogota. Additional data is needed to
12/properly test the hypothesis.--
Before considering one factor which partially explains the
hypothesized shift in demographic composition of the pirate barrios of
Bogota, it is useful to compare the 1975 data for Bogota' and Medellin in
terms of updated definitions of income categories. In 1975, using the
100% correction factor previously mentioned, the National Department of
Planning redefined the "low" income category to include monthly family in-
comes of $4,000 pesos or less. Table 17 below is constructed using the
- It is also possible, of course, that Vernez's income distribution
estimates for pirate barrios in 1970 were incorrect and that the percen-
tage of pirate barrio families within the low income range in 1970 was
closer to the figure reported in the 1975 sample. Vernez indicates that
the pirate barrio sample which he used was based upon available studies of
pirate settlements and not upon a random sample from the universe of pirate
settlements in Bogota. See Vernez, op. cit., p. 193.
TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF MONTHLY INCOMES OF PIRATE BARRIO FAMILIES SURVEYED IN MEDELLIN AND BOGOTA
IN RELATION TO FAMILY MONTHLY INCOME DISTRIBUTION FOR BOTH CITIES 1975
Monthly Income Ranges By Families Families
Income Level ($): (%) Total (%) Total La Cascada Total 5 Barrios Total
Medellin Medellin % Bogotaa % Medellfn % Bogotab %
Low Income Median
0 - 1,500 750 7.24 16.60 39.13 67.00
1,501 - 3,000 2,250 21.78 59 23.40 61 47.82 100 27.00 98
3,001 - 5,000 4,000 30.33 21.20 13.04 5.00
($3-4,000) ($3-4,000)
Middle Income Median
5,001 - 7,000 6,000 14.94 13.80 14
7,001 - 9,000 8,000 9.63
9,001 - 12,000 10,500 6.03 35 )25 0 2.00 2
($4-6,000)
2,001 - 16,000 14,000 4.38
High Income
More than 16,000 6.00 6 0 0
Notes
Percentages for 1975 income ranges constructed by first inflating Vernez's 1970 income ranges using
the 100% correction factor and then drawing a cumulative frequency distribution and interpolating the new
1975 income ranges from that distribution. The calculation is based on the implicit assumption that the
families are distributed evenly throughout each of the income ranges.
1)
Data source: Losada and Gomez, op. cit., p. 89.
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National Planning Department's 1975 family income ranges and income cate-
gories; it sets forth 1975 pirate barrio income distributions from the
author's survey of La Cascada in Medellin and the Losada and G6mez survey
of five barrios in Bogota. The Medellin data is consistent with the results
of the Bogota study with respect to general income categories. Because of
the comparatively small sample size of the La Cascada survey, however, it
is difficult to hypothesize about the percentage differences'in the income
ranges of the low and middle income categories for the Medellin and the
Bogota samples.
One of the factors which may explain the hypothesized shift in
family income levels in the pirate market between 1970 and 1975 is the
failure of incomes to keep up with the high rate of inflation in the Colon-
bian economy. This discrepancy between incomes and price inflation is
clearly demonstrated in Table 18 below for one of the income groups found
in the pirate market -- the workers or obreros. Table 18 indicates, for
example, that in 1970 an industrial worker earned an average monthly salary
of $1,367 pesos; in 1975, the same worker earned an average monthly salary
of $2,686 pesos, which represented an increase of 196%. However, during
the same period, the cost of living increased 242%. In real terms, the
worker's 1975 salary of $2,686 corresponded to a 1970 salary of $1,112 or
a loss in buying power of 18.7%. The same pattern of decreasing incomes
in real terms can be seen in the minimum wage until 1978, when a sharp in-
crease in the minimum amount was authorized.
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TABLE 18
AVERAGE WORKER SALARIES AND THE MINIMUM WAGE IN NOMINAL AND REAL TERMS
1970 - 1978
WORKERS (OBREROS) SALARIES/ MINIMUM WAGE
(Industrial Average)
YEAR NOMINAL REAL INDE INDEX
2
IDX- NOMINAL REAL INE-
70 1,367.7 1,367.7 100 519 519 100
71 1,500.0 1,347.7 98.5 519 472.3 91
72 1,658.8 1,311.3 95.8 660 524.2 101
73 1,885.7 1,181.5 86.3 660 415.2 80
74 2,241.3 1,161.3 84.9 900 467.1 90
75 2,686.1 1,112.2 81.3 1,200 498.2 95
76 3,336.4 1,152.5 84.2 1,200 415.2 80
77 4,257.4 1,040.1 76.0 1,770 430.8 83
78 5,425.0 1,189.9 87.0 2,580 565.7 109
Source: Statistics published by the National Administrative Department of
Statistics (DANE), cited in Alternativa, No. 197, 1979, pp. 32-33.
Notes
1/
- Statistics correspond to July of each year.
2/i
- Percentage variation of salary in real terms.
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b. Employment
The comparison of kinds of employment of pirate barrio resi-
dents in Medellin and Bogota set forth below in Table 19 requires some
qualifications. First, Losada and Gomez applied somewhat different
employment categories than those used by this author and Molina and Arias
in their Medellin study. Losada and Gomez used the following categories:
(1) worker (obrero) or day laborer (jornalero), meaning those employed
in factories, public works and construction jobs; (2) "employees"
(empleado) in service-type jobs such as guards, doormen, maintenance
persons in industry, etc.; (3) independently employed (trabajadores
independientes) meaning, street vendors, store owners, independent arte-
sans, etc.; (4) domestic employment (remunerated or unremunerated).
The first and third categories used by Losada and Gomez are identical to
the "industry" and "independent" categories used in the Medellin
studies. The two authors do not, however, explicitly link services and
other commercial or business types of employment together, as set forth
in Table 19. Thus, it is not clear whether or not "employees" in their
terminology should be broadly construed to include employees in business
jobs such as salespersons, etc. However, since the authors do define
the category in terms of "services" this author concluded it was rea-
sonable to treat the category as a proxy for "commerce and ser-
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vices". Second, the "domestic employment" categories included by Losada
and Gomez in calculating female employment were excluded in the table as
presented.
TABLE 19
COMPARISON (%) OF GENERAL KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT OF PIRATE BARRIO RESIDENTS
IN MEDELLIN AND IN BOGOTA
_/ 2/
MEDELLIN_ BOGOTA-
Employment La El La Es- Total Avg.
Category Cascada Diamante peranza Miramar (weighted) (5 Barrios)
Industry
(obrero) 45.0 48.0 37.0 44.0 44.0 27.0 (32.0; 2.0)
Commerce &
Services 42.0 16.0 11.0 17.0 20.0 50.0 (50.0; 14.0)
Government 0.0 13.0 11.0 15.0 11.0 0.0
Independent 13.0 23.0 27.Q 25.0 22.0 13.0 (12.0; 4.0)
Other 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 -- 4.0
Notes
- Employment data for La Cascada taken from author's survey. Data for
the other three Medellin barrios taken from Molinas and Arias, op. cit.,
p. 15. Percentages are rounded off.
2-/ Source: Losada and Gomez, op. cit., pp. 86-87. Percentages indicated
in parentheses are as given by authors for men and women respectively.
Single percentage figures are this author's calculations for men and women
combined based upon the data provided by Losada and Gomez, and limiting
employment categories for women to those indicated above.
The data presented in Table 19 indicate that the employment
categories which predominate in the pirate barrios surveyed in Medellfn are
workers in industry (obreros) (44%) and independents (22%). In Bogota,
however, the results of the Losada and Gomez survey indicate that pirate
barrios residents' principal source of employment is the service sector
(50%). Workers in industry, the second most frequent category of employment,
-126-
constitutes only 27% of those employed. This contrast in results between
the two cities is perhaps not surprising in view of their different regional
settings and functions. That is, as an hypothesis, it might be expected
that the pirate barrios in Medellin would have a higher percentage of in-
dustrial workers since Medelli-n is in the center of Antioquia, a major
industrial region of Colombia. Bogota, on the other hand is the capital
city; as the political and financial center of the country, with over twice
the population of Medellin, it is likely to have a greater demand for ser-
vices and hence a larger service sector for potential employment.
3. Physical Characteristics of Pirate Subdivisions
Because of the variety of lot offerings in the pirate markets of
both Medellin and Bogota, it is difficult to make comparative generaliza-
tions about the physical characteristics of the pirate subdivisions in the
two cities. Moreover, there are no average statistics on the pirate market
in Medellin, while for Bogota there now exist some average statistics de-
rived from a survey conducted by the Superintendency of Banks in 1977.
Those statistics, based upon 109 pirate subdivisions within the urban peri-
meter of Bogota indicate that the average lot size is approximately 125
13/
square meters.- The Losada and Go'mez study of 5 barrios found an average
of 154 square meters per lot, with two thirds of the total sample ranging
14/in size between 105 and 203 square meters.--
Judging from the Bogota data cited above and the limited data avail-
able from case studies in Medellin, it would seem reasonable to conclude
13/
- Carroll, op. cit., p. 5. Also, within the urban perimeter of Bogota
there apparently is little change in average lot size relative to distance
from the center. Ibid., p. 37.
14/
-- Losada and Gomez, op. cit. , p. 97.
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that lot sizes on average are larger in Bogota than in Medellin. Individual
examples of large lot sizes in pirate subdivisions of Medellin.can be given,
of course, but in view of the hilly and more limited land area of Medellin,
it would seem unlikely that lot sizes in pirate subdivisions would average
as high as 125 square meters, at least within the urban perimeter. Outside
the urban perimeter, average lot sizes might approach the sizes of those
found in La Cascada (147 M and 160 M ); but the steeply sloped terrain on
the periphery would greatly reduce the actual area constructable in contrast
to the constructable area of similar lot sizes on Bogota's flat plain.
4. Economic Aspects of the Subdivisions
a. Terms of Purchase
Carroll's analysis of the Superintendency's survey data indicated
that in Bogota the typical pirate lot purchaser can expect a downpayment
of approximately 25% of the total lot value, a payment period consisting
of an average of 36 monthly installments, and an implicit interest charge
15/
of less than one percent per month on the balance.- The purchaser terms
indicated in the case data from Medellin are similar to the average Bogota
purchaser model, but in the particular cases of El Diamante and La Cascada,
the downpayments were closer to 15% of the total purchase price, and the
payment periods were longer, 60 and 48 months respectively. In El Diamante,
it was observed that the developer charged an implicit interest rate as
high as 2% per month on the balance. It is very possible, of course, that
a comparable sample size of pirate subdivisions in Medellin would produce
average figures that conformed more explicitly to the Bogota averages.
Without additional subdivision data for Medellin, comparative generaliza-
- Carroll, op. cit., p. 37.
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tions are difficult to make.
b. Construction
Losada and Gomez found that approximately 67% of the pirate
barrio residents surveyed began to live on their lots (and presumably
began construction) within one year of purchase. Another 14% waited between
one and four years, and another 19% were already renting in the barrio in
16/
which they purchased their lots.- Doebele, similarly found that most of-
the purchasers (94%) began construction within one year of purchase. 17/
The corresponding percentage figure for La Cascada in Medellin was 52%.
The general conclusion from these figures would seem to be that most pirate
lot purchasers exercise their right to occupy their lots as soon as it is
economically feasible to erect some form of temporary shelter. Those who
choose to occupy their lots more than a year after purchase either may not
have the necessary economic resources to begin construction, or may have
living circumstances (ownership of another home elsewhere or rental quar-
ters in the same barrio) which reduce the urgency to occupy their lots
immediately.
5. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the sample size limitations upon the comparative
analysis of the pirate markets in Bogota and Medellin, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the two markets are similar in regard to the income and
employment characteristics of pirate lot purchasers, and the basic terms
of purchase. The two markets differ, however, in terms of scale and degree
of activity. In Medellin, the rate of pirate urbanization has greatly
- Losada and Gomez, op. cit., p. 95.
17/
- Doebele , op. cit. , p. 16.
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slowed and continues primarily in small subdivisions in the semi-rural
periphery. In contrast, Bogota' continues to experience a high rate of
pirate urbanization across its expansive plain. The principal proposition
which flows from the comparative analysis is that contrary to the earlier
findings of Vernez, it may no longer be correct to view the pirate market
as a provider of housing to the low-middle and middle income groups.
Rather, the effects of inflation and other factors requiring more analysis
may lead to the conclusion that pirate markets in BogotA and Medellin
serve primarily the low and low-middle income families, who have no other
alternative for housing except perhaps land invasion, which for reasons
described in Chapter V, they are unlikely to choose.
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CHAPTER V
THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE PIRATE SUBMARKET IN MEDELLIN AND BOGOTA
A. Introduction
It was previously noted that in an economy organized upon free market
principles, particularly a developing economy, unrealistically high urban
development standards can lead to market behavior which circumvents those
standards. It is important to understand that these legally imposed stan-
dards which govern the development of land, draw upon the overall legal
system which governs property rights, particularly those rights involved
in the transfer and possession of property. Just as standards for sub-
division development can be unsuited to the economic circumstances of low
income families, so also, the legal forms and procedures which govern the
transfer of land can obstruct the process of land parcelization to low
income families. To the extent that the formal legal system does so, more
"informal" documents and procedures for transfering land may develop in
land transactions between sellers and low income buyers.
Karst, Schwartz and Schwartz (1973) in their study of "invasion" bar-
rios in Caracas, Venezuela, documented an informal legal system which over
1/time showed evidence of merging into the established legal system.- Doeb-
ele (1975) in his study of the legal-institutional context of the pirate
subdivision market in Bogota, identified legal instruments and procedures
used in the sale and purchase of lots which, although they corresponded to
those used in the conventional (un-pirate) market, were, for various legal
1/
- See generally, Kenneth Karst, Murray Schwartz and Audrey Schwartz,
The Evolution of Law in the Barrios of Caracas (Los Angeles: Latin
American Center, University of California, 1973).
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reasons, inferior, and prejudicial to the rights of low income purchasers.
These instruments, nevertheless, operated to give the purchasers "color
of title," that is, the universally recognized right of possession, which
purchasers could reasonably expect in most cases would ripen into legiti-
mate title under the formal system. For this reason, Doebele concluded
that the "pirate barrio system" could be regarded as a system "halfway
between invasion and conventional subdivision" giving the low income parti-
2/
cipants a "semi-entrance" to the formal legal system.- In contrast some-
what to Doebele's form of analysis, Losada and Gomez (1976) in their study
of the same pirate market in BogotE, chose to apply a more theoretical
framework in their analysis of the legal aspects of pirate subdivisions.
They rejected a "legal system" view of pirate barrios, on the ground that
the concept of a legal "system" implied a degree of explicitness, formality
and autonomy which did not properly characterize the legal forms and pro-
cedures in pirate barrios. Instead, they suggested that it was more useful
to view the pirate barrios in terms of legal or juridical "configurations"
which could then be described in terms of their content (norms, institu-
tions and values) and their form (regularity, predictibility, legitimacy,
specialization of function, and coherency). From this analytical perspec-
tive, the authors concluded that the legal "configurations" evident in
the pirate barrios surveyed could best be described as "innovations, adap-
3/tations, or even 'deviations'" from the formal pattern of Colombian law.-
Whether one views the legal instruments and procedures used in the
pirate subdivision market from the institutional perspective of Doebele, or
2/
- Doebele, op. cit. , p. 53.
- Losada and Gomez, op. cit., pp. 170-176.
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from the more theoretical, sociological perspective of Losada and Gomez, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the legal form of operation of the pirate
market does represent an adjustment in the market to the economic constraints
of lower income families and the urban development constraints placed upon
owner-developers. As already noted, however, that accomodation, legally
speaking, places the low income family's ownership rights in jeopardy.
Should policy makers decide to modify or reform the legal institutions
which formally govern land transfer in order to facilitate low income
purchasers in the market, it is important to determine the latter's under-
standing of and attitude toward the formal legal system. Both Doebele,
and Losada and Gomez presented survey findings in this regard from their
studies of the pirate market in Bogota. It is the purpose of this chapter
to present and compare similar survey data from the author's case study in
the pirate market in Medellin. In order to provide a legal framework for
the analysis, Section B will briefly present the legal instruments which
govern land transfer or the transfer of title in the conventional subdivi-
4/
siamarket, that is, the non-pirate market.- Section C will briefly
describe the legal instruments which are used in the pirate market. Sec-
tion D will set forth the author's own findings relative to pirate barrio
residents' views of their legal circumstances and the formal legal system,
and compare those findings to those of Doebele, and Losada and Gomez.
Other legal-institutional procedures and standards which affect
the subdivision process, such as the Municipal Planning Department's
subdivision requirements and the Banking Superintendency's regulations,
will be considered in Chapters VI and VII respectively.
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B. Legal Instruments and Procedures Governing Land Transfer in the
Conventional Subdivision5/
The following description briefly summarizes the principal documents
and procedural steps required to transfer title to property in a conven-
tional subdivision.
1. Separacion (separation): The prospective purchaser pays the
developer or subdivider a deposit in order that the subdivider will "sep-
arate" a lot, namely, hold the lot in name of the prospective purchaser.
If, within a specified time further steps to complete the purchase are not
taken, the separacion lapses and the subdivider may keep the deposit.
2. Promesa de compraventa (literally translated, a promise of purchase-
sale): The seller (subdivider) and the buyer enter into an agreement (con-
tract) by which the seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy, a
specified lot (and house, if such is the case), provided the buyer has paid
the seller the purchase price of the property through a series of install-
ment payments, with interest on the balance due, and a higher rate of in-
terest for delays in payment. In effect, the promesa de compraventa is "a
contract to make a contract." Included in the contract usually are pro-
visions giving the seller the right to demand full payment of the balance
due, or to recover the property in the event of delays in payment, as well
as provisions allocating responsibility for the payment of service installa-
tions and taxes.
3. Escritura publica de compraventa (title deed): Once the terms of
- This section, with some adaptation, is taken from William A. Doe-
bele's excellent summary of the legal institutions which control the conven-
tional subdivision process in his study, o.. cit. The same information
may also be found in William A. Doebele, "The Private Market and Low
Income Urbanization: The 'Pirate' Subdivisions of Bogota," The American
Journal of Comparative Law, XXV (Summer, 1977, No. 3).
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the purchase and sale agreement have been fulfilled, the seller has an
6/
obligation to deliver an escritura- or deed which is the necessary docu-
ment for the transfer of the legal title of the property to the buyer.
This title deed usually sets forth a detailed description of the property,
any outstanding mortgage on the property and all legal obligations of both
parties.
4. Certificado de Paz y Salvo (certificate of no unpaid taxes): This
certificate signifying that all property taxes have been paid, must be
obtained from the real property tax authorities by one of the parties (as
agreed upon) before the escritura (title deed) can be notarized and finally
registered in the office of real estate records.
5. Escritura otorgada ante notario (notarization of the deed); Once
the paz y salvo has been obtained, the escritura may be notarized by a
Notary Public. When the escritura has been notarized it is referred to as
an escritura pu'blica (public deed), since it becomes a public document
listed at an official notary.
6. Escritura registrada (registered deed); The notarized document is
presented to the municipal real estate record office. Once entered in the
official register, the title officially passes to the buyer (subject to
whatever conditions may be stipulated in the escritura).
7. Departamento de Catastro Municipal (municipal department of real
estate taxation): One of the parties, usually the buyer, takes the regis-
tered escritura to the Department of Real Estate Taxation to insure that
§ Although the formal term for title deed is escritura piblica de
compraventa, it is popularly referred to in abbreviated form as simply an
escritura. It should be noted, however, that the latter Spanish term by
itself is also frequently used to mean simply a legal instrument.
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the tax bills will be sent to the new owner. The buyer normally performs
this task since if it is not done he may encounter difficulty obtaining
his own paz y salvo for purposes of selling at some later date. The
seller, of course, is also interested in completing this task in order to
terminate his tax liability on the property which he has sold.
C. Legal Instruments and Procedures Used in Transactions in the Pirate
Subdivision Market
In pirate subdivisions, whatever the form of the purchase and sale
agreement (written or oral) between the buyer and the seller (subdivider),
it is the procedure for periodic installment payments after the initial
downpayment which is most common to all the transactions. That procedure
is the issuance of recibos (receipts) for monthly or other time period
payments. Distinctions between the legal status of buyers within the same
barrio or between barrios then turn on whether they received merely a
"verbal" promesa (de compraventa) or a "written" promesa such as described
in the section on conventional subdivisions.
Buyers in the pirate market who are in the most precarious position
legally are those who receive only a "verbal" promesa and who therefore
have only their recibos or receipts to evidence an on-going purchase and
sale transaction. Unfortunately, under Colombian law such receipts are
only evidence of payments made and do not provide a legal basis for the
enforcement of an alleged contractual obligation to transfer title upon pay-
ment of the full purchase price. The promesa must be in writing.- Col-
ombian law does, however, afford the buyer some protection by the recogni-
tion it gives to his status as possessor of the lot in question. Technic-
7/
- Ley 153 de 1887, art. 89.
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ally, where the buyer has had undisturbed peaceful possession of the lot
for a year, he may allege possession and bring an action in court to pre-
serve that possession. Conversely, the seller would have to bring a
court action within a year following the buyer's possession to reclaim the
8/property.- In practice, of course, the buyer does not have the resources
to bring such a court action. Most importantly, however, it appears from
what is known of buyer-pirate subdivider relations that such a protective
action by the buyer is not necessary. There are few cases of legal actions
by pirate subdividers to repossess lots sold. The transaction based upon
receipts alone goes forward and survives because of the balance struck be-
tween the buyer's faith in the subdivider's promise to give title, and the
subdivider's confidence that the buyer will be dependable in his payments.
The viability of the transaction itself, of course, does not resolve the
buyer's legal complications as far as technical proof of ownership, right
9/to urban services, etc.-
Where the pirate subdivider agrees to give the buyer a "written" pro-
mesa such as described above, he still does not usually conform to the
procedures followed in the conventional subdivision. In the latter case,
it is the usual practice for the seller to execute the escritura (deed)
within a few months after the execution of the promesa. The promesa then
serves as a so-called "binder," namely, a commitment by the parties to
satisfy the requirements stated in the promesa (i.e., payments and other
conditions) until the legal relationship is completed by means of the reg-
8 El Codigo Civil de Colombia, art. 974.
9/ One of the documents required of individuals who request services
from Empresas Publicas is the paz y salvo, which cannot be obtained, of
course, without first obtaining the legal title to the property in question.
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istered escritura. The practice of the pirate subdivider, however, is to
give the promesa only, and to withhold the escritura until he has received
the total number of payments including interest. As a result, the buyer is
again forced to rely upon the seller's good faith promise to deliver the
deed. It is true that unlike the buyer who possesses receipts only, the
buyer with the promesa is in a position legally to enforce the seller's
contractual obligation; however, his limited resources make this an imprac-
ticable and unlikely course of action.
As to the degree to which the pirate subdivider complies with his good
faith promise, Losada and Gomez found in their survey that the developer
had performed his obligation in less than 45% of the cases. The authors
noted, however, that the principal explanation for the subdivider's non-
performance appeared to be the fact that the buyers questioned had not yet
completed their payments. The authors concluded that the withholding of
the deed by the seller may be his most effective way to insure cancelation
of the debt owed, that is, payment of the purchase price and interest
10/charges.- Losada and Gomez in addition, noted other factors which might
explain the subdivider's non-compliance behavior. First, in some cases,
the developer may have mortgaged the property, in which case transfer of
title to the buyer may be impossible or create complications the developer
may wish to avoid. Second, it is possible that the developer is not at
paz y salvo, that is, not paid up in his property taxes, which, as noted
previously, is a prerequisite for the legal transfer of title.- This
circumstance appeared to have been at least one of the reasons the developer
10/ a
-- Losada and Gomez, op. cit. , p. 144.
ll/
-- Ibid.
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in La Cascada in Medellin refused to issue written promesas as well as
escrituras to most of the residents who purchased lots after the first few
lots were sold.
In conclusion, from a strictly legal point of view, it would appear that
by relying upon oral or written promesas and a system of payment receipts,
the buyer in the pirate market runs the risk either of dispossession or of
a lengthy and costly court action to prove title. In practice, however, as
will be described below, neither risk appears to be that great. In fact,
the Bogota survey data of Doebele, and Losada and Gdmez and this author's
data in Medellin suggest that although conflicts do exist between illegal
subdividers and buyers, the more important conflict may be between the
less formal documents and procedures in the pirate market and the rigid re-
quirements of the formal legal system which govern the conventional subdivi-
sion market. Moreover, the data suggests that the latter conflict does not
stem from any antagonism of the lower income groups in the pirate market
toward the formal legal system, but rather from the economic constraints
under which lower income groups must act. The data presented in Section
D suggest that they not only have confidence in the formal legal system but
also have considerable knowledge of it as well; and most importantly, they
have a desire to gain access to that system.
Before considering the issues presented in Section D, the question of
buyer-illegal subdivider relations deserves further comment. Doebele's
study in particular addressed this question and concluded that relation-
ship between these two actors in the market is relatively good. He found,
for example, that in regard to problem of buyer defaults in payments, only
26% of those surveyed believed that the subdivider would repossess the
lot, while 57% believed that he would not. Only one of the families inter-
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viewed knew of a case of actual repossession. Moreover, 91% indicated that
they had not had any disputes with the subdivider over payments. With
respect to the escritura, 76% of those interviewed expressed confidence
that the subdivider would eventually fulfill his promise to deliver the
title to their property; approximately 9% had already received their es-
crituras. On the question of services, Doebele reported that 73% had said
they had not argued with the subdivider about the matter, although some
(18%) were aware that their community board (junta) had been at issue
with the subdivider over the provision of services. The general feeling of
most of those surveyed (88%) was that the subdivider had not been deceitful
12/in his dealings with buyers.- The findings of Losada and Go'mez in their
survey of pirate barrios are generally consistent with those of Doebele,
although they did identify buyer-subdivider conflicts around the issues of
stated purchase price and terms of payment, date of lot delivery, and pro-
mises made concerning services and delivery of title.- Their overall con-
clusion, however, was that the buyer-subdivider relationship does not
reveal the degree of abuse and conflict that has often been alleged.1 4 /
This author's own survey data of the La Cascada subdivision in Medellin
reveals somewhat more conflict in buyer-subdivider relations than reported
by the authors of the Bogota studies. However, as will be discussed below,
the results do not necessarily dispute their findings. In the case of La
Cascada, it will be recalled that approximately 3/4 of the families had
stopped their payments to the subdivider because of his refusal to give
- Doebele, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
13/
-- See Losada and Gomez, op. cit., pp. 137-146.
1-/ Ibid., p. 145.
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written promesas and his failure to provide services as allegedly promised
to approximately 70% of the purchasers. Thus the conflict between the
buyers and the subdivider was clearly evident. Moreover, disenchantment
was such that slightly more than half the families interviewed (52%) in-
dicated that had they known of the difficulties they were to have with
regard to services, documents, etc., they would not have purchased in La
Cascada.
Nevertheless, although the residents were certainly not satisfied with
the subdivider's performance, they generally exhibited confidence that
matters would eventually be resolved with the subdivider. In fact, half
the residents indicated that they still preferred to resolve their diffi-
culties directly with the developer rather than attempt to do so through
some official entity. In other words, they appeared to still have hope
that matters could be resolved on a personal level. Moreover, if we dis-
count for those few families who already had escrituras, 55% of those inter-
viewed expressed the belief that they would receive title from the subdivider
upon payment of the purchase price. As regards the issue of payment de-
faults (or, in this case, refusal to pay), only one resident interviewed
indicated that the subdivider had threatened to get a lawyer to disposses
those who didn't pay. Of the other residents who gave responses, 38%
stated that late payments resulted in interest charges of 18%. This res-
ponse correctly recited the terms in the written promesas held by a number
of the families. It is interesting to note that those who recited the
interest terms included those with only "verbal" promesas. Another 19%
indicated that the subdivider "did nothing" about late payments, and 10%
did not know what the subdivider would do. On the issue of services, it
is significant that despite the fact that 70% stated they had been promised
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services by the subdivider, only 44% actually blamed the subdivider for
the delay in obtaining services. Others (13%) blamed the delay on the
failure of the subdivision's own community action efforts (accion comunal)
to secure the necessary self-help labor and collaboration from residents
(particularly with regard to sewerage installation). A few individuals
(9%) blamed the delay on the fact that residents were not at paz y salvo.
This view, of course, obscured the fact that most residents did not have
title to their lots and therefore were not yet liable for property taxes.1 5 /
Finally, others variously blamed the Department of Municipal Planning and
Empresas Publicas.
The survey results presented above suggest that despite clearly arti-
culated dissatisfaction with the pirate subdivider, more than half the
residents nevertheless expressed a basic confidence in the outcome of
their dealings with the subdivider. These results, therefore, would appear
to generally support the findings of the Bogota studies that the relations
between buyers and subdividers are relatively good despite identifiable
conflicts. Doebele's study, however, shows higher percentages of positive
responses by pirate barrio residents. This difference, however, may not
be significant in view of the differences between this author's sample size
and that of Doebele, and that of Losada and Gomez as well. It seems reason-
able to expect that in a small subdivision such as La Cascada, there would
be a greater tendency for dissatisfaction to become unified and focused
against the developer. Families necessarily must participate more in the
community organizational efforts to obtain services, etc., while in larger
15/
-- The response did indicate, however, that the particular residents
understood the importance of the paz y salvo for the securement of services.
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subdivisions, as Doebele's data indicated, the same controversy may exist,
but may be handled by the community junta which proportionately involves
fewer residents directly with the problems and the subdivider.
D. Residents' Views and Understanding of the Legal System
It would seem reasonable to suggest that the buyers' basic optimism
and perseverence in their relations with illegal subdividers may stem from
their general knowledge of the legal system as well as their fundamental
belief that it will operate fairly on the issues of concern to them. The
studies by both Doebele and by Losada and Gomez found a high degree of
understanding of the legal system as well as confidence in its outcome.
This section will present the author's survey results in Medellin on the
same issues of residents' legal knowledge and confidence in the formal
system. Since the questions used by this author were the same as, or simi-
16/lar to, those used by Doebele in his study,-- the analysis will more closely
parallel the latter's presentation in order to facilitate comparisons.
Where questions used are identical and it is helpful for comparison pur-
poses, the response percentage from Doebele's study will be indicated in
brackets.
1. Knowledge of the Legal System
Consistent with Doebele's findings, every interviewed resident of
La Cascada expressed the desire to obtain a properly registered title to
his property. Approximately 78% [90%] acknowledged that they were aware
that in the meantime, the lack of title meant that they did not have to pay
16/
- Professor Doebele kindly granted permission to the author to use
questions from his Bogota survey questionnaire in order to permit the com-
parative analysis presented herein.
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17/taxes and that the subdivider did. Of those interviewed,-- 86% [69%]
thought that having a registered title would make it easier for their suc-
cessors to inherit the property.
With regard to the relationship between the documents possessed by
the residents and the procurement of urban services, only 44% [92%] indica-
ted an understanding that such documents would be necessary. Approximately
30% did not think the documents were necessary, and another 26% did not
know. Apart from the issue of sample size differences, this lower percen-
tage compared to Doebele's findings may reflect the residents' belief that
services were obtainable without regard to documents, by means of the
Rotating Fund of Empresas Publicas. The Fund, as noted earlier, was used
to extend services to subdivisions as a whole, usually before the process
of legalization was completed. In a conventional subdivision, of course,
the certificate of paz y salvo as well as other documents would be neces-
sary to obtain services.
Although a complaint had been lodged with the Superintendency of
Banks against the subdivider in 1973, it is interesting to note that two
years later only 17% [33%] of the residents properly identified the agency
as the entity which should receive complaints about the subdivision. An-
other 9% identified the Department of Municipal Planning. But over 60%
stated that they did not know of a procedure for complaining against the
subdivider. However, even though a large percentage of residents could not
identify the specific entities (i.e., the Superintendency and Municipal
Planning) responsible for regulating subdivision development, they did have
17/
- Only 7 responses were obtained for this question due to an over-
sight in the administering of the questionnaire.
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a perception of the overall legal and administrative system and appeared
to have clear ideas how they might go about resolving a complaint against
the subdivider. Apart from the proper place to complain, residents asserted
that the best place to complain was: the police (22%), the mayor's office
(22%), the community action agency (Accion Comunal) (22%), the Superinten-
dency of Banks (17%), the Department of Municipal Planning (9%) and a
political party (4%). This pattern of varied responses would suggest that
residents have clearly different perceptions of where effective authority
lies within the city government for the assertion of rights and the resolu-
tion of problems.
The residents also indicated a basic understanding of their poss-
essory rights to their property. When asked whether the documents they
received would protect them against the subdivider if he reneged on the
sale, 52% [81%] thought their documents would. However, another 22% an-
swered by emphasizing the importance of their possession in combination with
the documents. Only 13% [15%] believed their documents were worthless
against the subdivider's claims. Losada and Gomez also found a basic under-
standing among pirate barrio residents of the legal protection afforded
possessors. Almost 90% of those surveyed thought that a person who had
lived on a lot without documents of ownership for a year, would be protected
by the law against efforts by the actual owner to respossess the property.1 8
The authors also found that 83% of the those interviewed knew that the
escritura had to be signed before a notary public. 1 9 /
The results of the La Cascada survey in Medellin generally confirm
18/ a
- Losada and Gomez, og. cit. , pp. 147-148.
19/
-- Ibid., p. 147.
-145-
the findings of Doebele as well as Losada and G6mez that the residents of
pirate subdivisions have a considerable amount of basic knowledge of the
legal system and their respective rights under that system. The question
which arises, then, is whether they have confidence that those rights will
be protected. The following analysis suggests that pirate barrio residents
do have a high level of confidence in the formal legal system.
2. Confidence in the Legal System
It will be recalled that in La Cascada, except for those few who
had legal title to their property, only 35% of the residents had written
promesas, while over 50% of them had no document of purchase and sale, but
only verbal promises and receipts. Nevertheless, as already noted, 55% of
those with either written or verbal promises expressed the belief that
upon full payment of the purchase price they would receive the title from
the subdivider. As also noted, 74% believed that even if the subdivider
decided to renege on his sale and tried to remove them from their lots,
their documents (as well as their possession) would protect them. More-
over, were their properties to be invaded, 74% thought their documents alone
would be sufficient to remove the invaders, while another 9% thought that
20/
their documents in combination with possession would be necessary.--
20/
- The logical question which occurredin the process of interviewing
residents of La Cascada, 3/4 of whom were no longer paying monthly install-
ments to the subdivider because of his failure to deliver legal documents
and services, was: Why not invade instead? Only 22%, some of whom were
more sarcastic than sincere, stated that they would invade. The reasoning
given by some of these residents was that those who invaded seemed to re-
ceive urban services faster than those who purchased in a pirate subdivision.
Another stated that "possession" was more important than "receipts." How-
ever, 78% responded strongly that they would not invade. The most frequent
reason given was that invasion would bring "problems," meaning that there
would be no security or hope of obtaining legal title, only the constant
apprehension of losing the land they occupied. One resident stated, "I
like what costs me honorably." Another indicated that "receipts" were at
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With regard to the residents' confidence in the sale and credit
benefits which normally flow from ownership and documents of title, res-
ponses were less optimistic. Approximately 61% [58%] expressed the belief
that in the event they needed to sell their property quickly to raise money
that their documents would be accepted by buyers; but 39% [38%] did not
think so. Only 26% [44%] believed they could successfully use their docu-
ments as security for a loan, while 74% [50%] did not believe they could.
It is significant to note that one of the residents who did possess regis-
tered title to his property stated that -he did not think he could use it
as security for a loan. His view, however, was founded on experience. He
explained that he had gone to a local bank to obtain a loan for the con-
struction of his house, but despite his presentation of proof of legal
title to his property, the bank had refused him credit on the ground that
he lived in a "pirate barrio."
Residents of La Cascada also expressed a strong belief and confidence
their 'individual property rights would be respected when those rights came
in conflict with public purposes. For example, 83% [90%] stated that they
thought they would receive compensation for their property should it be
expropriated by the government for public purposes. Similarly, approximately
78% [89%] believed that if a public service authority such as Empresas
Publicas were to expropriate their property, compensation would be paid.
Losada and Gomez in their Bogota study of pirate barrios approached
20/cont. least some proof of ownership. It was apparent to the author
that despite the residents' difficulties with the subdivider, the majority
nevertheless felt secure in their possession and ability to prove ownership,
a status which they felt would never be obtainable if they resorted to
invasion.
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the question of resident confidence in the legal system somewhat differ-
ently from Doebele. They designed two broad questions to determine resi-
dents' expectations about outcomes under the Colombian judicial system.
The two questions were the following:
(1) Do you think that in general, Colombian judges are
(a) very fair (b) fair (c) unfair (d) very unfair?
(2) Considering the actual performance of the judges and the 21/
police, do you think the Colombian laws are generally fair?--
The authors then combined the two questions and scaled the responses in
three intervals to determine the residents' overall "opinion'of Colombian
justice. The three intervals and the percentages of responses in each for
all five barrios combined were as follows:-2-
Frankly positive: 19%
Neither positive nor negative: 36%
Frankly negative: 44%
The authors concluded that the negative tendency of the answers was mani-
fested in certain barrios more than others, perhaps because of particular
23/
negative experiences.-- It was the authors' overall conclusion that while
the residents appear to have considerable knowledge of the formal legal
system, they do not appear to understand how to use that system, and that
their generally negative or ambivalent opinion of the outcomes of the system
24/
suggests that they think using it would be futile anyway.--
21/
-- Losada and Gomez, op. cit., p. 148.
-- Author's calculation based upon individual barrio statistics pre-
sented by authors. See, ibid., p. 150.
23/
- Ibid., p. 149.
24/
-- Ibid.
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3. Evaluation
The results of the studies by Doebele, and Losada and Comez in
Bogota, as well as this author in Medellin, support the proposition that
pirate barrio residents have considerable knowledge of the formal legal
system which surrounds them. As regards the question of residents' con-
fidence in the legal system, the results obtained by Losada and Gomez
would appear to conflict with the findings of Doebele and this author. The
studies of Doebele and this author suggested that residents generally believe
that their individual property rights will be protected and that they will
receive fair treatment under the formal legal system. Losada and Gomez,
on the other hand, found a higher degree of resident ambivalence and cyni-
cisntoward the legal system and the outcomes obtainable under that system.
Notwithstanding this apparent difference in results between the
studies mentioned, it is perhaps to be questioned whether the results are
directly comparable. The methodology employed by Losada and Gomez was
quite different from that employed by Doebele and this author in their
studies. The methodology of Losada and Gomez relied upon two broadly
phrased questions about Colombian justice. In contrast, the questions of
Doebele and those used by this author were focused more specifically upon
the issues of legal title and property rights vis-a-vis third parties and
the government. It would seem reasonable to expect that the questions of
Losada and Gomez would tap the more generalized cynicism and ambivalence
found in most societies by lower income groups toward the legal system.
It is also possible, of course, that the questions employed by Doebele and
this author may have tapped a form of defensive optimism about the legal
system on the part of residents who understandably felt various degrees
of insecurity about their ownership status. Thus, none of the studies may
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have properly measured actual "confidence" in the legal system and expec-
tations of fair treatment.
Perhaps the most important conclusion possible from the results of
all three studies, however, is that the residents in pirate barrios are
certainly aware that they have possession of and rights to an asset which
the formal legal system recognizes and values. Whatever the range of their
optimism or cynicism about the operation of that system in general, it is
clear that they are determined over time to eventually gain access to it
and to attain the status of legitimacy which flows from legal ownership of
their property. The remaining two chapters consider modifications in the
legal-institutional structures which affect lower income families' access
to land and housing. Chapter VI considers modifications in the formal
subdivision requirements, namely the minimum standards program (normas
minimas) in Medellin and Bogota. Chapter VII considers other planned and
recommended institutional modifications as part of the overall conclusion
to the thesis.
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CHAPTER VI
THE NORMAS MINIMAS SUBDIVISION PROGRAM AND THE PIRATE MARKET
A. Introduction
In Chapter III, it was observed that the difficulties encountered by
Medellin planning officials with the pirate subdivision El Diamante, led
them to devise a program of reduced standards for the development of the
subdivision. The case of El Diamante also provided impetus for the estab-
1/lishment of a general program in 1973- of so-called "minimum standards"
01 2/
or normas minimas- for lower income subdivision development. Six years
before, Bogota' had also adopted an ordinance which allowed for reduced
3/
standards within a special district.- In 1972 and 1973, however, follow-
ing the recommendations of a major study,-/ the Bogota city council adopted
1/
- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 204 de 1973. Modifications in
the normas minimas requirements were made in 1975. See, idem., Decreto
No. 334 de 1975.
2/
- The exact term used in the Medellin regulations is obras minimas,
meaning minimum works or construction. However, the term normas minimas
is also used synonymously by many planning officials and will be used in
the analysis presented in this chapter.
El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota, Acuerdo No. 65 de 1967.
Consultecnicos, Ltda., Estudio de Normas Minimas de Urbanizaciones,
Servicios Publicos y Servicios Comunitarios (Study prepared for the
Instituto de Credito Territorial, the Planning Department for the Bogota
Special District and the National Planning Department, Bogota: 1971).
This study was subjected to considerable criticism by planning officials
in Medellin, in particular, the study's recommendations with respect to
lot sizes and other physical dimensions for subdivisions -- considered
too small and oppressive for lower income families. See, Fabio Botero
Gomez, Juan Carlos Duqrue Ramirez and Gilberto Arango Escobar, Analisis del
Estudio de Normas Minimas de Urbanizacion y de los Problemas de Vivienda
Urbana Para Clases Populares (Medell~n: Departamento Administrativo de
Planeacion y S.T., 1972).
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a series of ordinances which established a new normas minimas program.-
An important distinction between the two cities' normas minimas legisla-
tion is that the Bogota ordinance does not restrict the location of sub-
divisions to any particular area of the city while Medellin's ordinance
limits normas minimas subdivisions to locations zoned under one residen-
tial classification only. The importance of this distinction will be
discussed below.
These normas minimas programs as enacted in Bogota and Medellin repre-
sent modifications in one part of the egal-institutional framework which
governs the subdivision process. Modifications in the other parts of that
framework, namely the laws governing land transfer, just considered in
Chapter V, and the regulations of the Superintendency of Banks, considered
indirectly in Chapter III, will be treated briefly within the context of
the conclusions and recommendations of the final chapter.
This chapter will examine the nature of the subdivisions which have
been produced under the modified subdivision standards as enacted in
Medellin and Bogota. Similar to the inquiry in Chapter III concerning the
competitive viability of government housing programs, relative to the pir-
ate submarket, the inquiry here is whether the private market itself, once
freed of unrealistic subdivision regulations, can produce a competitive
alternative to the pirate submarket -- from the viewpoint of both the sub-
divider and the potential pirate lot purchaser. Unfortunately, similar
amounts of data are not available for the two cities. In Bogota, average
data has been obtained from subdividers for 14 normas minimas subdivisions
and 135 pirate subdivisions. In Medellin, while a number of formerly il-
- Idem., Acuerdo No. 20 de 1972; Acuerdo No. 21 de 1972; El Alcalde
de Bogota, Decreto 1259 de 1973; Decreto No. 1260 de 1973.
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legal subdivisions have been legalized or normalized under the city's
normas minimas program, only one subdivision has actually been designed
and developed under the program. This subdivision, therefore, is the only
source of data on normas minimas subdividing in Medellin. The pirate sub-
division data, of course, is also limited to case study data. Because of
the disparity in the amount and kind of data for the two cities, the fol-
lowing analysis will present the Bogota data first in order to provide a
general framework for examining the data from the Medellin subdivision.
B. Normas Minimas Subdivisions and the Pirate Submarket in Bogota
The data source for the comparative analysis of normas minimas subdiv-
isions and pirate subdivisions in Bogot is the survey conducted by the
Superintendency of Banks in BogotZ in 1977. The data was analyzed in a
6/preliminary study (1978) by Alan Carroll of the World Bank.- It is rele-
vant to the analysis presented later in this chapter to emphasize that the
data analyzed by Carroll covered the supply and demand aspects of the pirate
market as a land development business only. The survey did not collect
data on the dwellings or residents of the normas minimas or the pirate
subdivisions. The following results were reported by Carroll for the market
solutions produced under normas minimas in comparison to the solutions pro-
duced in the pirate submarket.
1. Physical Characteristics of Subdivisions
With respect to the physical characteristics of the subdivisions,
6/
- Alan Carroll, "The Supply of Residential Land by Pirate Subdividers
in Bogota" (washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Preliminary Discussion
Pauer, December 1978). Mr. Carroll kindly gave this author permission to
cite some of the general percentages and numbers which are presented in
detailed tables in the paper. The policy of The World Bank as to prelim-
inary, unreleased reports,prohibits the presentation in this thesis of the
tables and more detailed data.
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Carroll found that the average size of the lots in the normas minimas sub-
divisions tended to be approximately 25% smaller than those in the pirate
subdivisions (92 M as opposed to 125 M ). The total usable area for lots
in normas minimas subdivisions was also smaller (57% as opposed to 71% for
pirate subdivisions). However, the normas minimas subdivisions usually
contained a greater amount of green space or zonas verdes than the pirate
subdivisions (9% as opposed to 5%), had more communal space (12% as opposed
to 5%), more services, and generally were better located.-
2. Tract Acquisition and Development Costs
The majority of both types of subdividers purchased their tracts by
means of a single lump sum. Payment by means of a downpayment and install-
ments was used primarily in the larger subdivisions. There were relatively
few cases reported of interest charges as part of these purchase contracts.
Interest charges in such cases ranged between 0.3% and 7.0% per year. The
normas minimas subdividers, however, paid approximately 28% more per square
meter for subdividable land than did the pirate subdividers. All the normas
minimas subdividers made infrastructure investments, providing at a mini-
mum, water and streets. Approximately 131 of the pirate subdividers had
provided no infrastructure at all. It should be noted, of course, that in
those pirate subdivisions with infrastructure it was not necessarily the
subdivider who installed it. Rather it was often the community or the
municipal government who undertook installation, with or without the aid
of the developer. Carroll cautioned that comparisons in regard to expendi-
tures and amount of infrastructure reported were difficult because the sur-
vey questionnaire did not distinguish between completed and planned infra-
7/
-' Carroll, op. cit., pp. 4, 17.
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structure investments. Interestingly, over three-fourths of both the
pirate as well as the normas minimas subdividers waited a year or more after
8/
commencing lot sales before installing infrastructure.- This latter point
will receive further comment below. Carroll noted that although normas
minimas subdividers reported higher costs per unit for sewer and street
construction than did pirate subdividers, the latter reported costs two-
thirds and three-quarters higher than the normas minimas subdividers for
water pipes and electrical lines. Since it would be expected that normas
minimas subdividers would have higher overall infrastructure costs than
pirate subdividers who provide lesser quality of the same, Carroll concluded
that the higher cost data reported by pirate subdividers cast doubt upon
the validity of the infrastructure and cost data.1" The costs of profes-
sional services, publicity and administration ("overhead") were calculated
on a per-lot basis. The results indicated that both kinds of subdividers
had similar costs for publicity and administration; however, the pirate
subdivider reported costs twice as high as the normas minimas developer for
professional services. Again the results ran somewhat against expecta-
tions, since pirate developers avoid the considerable paperwork which is
part of the conventional subdivision approval process. It was Carroll's
conclusion that the pirate subdividers probably exaggerated their costs in
10/
all three categories of overhead costs.--
3. Terms of Purchase and Developer Profits
According to Carroll's analysis, the purchaser in a normas minimas
8/
- Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
9/
- Ibid., p. 29.
1-/ Ibid., p. 32.
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subdivision in Bogota pays approximately one-third more for a lot than he
would in the pirate market. The price he pays, however, usually purchases
more services, more open space, a better location and the greater likeli-
11/hood that his lot will be transferred with legal title.- The terms of
purchase, however, are very similar to those in the pirate submarket. Car-
roll found that the average downpayment is close to 30%, compared to
approximately 25% in the Bogota pirate market. The average installment
schedule is 39 months, compared to an average of 36 months in the pirate
12/
market.- Perhaps of most significance, the data indicated that normas
minimas subdividers appear to earn a higher rate of profit on their trans-
action than do pirate subdividers. Carroll found that the annual profit
for normas minimas subdividers ranged between 77% and 146% while that of
13/pirate subdividers ranged between 33% and 46% per year.-- He noted, how-
ever, that the absolute values should be treated with caution in light of
the great degree of variation observed across subdivisions, the effect of
inflation, and the favorable assumptions which underlay the estimations
of profit, in particular, the assumption that there was no lateness or
default in payments. Notwithstanding these qualifications, Carroll con-
cluded that the figures did accurately indicate the order of magnitude
14/
of profit rates realizable in both kinds of subdivision development.--
11/
- Ibid., p. 4.
1-2/ Ibid., p. 37.
1- Ibid., p. 6.
- Ibid.
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4. Evaluation
The logical question which follows from Carroll's findings is why
comparatively few normas minimas subdivisions have been developed in
Bogota if normas minimas subdividers can make better returns than pirate
subdividers. Carroll suggested four possible explanations. First, poten-
tial developers of normas minimas subdivisions may be deterred by lack of
access to the necessary capital to install required infrastructure. It
will be recalled that in almost all of the subdivisions examined in the
Bogota study, including normas minimas developments, the subdivider sold
lots before undertaking the installation of infrastructure. This develop-
ment pattern, Carroll suggested, indicates that the income from lot sales
is used to finance the subsequent infrastructure investment.- It was
noted in Chapter II that this same constraint on capital appeared to be
one of the factors explaining the growth and persistence of pirate subdiv-
isions in Medellin.
A second explanation suggested by Carroll is that the supply of
land for normas minimas subdivisions may be limited, in part, by the impact
of zoning laws. This explanation will be discussed with specific reference
to Medellin in the analysis below. The third explanation put forth is that
the process of subdivision approval under the normas minimas program to
date has been characterized by delays and uncertainty -- leaving subdividers
without the necessary permits for legal service connections. In this re-
gard, it is instructive to note the dilemma of the conventional subdivider
compared to the alternative of developing in pirate fashion. In March,
1975, a conventional subdivider published a letter of complaint in El
- Ibid., p. 8.
-157-
Tiempo, one of the major newspapers in Bogota. After noting with approval
the Special District government's "campaign" against pirate subdividers,
particularly those who fraudulently sold land they did not own, the indivi-
dual added:
But I want to explain that there are many subdivisions, organized
by serious firms with solid economic backing, who are owners of
properties and who have complied with all the requisites, but to
whom the Planning Office of the District does not opportunely
grant the licenses, delaying days, months and years . . . causing
serious losses to the directors and owners of these subdivisions.
Therefore, it is the [Special] District, through the Office of
Planning, which is . . . sponsoring the pirate subdivisions,
because if permits are not given despite the fulfillment of all
the requisites, what can an urbanizer do who is at the mouth of
bankruptcy?i16/
The tone and the words of the letter quoted above indicate the subdivider's
concern with the "image" of his firm and other ostensibly legitimate
developer firms; it is this community or social image problem of the sub-
division business in general which Carroll suggests may be the fourth factor
explaining the relatively small number of normas minimas subdivisions which
have been developed in Bogota.
C. Normas Mrnimas Subdivisions and the Pirate Market in Medellin
As noted in the introduction, as of 1979, only one subdivision has been
designed and developed in Medellin under the normas minimas regulations
17/
established in 1973.- From limited information obtained by this author
in 1979 from the Municipal Planning Department, it appears that two addi-
tional subdivisions are in the process of receiving approval as normas mini-
mas subdivisions. Apart from these, however, the only other subdivisions
16/
-- El Tiempo, March 16, 1975.
- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 204 de 1973.
-158-
to which the normas mfnimas have been applied are pre-existing illegal sub-
divisions or settlements which are now either "legalized" or in the process
of being legalized. (See, Figure 21.) Before considering the factors
which may explain the lack of normas minimas subdivision activity in Mede-
llin, it is instructive to present the data which is available for the one
completed normas minimas subdivision, and to consider its viability as an
alternative to the subdivisions in the pirate market.
1. Case Data: Normas Minimas Subdivision-8
a. Physical Characteristics of the Subdivision
The normas minimas subdivision in question is located in Comuna
2 (Robledo) approximately 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the center of Medellin,
and has good access to bus services. The total subdivision area is 21,335
square meters, of which 8,999 M2 (42%) was subdivided into 78 lots which
average approximately 115 M2 in size (frontage: 6.5 mts.). About 26% of
the total area is devoted to green space (5,548 M2 ) and street area com-
2prises approximately 32% (6,788 M ).
b. Tract Acquisition and Development Costs
The developer financed the purchase of the tract at an interest
rate of 1.0% per month or 12.0% annually. In contrast to the majority of
normas minimas developers in Bogota, the Medellin developer did install
infrastructure prior to the sale of lots. The infrastructure consisted of
sewerage, water and graded roads. Table 20 sets forth the development
costs of the subdivision in terms of gross costs, the net area cost per
square meter, and the per lot cost. The table indicates that on a per lot
18/
-- The data presented here was supplied to this author by the developer
in April, 1979.
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TABLE 20
DEVELOPMENT COSTS AND EXPECTED PROFIT OF NORMAS MINIMAS SUBDIVISION,
MEDELLIN, 1975
Total Lot Price
Costs
1. Tract cost per M : $50.00
$36,000.00
Cost of global tract
Net area ( sable area)
cost per M
Cost per lot
2. Infrastructurea
: $1,066,750.00
:$ 118.54
$13,676.00
:$
:$
a. Bulldozing roads
b. Sewerage
c. Water b
d. Project design costs
Net area cost per M :
Cost per lot
3. Administration
90,000.00
220,000.00
280,000.00
45,000.00
70.56
$ 8,141.00
$ 260,000.00
Net area cost per M
Cost per lot
4. Taxes and related costs
(notarizations, regis-
tration of deeds, etc.)
Net area cost per M
Cost per lot
5. National income tax
Net area cost per M
Cost per lot
Total Costs:
Total subdivision cost
Net area cost per M
Total cost per lot
PROFIT:
28.89
$ 3,333.00
$ 30,000.00
:$ 3.33
$ 384.00
: $ 100,000.00
:$ 11.11
$ 1,282.00
$2,091,750.00
$ 232.43
$26,816.00
$ 9,184.56
Notes
The installation of electricity is not governed by the normas m enimas
regulations. Empresas Publicas installs service and charges users under
installment payment plan.
b Includes costs of subdivision design as well as design of roads,
water and sewerage.
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basis, a little more than one half of the total cost (51%) consisted of the
cost of the land itself. Infrastructure (including the cost of project
designs) constituted close to a third (30%) of the cost, while administration as
well as taxes and required legal steps amounted to the remaining 20%. Un-
fortunately, there is no comparable average data or case data for these
cost categories of pirate subdivisions during the same time period in
Medellin. Examining the cost data on a square meter basis in relation to
the average data presented for normas minimas subdivisions by Carroll, it
is interesting to note that the Medellin developer's infrastructure costs
were considerably higher than subdivisions of comparable size in Bogota.
Carroll reported that the average net area cost per M2 for medium normas
minimas subdivisions (10,000 to 50,000 M 2 ) was approximately $43.00. 19
The Medellin developer's net area cost per M (excluding professional de-
sign costs) was approximately $66.00. This figure is also higher than the
average for all Bogota normas minimas subdivisions surveyed ($57.00).-
c. Terms of Purchase and Developer's Profit
Table 20 also indicates the selling price per lot in relation
to costs. It indicates that the selling price of a lot in 1975 was $36,000,
meaning that on an investment of $26,816.00 per lot, the developer's poten-
tial profit was $9,184.56 or approximately 34%. The issue of the profit-
ability of normas minimas subdivisions in Medellin will be considered in
the evaluation below. The terms of purchase for buyers in the normas mini-
mas subdivision were as follows:
19/
-- Carroll, op. cit., p. 31.
20/
-- Ibid.
-161-
Lot Sale Price:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $36,000.
Downpayment: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10,000.
Monthly Installment Payments (30 months):. . . $ 1,060.
Interest Charge: 1.5% per month on balance outstanding
The developer indicated that at the time he began marketing the lots
(late 1975), the average monthly income of those who purchased the lots
was approximately $5,000.
d. Evaluation
Unlike Carroll's analysis for Bogota, the inquiry here is not
motivated by the finding that the Medellin developer realized a profit con-
siderably higher than his counterpart in the pirate market. However, the
developer's profit (34%) is certainly reasonable and the question remains,
namely, why only one normas minimas subdivision has been developed under
the program since its official enactment in 1973. Before examining this
question, however, it is important to look at the demand side of the housing
market and to evaluate the solution offered by the normas minimas subdivision
from the viewpoint of the potential pirate lot purchaser.
Table 21 presents the comparison of the normas minimas sub-
division's characteristics with those of specific examples of pirate and
government subdivisions previously discussed or mentioned in the analysis.
The range of physical characteristics is presented primarily for the
reader's benefit since the previous analysis has suggested that the charac-
teristic of singular importance to the pirate lot purchaser is the lot it-
self. In this respect, it is apparent that the normas minimas subdivision
compares very favorably to the lot offerings in the pirate subdivisions
indicated, and certainly compared to the I.C.T. offerings. For example,
the lot size offered is only about 10% smaller than that in nearby El
Diamante, while it is 60-90% larger than the lots in the two I.C.T. sub-
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divisions. If we add to the factor of lot size, the previously noted im-
portance of spatial flexibility, the only relevant comparison which remains
is between the normas minimas subdivision and the pirate subdivision with
21/respect to price, terms of purchase and services.-- The government alter-
natives as previously analyzed in Chapter III, are not competitive in
these contexts.
TABLE 21
COMPARISON OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NORMAS MINIMAS SUBDIVISION
WITH EXAMPLES OF PIRATE AND GOVERNMENT SUBDIVISIONS IN MEDELLIN
Physical Normas Min- I.C.T.
Charact- imas Sub- El Castilla I.C.T. Doce de
eristics division % Diamante % Vieja 1 % Zea II % Octubre %
Tract 21,335 95 041 549,335 94,229 468 000
size M2  M M2  M2  M
No. of
lots 78 380 2,241 464 6,500
Area usable
for lots 8,999 42 49 831 52 352 703 64 29, 45 31 180 000 38
(net area) M 2  M M M M
Average 90 M2
size of 128 M
lots 115 M2  128 M2  256 M2  60 M 72 M2
Street 6,798 32 21,453 23 196,632 36 33,757 36 unknown ?
Area M2  M2  M2  M2
Green area
(zonas 5,548 26 23,757 25 -- 0 31,427 33 121,680 26
verdes) M 2  M 2  M 2  M2
Notes
1 Older pirate subdivision, now integrated into the city. See Appendix D.
21/
2- One additional issue, of course, is the comparison of the relative
likelihood of purchasers obtaining legal tenure in the two types of subdivi-
sions. However, the data and analysis presented in Chapter V would suggest
that pirate barrio purchasers' confidence in the legal system and the ultimate
transfer of title is such that differences between the probabilities of ob-
taining legal tenure would not be significant compared to the physical and
cost differences observed between the subdivisions.
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In order to compare prices, terms of purchase and extent of
services in the normas minimas subdivision and pirate subdivisions of
Medellin, it is necessary to return to this author's own data for La Cas-
cada as well as the sample data from three pirate barrios presented by
Molina and Arias (1976). Table 22 presents the comparison of the two pri-
vate market alternatives in 1975-1976 with respect to the aspects men-
tioned. An examination of the purchase terms for all five subdivisions
indicates that the normas minimas subdivision offered terms in 1976 which
were more favorable than those of the first two pirate subdivisions pre-
sented in the table (El Diamante and Miramar) and less favorable than the
purchase terms of the other two subdivisions (La Esperanza No. 2 and La
Cascada).
On the basis of this straight-forward comparison alone, it
would be reasonable to conclude that the normas minimas subdivision can
and does compete with at least some of the varied offerings in the pirate
subdivision market. Not only does the normas minimas subdivision offer a
better price and better terms of purchase it also includes essential urban
services at the point of purchase. However, it is the variety of solutions
observed in the pirate submarket, particularly over time, which requires
that certain qualifications be attached. First, it should be noted that
the normas minimas subdivision, El Diamante and also Miramar are all loca-
ted in the same Comuna (Robledo) within relative proximity, and within the
urban perimeter of Medellin. The significance of this fact becomes evi-
dent when combined with a second observation, namely, that both El Diamante
and Miramar are pirate subdivisions whose principal growth (i.e., sale of
lots) occurred in the mid and late 1960's. In other words, by 1976, most
of the lots in the two subdivisions had been sold. The terms of purchase
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TABLE 22
COMPARISON OF A NORMAS MINIMAS SUBDIVISION AND PIRATE SUBDIVISIONS
IN MEDELLIN IN TERMS OF LOT PRICE, TERMS OF PURCHASE AND SERVICES PROVIDED
IN THE YEARS 1975 AND 1976
Normas Minimas El b La Esper- La
Item Subdivisiona Diamante Miramar anza No.2b Cascada
_ 1975 & 1976 1976 1976 1976 1975
Average Lot
Price
$36,00
(115 M-)
$45,000
$128 M2)
$45,000
(117 M2)
$4,000
(141 M2)
$16,000
(147/160 M2)
Downpayment $10,000 $30,000 $30,000 no credit $2,000
terms
Monthly In- $ 1.060 $1,250 $1,250 no credit $ 100
stallments terms minimum
Interest 1.5% per 1.5% per 1.5% per -- none on
Charges month on month on month on monthly
balance balance balance balance;
1.5% on
overdue
balance
Term 30 months 12 months 12 months Full pay- 48 months
ment re-
quired 
_
Developer
-water
-sewerage
-graded rds
Empresas
Publicas
-electricity
Developer All services provided
-$400,000 through the Habilita-
contribu- tion of Housing Div.
tion Empresas Publicas ex-
Empresas cept for water in La
Publicas Esperanza (accion
(Housing comunal)
Habilitation
Div.)
-all services
sewerage
(accion
comunal)
water (near-
by stream-
La Iguana)
electricity
(contra-
band)
b Molina and Arias, op. cit., p. 30.
Services
Notes
Lot sales began in 1975 and continued into late 1976.
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which Molina and Arias reported in effect in 1976 in El Diamante and Mira-
mar were markedly different from the earlier terms of purchase reported
by the authors for the two subdivisions (and by this author for El Dia-
22/
mante in 1973).-- The much higher price and more stringent credit terms
demanded would appear to reflect both the scarcity of remaining lots in the
now serviced and built-up subdivisions, as well as the speculative behav-
ior of the pirate developer, who, as previously noted, often holds some
lots off the market until services are provided. Therefore, it may be
that the best conclusion which can be made from the available data about
the competiveness of the normas minimas subdivision with pirate subdivi-
sions in Medellin is that it competes successfully with price and purchase
terms for the relatively few remaining lots in older pirate subdivisions.
This conclusion would seem reasonable if it is recalled that
the pirate subdivision market has been a market which has flourished pri-
marily on the periphery of urban areas where land prices are cheaper and
services are either prohibited or unlikely to be extended in the foresee-
able future. For example, such subdivision areas as El Diamante and
Castilla (see Table 20 and Appendix D) were once considered "peripheral"
to the urban area of Medellin. The city's subsequent growth resulted in
their nozmalization, servicing and incorporation, into the urban area of
Medellin, and their land values appreciated accordingly. Now, however,
because the extension of the urban area of Medellin has nearly reached
its physical limits against the hillsides surrounding the city, peripheral
activity of pirate subdividing appears to have extended into the semi-
rural areas surrounding Medellin (see, Figure 3, Chapter II). The signi-
22/
-- See Molina and Arias, op. cit., pp. 27-30.
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ficance of the peripheral character of these new pirate subdivisions rela-
tive to the cost competitiveness of the normas minimas subdivision is
evident in Table 22. Both La Cascada and La Esperanza No. 2 are peri-
pheral, semi-rural pirate subdivisions whose lot sales occurred primarily
23/
after 1970.-- In 1976, the lot prices, terms of purchase (as well as
lot sizes) continued to reflect the cheaper cost of unserviced land on the
periphery compared to lot prices and credit terms available within the
urban perimeter of Medellin.2-4
Apart from the matter of legal tenure, the only aspect in which
the normas minimas lots would appear to compete successfully with these
most peripheral pirate subdivisions is in the provision of services.
Clearly the legal provision of services is important to the pirate lot
purchaser. However, very little information exists about the importance
of services to such purchasers when balanced against the additional costs
in lot price which usually results. From the limited data obtained in the
La Cascada study, this author suggested that the purchasers principal ob-
jective is to obtain a lot at a low price irrespective of existing services
as long as service needs could be met through temporary measures (i.e.,
natural sources and contraband), and there is the reasonable expectation
that legal services can eventually be obtained. It is not clear that the
same purchaser in the pirate subdivision is willing to pay the additional
cost for a serviced lot at the outset, as reflected in higher purchase
23/
-- Molina and Arias indicated that La Esperanza No. 2 originated in
the years 1971-1972. Ibid., p. 9.
24/
- This point was illustrated graphically in the comparison of land
values per square meter in El Diamante and La Cascada between 1966 and
1976. See Chapter III, Figure 15A, supra.
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price quoted and the higher downpayment and installments required. That
is, it may be incorrect to hypothesize that there is a demand for serviced
lots provided in the normas minimas type subdivision. For example, further
statistical analysis by Carroll of the data presented in his preliminary
study of the normas minimas and pirate subdivisions of Bogota, indicated
that the only service infrastructure for which purchasers appeared to be
25/
willing to pay more for lots was sewerage.- This qualified description
of the demand for serviced lots corresponds more closely to the viewpoints
expressed to this author by residents in La Cascada. However, even this
finding needs to be examined in relation to the characteristics of purchasers
in the normas minimas subdivisions, particularly their income levels and
types of employment. It should be remembered that Carroll's study ex-
plicitly did not consider the characteristics of these purchasers. If the
1975 average monthly income of purchasers in the Medellin normas minimas
subdivision ($5,000) is any indication, it would suggest that the purchasers
are a higher and presumably more stable income group within the working
class. Therefore, to speak of demand for normas minimas-type serviced
lots, or even sewerage alone, may mean that there is a demand and expecta-
tion on the part of those who are better able economically to afford the
higher lot costs associated with the provision of services. 2 6
25/
-- Notes of discussion with Mr. Alan Carroll, March 14, 1979.
26/
-- This argument is somewhat analogous to the so-called "creaming"
effect observed in sites and services programs, whereby the better organized
and better serviced (compared to squatter settlements) sites and services
projects attract the more established, higher income members of the working
class, leaving behind those with lower incomes whose livelihood had de-
pended upon the sale of goods and services to their more established neigh-
bors. See William A. Doebele and Lisa R. Peattie, "Some Second Thoughts
on 'Sites and Services'" (unpublished manuscript, M.I.T., October, 1976).
Within the normas minimas context, the question is whether the better or-
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None of the caveats expressed above about the true economic
competitiveness of normas minimas subdivisions from the perspective of the
pirate lot purchaser are intended to suggest the curtailment of such pro-
grams. Rather, they are intended to highlight the fact that the economic
constraints of the present pirate lot purchaser (low income and limited or
no access to credit) may make the normas mi'nimas "serviced" lot offering
inaccessible except perhaps to the highest income range of those who would
otherwise seek lots in a pirate subdivision. In order to determine the
real validity of this proposition, of course, the same sort of analysis
that has been done by Vernez, Losada and Gomez and others of purchasers in
pirate subdivisions must be done in normas minimas subdivisions. From a
policy viewpoint, however, the interesting question is whether the more
expensive normas minimas "market" solution could effectively serve poten-
tial pirate lot purchasers if the latter were simply given the access to
credit that they heretofore have been denied. A recently devised national
program to provide such access to credit is considered briefly in Chapter
VII. At this point, however, in order to complete the analysis of the
26/cant. ganized development process and the serviced lots of such
subdivisions attract primarily the higher income group of workers who have
the necessary resources to afford the higher cost of securing a lot. In
conversations with the developer of the old, well-known pirate subdivision
in Medellin, La Castilla, the developer made some observations in the "pir-
ate" subdivision context which suggests that the more established members
of the working class might seek lots in the better developed and serviced
normas minimas subdivisions. He indicated that approximately 500 masons
(albaniles) were the first to buy lots in Castilla. After constructing
houses and residing for 4-5 years, they then sold their homes for a con-
siderable profit to a "somewhat wealthier" obrero group, improving their
own economic position and further developing the barrio. Interview with
Dr. Augusto Cock Alvear of Cock Alvear Hermanos y Cia Ltda (Medellin:
June 12, 1975).
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normas minimas program in Medellf'n, it is necessary to return to Carroll's
supply question namely, why more subdivisions have not been developed in
Medellin.
The factors which would seem to explain the lack of significant
normas minimas subdivision development in Medellin are suggested with the
caveat that further analysis is needed. The first factor, perhaps of most
importance, is that the supply of land in Medellin available for such types
of subdivision is extremely limited. The scarcity of land suitable for
residential use has been noted previously. In addition, however, unlike
the Bogota ordinance, the normas minimas ordinance in Medellin restricts
the development of such subdivisions to one residential zoning classifica-
27/tion (R-3).- This classification covers primarily the more peripheral
northeastern and northwestern areas of the city. Apart from the social and
spatial segregation which this zoning restriction implies, it clearly
further reduces the supply of land which might be used by developers for
such subdivisions. Moreover, since the more peripherally located land
tends to be more steeply sloped, potential normas minimas developers might
be deterred by the concern that the costs of land preparation and service
installations would make the venture only marginally profitable. It would
seem advisable for Medellin's planning officials to consider Bogota's ap-
proach to normas minimas, which permits locational flexibility provided the
Special District Planning Department's standards and procedures for normas
minimas are met.
27/
- El Alcalde de Medellin, Decreto No. 334 de 1975, art. 2. Article
3 of the regulations, however, does authorize the Board of Directors of
the Department of Municipal Planning to exercise some discretion in this
regard.
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A second factor inhibiting the development of normas minimas
subdivisions is the official subdivision process required by the Municipal
Planning Department. The developer of the one normas minimas subdivision
in Medellin echoed some of the same criticism of the approval process as
those of the Bogota developer quoted above. It appears that the same
approval process governs conventional as well as normas minimas subdivisions;
the delays and requirements are not only expensive for the developer but
also discourage potential buyers who are informed of the delays.- (See
Appendix E for list of steps and documents required in the approval process.)
A third factor may possibly be the limitations upon the deve-
lopers' access to capital necessary to provide required infrastructure.
The limited data available suggest that this constraint appears to operate
in the pirate subdivision market. However, the question is whether those
developers who would undertake a normas minimas subdivision are the same
as those in the pirate market. It would seem unlikely; those who would sub-
divide under normas minimas may be better organized and have greater access
to capital. However, if the normas minimas program is not intended to
"compete" with pirate subdividers but rather to draw them into the conven-
tional subdivision process, then mechanisms should be devised to enable
these developers to finance the infrastructure. A final factor which may
explain the lack of normas minimas development in Medellin is that the pro-
gram may not have been promoted sufficiently to make developers aware of
the profits which could be realized in such subdivisions. It is reasonable
to argue that the developer of the normas minimas subdivision in Medellin
28/
-- Notes of author's correspondence with developer, September, 1976.
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could have charged a higher installment payment over a somewhat longer
term and still have sold all the lots in the subdivision. If it is remem-
bered that one of the principal concerns of the lower income family is the
timing of costs, then it could be expected that such families might be
willing to pay more over time for the opportunity to obtain ownership of a
lot and build in accordance with their needs. This conclusion, of course,
is most plausible if the restraint on credit access for such families is
removed.
In conclusion, it would seem that the normas minimas subdivi-
sion program in Medellin could provide an alternative to present purchasers
in the pirate submarket provided they are given access to credit necessary
to purchase the more expensive "serviced" lots. If the present restraint
on lower income families' access to credit is not changed, then the limited
data suggest that the lower income purchaser presently found in the pirate
market will continue to opt for the less expensive, more peripherally loca-
ted lots in that market. On the supply side, it seems reasonable to sug-
gest that the limited amount of normas minimas subdivision development in
Medellin is due to limited land supply compounded by the zoning restric-
tions placed upon the program, as well as possible problems of developers'
access to capital and their understanding of the potential profitability
of the program.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary of Preceding Analysis
The preceding analysis has traced the historical development of the
phenomenon of pirate subdivisions in Medellirn and suggested a number of
structural factors underlying the growth and persistence of the pirate
submarket. These were identified as the city's rapid rate of urbanization
particularly by lower income families during the decades of 1950 and 1960,
creating a strong demand for housing in a market governed by municipal
policies and standards unrelated to the needs of those low income families.
The city's rigid urban perimeter policy and high technical standards for
land classification, subdivision and the provision of services increased
the cost of land drastically within the urban perimeter and helped foster
the market behavior of pirate subdividers. The latter responded to the
demand for cheaper land by selling unserviced lots to lower income families
on the urban periphery.
By comparison to the present rate in Bogota, the rate of pirate subdivid-
ing in Medellin is relatively low. The reason for this difference appears
to be because of the limited supply of land remaining in Medellin and the
relatively effective control exercised by the Superintendency of Banks
within the more limited geographical area of Medellin. Nevertheless, it
is argued in this thesis that pirate subdividing continues into the semi-
rural peripheral areas surrounding Medellin. The phenomenon continues, it
is suggested because of the inability of the Superintendency to effectively
police the more distant and less visible "pockets" of pirate subdivisions,
and most importantly, because alternative housing submarkets, from the
viewpoint of the lower income purchaser, cannot compete with the housing
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solution offered by the pirate submarket. It is argued that lower income
purchasers in the pirate submarket understand the common sense proposition
that ownership of a plot of land provides access to an asset which appre-
ciates over time as well as the opportunity to construct a home in incre-
mental stages in conformance with their needs and economic constraints.
It is suggested that the lower income purchaser seeks primarily spatial
flexibility and financial feasibility (i.e., amount and timing of payments)
in his purchase of a lot and that the solutions offered by alternative
housing submarkets in Medellin have violated one or both of these criteria.
Government (I.C.T.) sponsored housing programs in particular have offered
primarily pre-built solutions of limited size and little flexibility for
expansion or alteration at prices requiring high downpayments and monthly
installments. A government-sponsored "lot with services" program in
Medellin theoretically would appear to be able to offer lots at prices
competitive with the unserviced pirate lots, in view of the I.C.T.'s owner-
ship of a large portion of the remaining land supply and its ability to
coordinate with Empresas Publicas. However, zoning restrictions upon
I.C.T. land and the limited supply would likely lead the I.C.T. to decide
against such a program. The proper arena to determine the viability of
the "lots with services" program in competition with the pirate submarket
may be in the other rapidly growing smaller cities in the Department of
Antioquia. It is submitted, however, that in such a large arena it is
unlikely that the I.C.T. could assemble land quickly and efficiently
enough to compete with the many actors (subdividers) in the pirate sub-
market or in lots sizes and prices sufficient to meet the diverse economic
circumstances of lower income families.
It is suggested, therefore, that the "market" solution offered lower
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income families through pirate subdividing could potentially satisfy public
policy concerns, particularly with respect to infrastructure costs, pro-
vided adjustments are made in the legal-institutional framework which
governs the land subdivision process. Moreover, from the perspective of
lower income families, survey data suggests that they not only strongly
desire legitimacy within the existing legal-institutional system but have
sufficient confidence in that system to support modifications intended to
respond to their needs. Less information is available on the views and
potential market behavior of pirate and non-pirate subdividers in response
to legal-institutional modifications intended to encourage and facilitate
their development of "serviced" lower income subdivisions. What data does
exist is from the so-called normas minimas or minimum subdivision stan-
dards programs in Medellfn and in Bogota. Comparatively few developers
have opted to develop subdivisions under these programs whose modified
standards are designed to facilitate the provision of service infrastruc-
ture. Although further research is needed, the limited data from both
cities suggests that the explanation may be found in such factors as limited
developer access to necessary capital, the restrictive effect of zoning
laws on land supply and a slow and therefore costly subdivision approval
process. Data on normas minimas subdivisions in Bogota suggest that deve-
lopersof such subdivisions can nevertheless earn profits that are larger
than those reported by pirate subdividers. The limited case data from
Medellin indicates that the normas minimas subdivider in that city could
also earn a reasonably high profit. However, the Medellin case data also
raises the question of whether the more expensive "serviced" lots offered
in the normas minimas subdivision are presently accessible to only the more
economically stable (higher income) families within the working class.
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Research needs to be done on the socio-economic characteristics of pur-
chasers in normas minimas subdivisions. The lack of such information,
however, should not delay the promotion of normas minimas subdivisions as
a lower income housing solution in the market. Lower income families in
general would be able to afford the more expensive "serviced" lots in such
subdivisions provided they had access to a source of credit which hereto-
fore has been unavailable to them. The remainder of this chapter will
consider briefly a recently established credit mechanism for lower income
families as well as other proposed modifications in the legal-institutional
framework which affects lower income families' access to land and housing.
B. Proposed Modifications in the Legal-Institutional Framework Which
Governs Access to Land and Housing
1. Credit Programs
a. The Central Guarantee Foundation (Fundacio'n Central de Garantfas)
Within the last year a program has been developed at the national
level to respond to two of the previously described factors which have
hindered lower income families in the housing market: limited economic
resources and the requirements imposed by conventional financing institu-
tions for the extension of credit. The program is founded upon the concept
of providing institutional help and support of lower income families who
organize themselves into community associations, which once formed, will be
recognized as legal personalities for the receipt of loans as a community
1/
- The source for the presentation here is a report by the Fundacion
Central de Garantlas entitled "Financiacidn a La Construccion de Vivienda
Por Autogestion Comunitaria: La ayuda Institucional a los Sectores Mar-
ginados," (Mexico: Contribucidn de la Fundacion Central de Garantias y
el Banco Central Hipotecario de Colombia a la Reunion de Expertos sobre
Financiaci6n y Administracion de los Asentamientos Humanos, Noviembre 27 -
Diciembre 1, 1978).
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for the purchase of land and the incremental construction of housing. Once
a community is legally constituted, various organizations such as the
National Apprenticeship Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje -- SENA)
and theColombian Institute for Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de
Bienestar Familiar -- ICBF) will instruct community members concerning
such matters as construction, accounting, bookkeeping and other aspects
necessary to know for the planned self-help effort. During the same period
that community instruction is being carried out, the community will be ad-
vised in its search for a tract of land, the design of the subdivision as
well as houses, and the identification of possible community industries for
the production of necessary materials for construction.
At the point that the above tasks have been accomplished, the
newly created Central Guarantee Foundation (Fundacion Central de Garantias
-- FCG) will step in to represent and guarantee the community before the
National Housing Bank (Banco Central Hipotecaria -- BCH) for the previously
mentioned loans for land purchase and construction which will be granted
by the National Housing Bank to the community as a whole. The Central
Guarantee Foundation's initial equity of $30,000,000 pesos is provided by
the National Housing Bank; the Foundation is authorized to guarantee loans
to communities up to ten times its own capital authorization, in order to
encourage multiplier effects.
The so-called "associative line of credit" between the National
Housing Bank and the community will permit successive loans for the pur-
poses of:
-acquiring land
-subdividing and preparing the land
-acquiring tools and equipment necessary for construction
-manufacturing via labor intensive means, necessary materials
-acquiring other building materials
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-contracting designs, studies and technical assistance
-constructing the actual houses
-paying fees necessary to purchase and register land, obtain
building permits and obtain infrastructure connections
-paying insurance costs: life, fire, etc.
The maximum effective loan per family through this community loan program
will be approximately $180,000 pesos (U.S. $4,500) at the lowest existing
term and interest (15 years at 18% per year or 1.5% monthly). Monthly
loan repayments are to be made collectively. There will be no initial
downpayment. The program also requires the community form a so-called
"Solidarity Fund" (Fondo de Solidaridad) or savings account to which all
families must contribute during the period of housing construction in order
to cover the payments of those families who may experience temporary fin-
ancial difficulties.
As described, the community credit program established through
the National Housing Bank and the Central Guarantee Foundation will provide
a significant structural change in the legal-institutional framework. A
number of pilot programs are planned before the program is formally applied
in Colombia. Some of the principal questions which such a program raises
are the following. First, the pirate submarket described in the preceding
chapters reflects in one respect the high degree of individualism in
Colombia society. The program as structured requires a high degree of
cooperativism. The question, therefore, is whether the necessary degree
of cooperativism can be both created and sustained over the period of time
necessary to learn requisite skills, identify land for purchase, and de-
sign the subdivision -- perhaps 18 months to 2 years. Related to this
issue is the question of community confidence in its leaders. One concern
that exists in such a program is whether family monthly payments made
toward the community's collective payment as well as the actual loan funds
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2/
received, will be misused by community leaders.- Even in the author's
own conversations with residents of the La Cascada subdivision some views
were expressed that designated community leaders had misspent funds col-
lected among the families for various community purposes.
The credit program raises an additional question from the
viewpoint of transaction costs. The program contemplates that the community
association will first organize itself and then with the help and advice of
various institutions perform the tasks of identifying land for purchase,
subdividing it, and contracting out designs, studies and technical assis-
tance. This process means that a large degree of coordination must be
achieved between a collective group of families and a considerable number
of institutions in order to produce the final housing solution. It would
seem that the transaction costs could significantly raise the ultimate price
of that housing solution. The formulation of the program seems to have
ignored the entrepreneurial element observed in the operation of the pirate
submarket which successfully performed the task of land assembly and
sometimes the task of land subdivision. From this perspective, therefore,
the question is whether the community cohesiveness necessary for loan pro-
grams to operate could be achieved at less cost by structuring the credit
mechanism to allow private subdividers to perform the land assembly and
subdivision tasks. Thus, for example, the credit program might permit
families who wish to purchase lots in a normas minimas type subdivision
available in the market to organize themselves into an association which
could apply for the credit necessary to purchase lots from the subdivider.
2/
- Notes of William A. Doebele from interview with Dr. Luis Ricardo
Paredes, former Chief of the Superintendency of Banks (Cambridge, Mass-
achusetts: August, 1978).
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The other collective requirements of the loan program for housing construc-
tion and monthly payments, etc., would be retained. Allowing families
individually or in smaller groups to first identify lots they wished to
purchase, and then to use the existing prepared subdivision as the incentive
for acting collectively to finance and construct their homes would eliminate
the amount of community and institutional involvement in tasks which the
market already performrelatively well. Notwithstanding the questions
raised by the program, it represents a major institutional change which
should be implemented and assessed through the proposed pilot programs.
b. Severance Fund Mortgages
It was observed in the analysis of resources relied upon by
pirate lot purchasers that the severance fund or cesantfas was used by
many to finance both the downpayment and the cost of construction. The
National Housing Bank has proposed a program by which a worker with three
years of continuous employment could mortgage his cesantfas to finance a
3/downpayment or monthly payments.- As applied for example, to monthly
payments, the yearly severance payment would go to the Bank directly rather
than to the individual worker. It would seem that such a program could
potentially constitute a significant source of credit for lower income
families and would have the advantage of using an institutional structure
with which lower income families are very familiar and already rely upon.
2. Legal Instruments Governing Land Transfer
The general objective of reform with regard to the actual purchase
and sale contract should be to improve the lower income purchaser's leverage
in the land transaction with the subdivider by providing him with additional
3/
- Ibid.
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remedies should the subdivider fail to fulfill his obligation to provide a
written purchase and sale contract and promised services. Such remedies
might include permitting the purchaser to stop payments until those obliga-
tions are met.
3. Regulations Governing the Subdivision Business
The institution responsible for regulating the business of land
subdivision is the National Superintendency of Banks. It is important to
note that the National Law No. 66 (1968) which the Superintendency has
applied to control pirate subdivisions originated in response to fraudulent
middle-class housing schemes.- As a consequence, the detailed financial
accounting and subdivision permit requirements are geared to business
operations far more sophisticated and organized than those of subdividers
in the pirate market. Such requirements also apply to subdividers who
wish to develop lower income subdivisions under the normas minimas program.
This uniform application of detailed regulations to a program intended to
provide housing to lower income families is counterproductive since it
only increases the costs of subdividing. Legislation should be introduced
either to eliminate existing reporting requirements fcnormas mInimas sub-
division projects (and allow the Planning Department to supervise the pro-
cess), or to simplify them.
4. The Subdivision Approval Process
Similar to the mismatch observed between the Superintendency's
requirements and the objectives of the normas minimas program, the Municipal
Planning Department's subdivision approval process also appears to conflict
with the purposes of that program. The requirements and delays which
- The most well-known example was that of Casa Club.
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characterize that process increase costs and discourage subdividers from
submitting plans under the program. The Planning Department should con-
sider establishing a separate and more stream-lined approval process for
those subdividers who choose to develop with normas minimas. It appears
that the program could be more successful in Medellin, particularly, if
it were promoted and given the cost benefit of simplified subdivision
approval procedures.
The proposed modifications in the legal-institutional framework
which were sketched above and briefly evaluated, are already familiar to
most planning officials in Medellin and in Bogota. The purpose here has
been to present them against the background of information and analysis
provided on the pirate submarket in Medellin. It is hoped that the data
and analysis presented here on the pirate submarket in Medellin will aid
its planning officials, and Colombians in general, in evaluating those
proposals.
A-l
APPENDIX A
EXTENT OF PIRATE SETTLEMENTS IN MEDELLIN 1975
The following is a list of pirate settlements identified by the Department
of Municipal Planning in its study by Gilma Mosquera and William Hinestrosa,
Diagn6stico General sobre el Problema de la Vivienda en Medellin (Medellin:
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacidn y S.T., 1976) pp. 173-80. This
author's calculations of areaand population for each settlement are derived
from the Anuario Estadistico de Medellfn de 1975. Pirate settlements not
indicated in the Anuario by name as indicated by the Planning Department's
study were not included in the calculations presented in Chapter II, Table 2.
Those settlements excluded from the calculation in most cases represent areas
and populations within official barrios and accurate data estimates for these
sub-areas were not available. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that
the estimates presented in Table 2 of the text conservatively represent the
extent of pirate subdivisions in Medellin. Blanks in columns indicate data
was unavailable.
I. PIRATE SETTLEMENTS STILL IN STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION INTO
THE URBAN SYSTEM OF MEDELLIN
Coiuna / Code Pirate Barrio or Settlement Area Population
(Hect.) 1975
Comuna 1 (Oriental)
Within Urban Perimeter
1107 Villa Guadalupe 25.6 8,155
1201 La Salle (parte alta) 31.8 10,257
1209 Barrios Unidos (Las Granjas)
1103 Andalucia 25.0 5,065
1102 La Francia 34.1 5,685
1303 Versalles No. 1 25.3 7,208
7104 Granizal 17.9 4,012
1209 Las Granjas 42.7 9,654
1207 Las Esmeraldas (sector norte) 21.2 6,705
1302 Las Nieves (parte alta)
1306 Santa Ines (narte alta) 28.3 8,123
Outside Urban Perimeter
7106 San Pablo 24.7 4,998
1302 El Raizal (parte alta) 41.7 10,729
7108 Versalles No. 2 32.5 697
7105 La Esperanza 46.5 1,278
San Jose - La Cima7107 73.7 6,393
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Comuna / Code Pirate Barrio or Settlement HArea Populion
Comuna 2 (Robledo)
Within Urban Perimeter
2205 La Esperanza (parte alta) 40.4
2304 El Diamante 36.4 6,189
2103 Belalcazar 46.5 3,562
2110 Castillita
2207 Kennedy 48.2 15,473
2310 Palenque No. 1 29.4 1,776
2207 Miramar
2206 San Martin de Porres 40.5 7,509
6305 San Francisco
2308 Bello Horizonte (parte) 36.7 1,174
Outside Urban Perimeter
8202 El Picacho
7202 Aures 38.5 1,220
7203 Palenque No. 2 49.2 408
7204 La Pola 20.5 424
7205 El Cucaracho 29.5 484
8205 Pajarito (San Cristobal-Rural)
Comuna 3 (La Candel-
aria)
Within Urban Perimeter
3206 Villa Lilliam (Las Estancias)
3206 Las Estancias 52.9 6,418
3207 El Pinar 41.6 2,959
3305 Avila (La Milagrosa)
3404 La Esmerelda (Asomadera)
3402 Loreto (parte alta)
3302 El Vergel (Miraflores)
3506 San Antonio (Barrio Colon)
3203 Villa Tina 67.8 9,154
3401 El Hormiguero (El Salvador)
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Comuna / Code Pirate Barrio or Settlement Area Population(Hect.) 1975
Outside Urban Perimeter
7301 Los Mangos
7301 Llanaditas 43.1 2,033
Comuna 4 (La America)
Within Urban Perimeter
4307 El Socorro (San Javier No. 2)
4314 Veinte de Julio 46.7 4,855
4303 Lo Soledad (El Coco)
4303 El Coco 26.9 1,637
4306 Juan XXIII (La Pradera)
Outside Urban Perimeter
7401 Blanquizal 60.9 429
8205 La Cuchilla (San Cristobal Rural)
7403 El Salado 52.4 3,081
8402 San Pedro (San Vicente Ferrer-
Rural)
7402 La Quiebra 73.2 697
5205 Las Vegas (Santa Maria de Los
Angeles)
4307 Antonio Narifo (San Javier No. 2)
8401 San Vicente Ferrer (La Loma)
7403 Eduardo Santos (Guadarrama)
(El Salado)
7404 El Corazon 81.8 1,284
Comuna 5 (El Poblado)
Within Urban Perimeter
5207 Loma de Los Parras (Los Naranjos)
5210 Loma de Los Gonzalez (Alejandria)
5207 Loma de Los Garabatos (Los
Naranjos)
5209 Loma de Los Mangos
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Comuna/Code Pirate Barrio or Settlement Area Population
Outside Urban Perimeter
9501 LaChacona (Las Palmas)
Comuna 6 (Belen)
Within Urban Perimeter
6208 Buenavista (Altavista)
7601 Sucre (Zafra)
6207 Las Violetas 60.0 4,623
6305 El Rincon 115.7 6,879
7404 Betania (Careperro) (El Corazon)
6303 San Rafael (La Colina)
Outside Urban Perimeter
7601 Zafra 33.6 1,802
7106 San Pablo 24.7 4,998
8403/04 Aguas Frias
6208 Altavista 34.4 5,996
8605 La Capilla (San Antonio de Prado)
8605 El Manzanillo (San Antonio de Prado)
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II. PIRATE SETTLEMENTS NORMALIZED AND INTEGRATED WITHIN URBAN SYSTEM
OF MEDELLIN
Comuna / Code Pirate Barrio or Settlement Area Population(Hect.) 1975
Comuna 1 (Oriental)
1301/1401
1202
1408
1108
1106
1306
1207
1302
Comuna 2 (Robledo)
2202
2205
Comuna 3
(La Candelaria)
3402
Comuna 4
(La America)
4211
4306
Comuna 6 (Belen)
6104
6210
Campo Valdes
Berlin
Brasilia
La Rosa
Santa Cruz
Santa Ines (sector occidental)
Las Esmeraldas
Las Nieves (sector occidental)
Castilla
La Esperanza (parte baja)
Nacional (Loreto)
Las Mercedes
La Pradera
Apolo (Cristo Rey)
Las Margaritas (Las Playas)
La Gloria
39.7
27.9
32.5
16.3
23.9
28.3
21.2
39,489
10,840
13,633
5,420
8,043
8,123
6,705
54.6
40.4
28,240
21,646
32.5 7,597
72.9
26.8
5,813
8,269
66.9
34.1
14,883
10,083
6205 45.0 4,219
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APPENDIX B
Description of Research Methodology
The data presented in this thesis was obtained by means of document
research in municipal offices, structured interviews of planning and
administrative officials, and the author's written survey of residents
of the pirate subdivision, La Cascada.
A. Document Research and Interviews
The principal sources for the document research were the offices
of the Municipal Planning Department, the Superintendencia Bancaria,
the Instituto de Credito Territorial, Casitas de la Providencia, and
Empresas Publicas (Division de Habilitacion de Barrios). Written inter-
views for the directors and departmental heads of the entities indicated
above, as well as for other present and former municipal officials, were
structured from issues identified prior to beginning the research and
from the information obtained in the document research itself. Follow-up
interviews were also conducted where necessary.
B. The Survey
1. Choice of Subdivision for Survey
The author's objective was to identify and survey a pirate subdivision
of recent origin in order to understand the development process of such a
subdivision. La Cascada was selected for the survey through the aid of a
staff member of the Planning Department who was familiar with the
community efforts of the subdivision to obtain services. La Cascada was
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believed to be the most recent of the relatively few new private
subdivisions that had been identified at the time. The subdivision was
relatively small, consisting of 27 lots with homes already constructed
or in the process of being constructed, and an estimated four additional
lots reported to have been sold. Three-quarters of the lots had been
sold between 1970 and 1975. The small size of La Cascada made it suitable
for the author's one-person survey. The author was introduced to the
residents of the subdivision by the Planning Department staff person and
another community person at a meeting organized to consider sewerage and
water problems. The author explained his purpose to the residents and
received their permission to interview them by means of a written
questionnaire. The author administered the questionnaire to 23 of the
27 households on successive weekends in April and May of 1975.
2. Structure of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of 72 written questions which were asked
in "open-ended" form and required approximately one hour to administer
to a family household head. By necessity, the questionnaire was pretested
among three families in the subdivision itself for internal consistency.
It was found that only small modifications in the wording and ordering
of a few questions were necessary. Follow-up interviews of these three
families were conducted at the end of the survey period. The questionnaire
was structured according to the following general categories:
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Category No. of Questions
1. Family income and employment 10
2. Terms of purchase and resources used to finance purchase 5
3. Housing construction: amount of investment, financial
resources, and future plans 4
4. Prior residence, choice of subdivision and evaluation
of choice 11
5. Residents' knowledge of alternative housing solutions
offered by the government (municipal and national) and
nonprofit organizations 5
6. Residents' relations with subdivider re: documents of
title, services and installment payment policy, and
perceptions of the best way to resolve difficulties with
subdivider as to those issues 11
7. Residents' perceptions of proper public authorities to
whom to complain about subdivider and of the effect
of enforcement of the subdivider's promises 6
8. Perception of lots as means for speculation 2
9. Documents of title received, and perceived legal
significance 5
10. Perceived rights of succession with documents
possessed (in case of death of purchaser) 3
11. Perception of status with regard to the property tax 1
12. Perception of value of registered title 4
13. Perception of rights in case of lot expropriation by
public authorities 2
14. Physical dimensions of lot and time of purchase 3
TOTAL NO. 72
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The majority of the questions concerning residents' views and under-
standings of the legal-administrative system and of the legal significance
of their documents of purchase was taken from the survey instrument used
in the Bogota study of William A. Doebele, Professor of Advanced
Environmental Studies, Harvard University. (See Bibliography, Appendix F).
The questions were used in order to provide a comparative basis for
analysis of the results obtained in Medellin. The results from the survey
were calculated in terms of frequencies of responses for each question
only. The sample size was considered too small to run cross-tabulations
of any useful significance for the analysis presented.
3. Limitations of the Survey
The most obvious limitation in the survey is that the author himself,
a Spanish-speaking but non-native researcher, conducted the interviews.
Under such circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect that lower
income residents' responses to a Northamerican would be less than candid,
and possibly tailored to meet the presumed expectations of a foreign
interviewer. The author sought to minimize this potential limitation by
receiving an introduction to the subdivision community through individuals
who were trusted by the residents. In addition, prior to beginning the
survey, the author spent considerable time with residents in informal
conversations in order to make clear his purpose and to assure the
residents of the confidentiality of the information which would be asked
1/ Permission to use the questions was granted to the author by
Professor Doebele in correspondence dated Oczooer 22, 1974.
of them. Whatever bias may have been introduced by the interviewer's
status is difficult to measure. However, the results which the author
obtained were internally consistent and did show a normal range of
responses among the individual questionnaires administered.
Another limitation of the survey is the sample size of La Cascada
(n=23). Such a small number is normally not considered statistically
large enough to be more than illustrative only. This qualification,
therefore, must attach to that portion of the analysis in the thesis which
is presented using data derived from the survey; however, it should be
noted that the findings of the survey were generally consistent with the
results obtained from the larger, statistically significant survey samples
used in the Medellin and Bogota studies discussed in the text. It is this
author's view, therefore, that within the context of other research on
the same subject, the La Cascada findings have stronger statistical value
and may be regarded more as representative rather than merely illustrative
of the pirate submarket phenomenon.
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APPENDIX C
Example of Promesa de Compraventa
Used in La Cascada
Entre los suscritos, a saber: ( ) de
una Darte, que en adelante se lilanara el Prcni-
tente Vendedor y de otra ( ) que en a-
delante se llanara el Promitente Comnrador to-
dos mavores de edad v vecinos de este kunicirio
se ha celebrado el.Contrato de venta que se de-
:ine "or las siguientes estirulaciones; PRIMERA O-E1 romitente Ven-
dedor se'obli-a a vender a. Proritente Com-nrador y este se oblica a
co-nrar a aiuel. ctorgando v acertando resnectivamente el c6rres-
nondiente instrunento nublico sobre la transferencia del dominio
de una narcela de terreno en la narcelacion " La cascada " de este mu-
nicinio, en la Manzana "II" distinguida con el nunero ( )en
ei plano levantado nor los siguientes linderos: nor el Norte con la par-
cela numero ; nor Oriente con la narcela numero
nor el Sur con la calle en el nrovecto Caciaue Nutibara
v nor el COccidente con la narcela nurnero todas nTroiedad
del -romitente vendedor nrometidas a venta a otras -ersonas.-SESUN-
.A - El -recio de esta venta es la suna de DIEZ Y SIETE MIL PESOS
( $17.000-oo) n/1. colonbiana , que el nromitente Cornrador se oblica
a nacar al Pronitente Vendedor c a su renresentante lecal en esta
Ciudad y en la forma sicuiente: DOS 'IL PESOS (S 2.000-oo) cuota i-
nicial-arras del nesocic en :ue el Promitente Vendedor declara tener re-
cibidos a su entera satisfaccion ce manos del Pronitente Commrador
a su entera satisfaccion en esta fecha el resto Csean ')UINCE MIL
PESOS ($15.000-oc) ml/colombiana en el termino de cuatro (4) a'nos
contados a nartir de la fecha del nresente contrato en adelante,sien-
do oblicacion del Pronitente Conrrador la de abonar una cuota cuota
no menor de CIEN PESOS (S 300-oc) n/1, cada mes hasta la coleta
solucion del rano. De cada. 'nagc exedira el nrmcitente Vendedor un
C-2
- II --
recibo esiecial - dichos recibos seran los unicos que este reconocera
los natos solo se acreditaran con Ia nresentacion de todos v cada
uno de los recibos corresnondientes, sin oue sea aplicable el Art.-
1.628 del Co'digo Civil. Durante los anos senRalados conc nlazo del pre-
sente contratc, no habra interes alguno , salvo la demora en las cuo-
tas en cuyo caso el Promitente Connrador papara un interes de recargo
o nora de DIEZ Y OCHO -or ciento (18%) anual sobre las cuotas atra-
sadas, sin )eriuicio de que el Promitente Vendedor haga uso del de-
recho o derechos de que mas adelante se hablara. Si cunlido el ola-
zo senalado nor la nresente obliracion, el oropmitente Cororador no hu-
biere razado la totalidad del saldo a deber, reconocera y ,aqara al
Promitente Vendedor el mismo interes del diez v ocho oorciento anual
sobre las cantidades cubiertas.-. TERCERA.- La surer-icie de esta
narcela es de ocho metros o sean diez varas de frente nor veintres
varas e sear. diez v ocho metros con cuarenta centinetros de centro
(10 x 23 irual a metros Sy 18,40 a sean 147,2C Trts cdos.) las
varas son de ochenta centimretros C u..Ia ,arcela nrometida en venta
hace narte inteerante de la finca adouirida en mayor extension nor
el Proninente Con:rador nor conrra hecha a la SRa. Judith Acosta vda
de Unezui v a Alfonso Unegui Acosta, confomne a la Escritura oublica
#314 del 10 de Febrero de 1.966 de la Notaria 4a. de Medellin.--
CUARTA- Una ve: oue el nrominente Comorador ternine de nagar la totali-
lidad del -recio estinulado el Prorinente vendedor nrocedera' a obtor-
7arle la corres-ondiente escritura de venta, nero nodra otorgarla an-
tes si el Promitente Comorador hubiera nagado nor lo menos la cuota
inicial v aarantiza con hiroteca sobre el risno lote o narcela el res-
to de la Deuda.-.CTNINTA- La entreca material de la rarcela se hace
desde 2sta risma fecha a titulo de TENENCIA PRECARIA, auncue el Pro-
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mitente Comorador queda autorizado a poner nejoras desde esta misma
fecha. EL PROMINENTE VENDEDOR queda con el derecho a recobrar la nar-
cela, con las mejoras establecidas nor el yromitente Comrrador, si es-
te dejare de pagar tres cuotas (3) mensuales y no tendra que re-
conocer el valor de dichas mejoras, ni devolver lo que hubiere reci-
bidc a cuenta del precio de la narcela, nues dichos valores quedaran
a favor del Promitente VendedoT, nor concento de rerjuicios, comnen-
sacio'n del uso v demerito del inrueble. La referida mora da luar a
lanzamiento de acuerdo con el Art. 1.115 de Codigo Judicial.- SEXTA-
Si la meiora aue establezca el Dronitente Comorador es una casa o
local, debera hacerla con suficientes esteticos y debe cercar la oar-
cela nor todos los lados, a su costa nara imnedir el acceso a ella
de nersonas o animales y a costear la escritura de hinoteca, su
cancelacion v la venta cuando lle-ue el caso. SEPTIMA- El Promitente
Vendedor se comnoronete u'nicamente a hacer el trasnaso del dominio de la
rarcela, rateria de este contrato en la forra v condiciones adquiridas
v se coverorete a hacer dicho trasnaso, dando el innueble libre de censo,
enbarco Judicial Hinoteca, Reuistro Civil -or demanda, nleito nendiente
v condiciones resolutorias. Por tanto, corresnonde al Proritente Comra-
dor llenar los reouisitos aue ridan las autoridades en General.-.OCTAVA-
Este contrato de rronesa de venta ni el que lo lecalice, incluve derecho
sobre anuas de nin7una clase v nor I tanto el Promitente Vendedor
se reserva todo el doinio sobre las aguas que atraviesan o alinde-
ran el inmueble en 7eneral, nudiendo cambiar su curso cuando v como
lo tenza a bien el Promitente Cororador no nodra hacer obras de
cantacio'n en subterraneas de azuas .-NOVENA *- Si el Promitente Com-
-rador raqa la totalidad del nrecio estinulado en el nresente contra-
to dentro del n-rimer ano de su vicencia tendra derecho a una rebaia
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del Die- oor cientc (10%) sobre lcs saldos no vencidos v va nagados.
-DECIMA- El Proritente Conradcr no nodra transferir los derechos v
obligaciones que adouiere nor redio del nresente Contrato sino cuan-
do hava cubierto la totalidad del -recio estinulado o con el consenti-
niento del Proritente Vendedor.-. DECIMA PRIMERA- El Promitente Com-
-rador no -odra torar materiales de construccicn como arena, riedra
etc. sino dentro de los linderos de la -arcela rronetida en venta
en ninvu'n caso del restc de la finca del ronitente Vendedor o de o-
tros comoradores de narcelas, resoondiendo nor los nerJuicios que nue-
de ocasionar en terceros. En caso de incumpliniento de cualesquiera
de las partes, se estirula como clausula nenal una suna igual al
7recio estinulado nor la narcela, Se renite, que cualesquiera dispo-
sicion C) ravamen que inrongan las Autoridades obligan unicamente al
Pronitente Conrador.
Para Constancia se firna el -resente Contrato en orig'inal v conia
-ara el Pronitente Conrador el dia Veintitres (23) de Sentiembre de
mil novecientos setenta v cuatro (1974) ante testiros.
El Promitente Vendedor Cedula # de Medellin
Testigo de Vendedor C6dula # de "edellin
El Promitente Comorador Cedula # de
Testi-o del Coon'rador Cedula # de
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APPENDIX D
Pirate Barrio: Castilla La Vieja
One of the older and perhaps most well-known pirate subdivisions in
Medellin is "Castilla" which was developed by the Cock family on land
purchased in the northwestern part of the city. A brief description
is presented here in order to highlight the barrio's present-day image
among some planners in Medellin as a sort of "model" of some of the
positive aspects of the pirate subdivision process.
Lots were sold in the area of Castilla as early as 1930. However,
not until 1945 did it start to become known as "Castilla." The subdivision
by that date consisted of approximately 30 houses.1 Eventually, 2,241 lots
were subdivided and sold in a tract area of 549,335 square meters. The
lots varied in size, but the predominant size was 128 M2 , subdivided either
as 6.4 mts. by 20 mts. or 4 mts. b 32 mts. The smallest size was 6.4 mts.
by 12.8 mts. or approximately 82 M . The Cock family also sold 256 square
meter lots (twice the size of the 128 M2 lot) but purchasers usually found
the size too large and sold half the lot.
According to the Cock family, approximately 500 albaniles or masons
were among the first to buy lots in Castilla. After constructing houses
and residing in them for a period of 4 or 5 years, the masons purchased
lots further up in the subdivision and sold their original homes to a
somewhat wealthier worker (obrero) group of families. These masons
apparently repeated the process of purchasing, building and eventually
selling, and thus acted as a sort of "vanguard" in developing the barrio.2
The positive aspects seen in the barrio by some Medellin planners
(especially in contrast to such I.C.T. projects as Doce de Octubre),
are that the subdivision is generally well-laid out, (see map) although
lacking open space, and that the residents had the flexibility to expand
their construction to two or three stories and rent the additional space.
The density is high in Castilla (more than 500 persons per hectare)
because of the use of space in this manner and this aspect has been
criticized. However, the scarcity of land remaining in Medellin for
single family housing has led the Department of Municipal Planning recently
to propose multi-family housing through second story additions as a
solution for lower income families. 3 It is likely, therefore, that the
second and third story construction process which occurred in Castilla
will received renewed attention from policy makers seeking to devise ways
to encourage home owners to build additional floors for rental purposes
in order to expand the housing supply.
1Departamento Administrativo de Planeacio'n y S.T., "Estudio Socio
Economico, Barrio Castilla" (Medellin: 1965).
2 Interview with Dr. Augusto Cock Alvear (Medellin, June 12, 1975).
3Mosquera and Hinestrosa op. cit., p. 242.
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APPENDIX E
Medellin Department of Municipal
Planning Steps for Subdivision Approval
(as published by the Department in
El Colombiano, April 9, 1975)
LA NUEVA REGIAMENTACION PARA
TRAMITES EN PLANEACION MUNICIPAL
A. De acuerdo con la nueva reglamentacion para su tramitacion en
Planeaci6n Municipal, debe cumplirse lo siguiente:
1. Presentar la solicitud en papel sellado firmada por el propietario
del lote y radicada en el archivo del Departamento Administrativo de
Planeaci6n y S.T..
2. Escritura pfiblica registrada o copia de ella.
3. Ultima cuenta de impuesto predial cancelada.
4. Certificado de avalio catastral emitido por el Departamento de
Catastro Municipal.
5. Cuatro copias heliograficas que muestren amarre geodssico horizontal
y vertical en escala 1:1.000. Poligonal de amarre en escala 1:5.000 a
1:10.000, seg.n la longitud de la poligonal. Cuadro de Coordenadas.
Hoja de los calculos respectivas que incluya el V.B. previo por parte
del ingeniero de levantamiento planimetricos del Departamento de Proyectos
Viales de Planeacion.
B. V0B0 Provisional de Vias y Loteo
1. Presentar la solicitud en papel sellado radicada en el archivo del
Departamento Administrativo de Planeaci6n y S.T..
2. Cuatro copias heliograficas que contengan: Loteo propuesto en
escala 1:1.000. Cuadro general de areas, asi: area total del lote.
Area 8estinada a vias. Area dedicada a zonas verdes y servicios
comunales para ceder al municipio de Medellin mediante escritura p13blica,
indicando el porcentaje que representa respecto al area total del lote.
Perfil figurado y ejes de vias a proyectarse, previo el V* B* del
Jefe del Departamento de proyectos viales de Planeacion.
Cumplidos estos requisitos, pasara. la solicitud a estudio del
Comite de Proyectos Especificos y su posterior ratificaci6n por parte
de la H. Junta de Planeaci6n y S.T..
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Una vez obtenida dicha aprobacion, el interesado procederE a localizar
nivelar y hacer proyectos definitivos de rasantes, el cual'sers revisado
por el Departamento de Proyectos Viales de Planeaci6n. Esto servirE de
base para proyectar las redes de servicio de aguas lluvias, aguas negras,
acueducto, energia y si fuere posible de tel'fonos, ciB-sdose a las normas
tecnicas exigidas por las Empresas Publicas de Medellin.
C. Aprobaci6n Definitiva de Una Urbanizacion
1. Presentar la solicitud en papel sellado radicada en el archivo del
Departamento Administrativo de Planeaciony S.T..
2. Tres copias helograficas, en escala 1:1.000, debidamente selladas
por Emprecas Pi"blicas de Medellin de cada uno de los planos de redes de:
aguas negras, aguas lluvias, acueducto, energia y, si hubiera sido posible
de telefonos.
3. Una copia maestra y cinco heliograficas del plano aprobado de vias
y loteo, en escala 1:1.000 con reducciones dentro del mismo plano en
escala 1:10.000.
4. Cinco copias heliograficas aprobadas del plano de perfiles y
rasantes.
Asi pasa a estudio del comits de proyectos especificos y luego a
ratificacion por parte de la H. Junta de Planeaci6n y S.T..
Con la aprobaci6n anterior, Planeaci6n elabora la minuta para cesi
6n
de fajas al municipio de Medellin, para lo cual el interesado debe adjuntar
tres copias del plano aprobado de vias y loteo en escala de 1:1.000.
Para obtener el acta de recibo de la urbanizaci6n por parte de este
Departamento Administrativo, el urbanizador deberE presentar:
Actas de recibo de redes por parte de Empresas Pblicas de Medellin.
Actas de recibo de pavimentos, andenes y cordones y zonas verdes por parte
de la Secretaria de Obras Piblicas y D. C.. Escritura Piblica registrada
de la cesi6n de fajas al municipio de Medellin.
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